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Abstract 
Architect of the New South: The Life and Legacy of William Mahone. 
By Heath M. Anderson, 
Bachelor of Arts, Virginia Commonwealth University, 2017 
A thesis submitted in partial requirements for the degree of Master of History at Virginia 
Commonwealth University. 
 
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2019. 
Major Director: Dr. Kathryn Shively, Associate Professor, Department of History, Virginia 
Commonwealth University. 
 
In Virginia following the Civil War, white and black people formed complex and shifting 
alliances based on their own self-interests that cut across the lines of established political parties. 
In this turbulent atmosphere, William Mahone forged a new biracial political coalition called the 
Readjuster Party in order to transform Virginia’s economy so that it would be competitive in the 
years to come. Chapter One argues that Mahone’s experience as a soldier and railroad man gave 
him the political clout needed to enter politics and an industrial vision for Virginia’s future that 
was markedly different from many of his contemporaries. Chapter Two argues that William 
Mahone’s leadership of the Readjuster Party, and its advocacy of universal male suffrage and 
economic reform, created a new political center in Virginia and demonstrates that the actions of 
both white and black people cannot be viewed as a monolith in the postwar era. Chapter Three 
demonstrates how William Mahone’s political career was excluded from white Virginians’ 
narrative of Reconstruction following his death because it provided a historical example of 
African American suffrage and an attempt to establish fair elections that clashed with Virginia’s 
established white supremacist social order. 
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Introduction 
 
Figure 1:  Maj. General William Mahone 1865 (Civil War Photographs, National Archives, 111-
B-2028) 
 
With Virginia’s economy in ruins and its antebellum social order destroyed in the 
aftermath of The Civil War, many white Virginians despaired and clung fast to their old values 
and traditions. However, others accepted their new reality and forged ahead into this period that 
scholars have termed “the New South,” and William Mahone was one of these men. A former 
Confederate general, who had ended the war as a hero among white southerners for his victory in 
the Battle of the Crater, Mahone wasted no time in building a successful railroad business in 
Virginia and organizing the political compromise that returned Virginia to the United States. 
When his business interests collapsed, William Mahone reinvented himself, organizing a third-
party movement known as the Readjuster Party in Virginia. The Readjusters lowered the state’s 
debt, funded public education and hospitals for white and black people, and advocated for 
universal male suffrage. However, there was tension beneath the surface. Mahone’s political 
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actions alienated many of his former comrades in the Confederate army and white Virginians 
generally. Before a statewide election in 1883, white Democrats’ fears over increased black 
participation in politics resulted in the massacre of at least four unarmed black men in Danville 
Virginia. Shortly thereafter, at a polling place, Mahone was struck in the face by a white man 
who was only chased off after a scuffle with Mahone’s own son. In the subsequent election, the 
Readjusters were soundly defeated and Mahone, the former Confederate hero, was labeled by the 
Democrats for the rest of his life as a traitor.1 
My research uses William Mahone’s life as a lens to examine this period of 
Reconstruction in Virginia and its historical memory. I argue that when confronted by the social, 
economic, and political impasse that faced Virginia after the Civil War, William Mahone 
pioneered a new way forward for the state when he embraced a vision of an industrialized 
Virginia and advocated for fair elections and universal male suffrage. His leadership of the 
Readjusters demonstrates that he accepted the Republican Party’s vision for Reconstruction and 
attempted to establish a lasting two-party system of government in the South. The Readjusters’ 
industrial vision, overtures to black people, and defense of their suffrage represented a struggle 
between Mahone’s vision for the New South and the Democrats’ loyalty to the old. Much of the 
Readjusters’ agenda was also popular among poor whites, and Mahone was only defeated 
because of elite Democrats’ aggressive appeals to the white supremacist inclinations of these 
white Virginians. With Mahone defeated by 1889, Democrats initiated the legal process through 
which nearly all of Virginia’s black population, and many of its poor whites, were 
                                                          
1 Joseph T. Glatthaar, General Lee’s Army: From Victory to Collapse, (New York: Free Press, 2008), 
468; “Mahone Confident of Victory,” The Telegraph, Nov 7, 1883, Scrapbooks, Box 216, William 
Mahone Papers, Rubenstein Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Duke University, Durham North 
Carolina. (Hereafter cited as WMP. All Scrapbooks are from the WMP.) 
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disenfranchised by the turn of the twentieth century. With disenfranchisement came the 
exclusion of William Mahone from the history of Reconstruction taught by proponents of the 
Lost Cause and printed in countless school textbooks. William Mahone’s policies might have 
aided black Virginians, but his relationship with them was fundamentally based on his desire to 
secure the black vote by promising them federal patronage and not guided by a genuine desire to 
restructure Virginia’s social order that protected white supremacy. Nevertheless, Mahone’s 
pragmatism cannot obscure the fact that the policies he approved as leader of the Readjusters 
employed black Virginians and funded their education on a level previously unseen in Virginia. 
The result of these actions was the last alternative Virginia had to control by a small number of 
white Democrats and nearly complete disenfranchisement.   
In the fractious political scene in postwar Virginia, where Party allegiance often counted 
for less than economic, ideological, and racial concerns, whether William Mahone was viewed as 
a champion of liberalism and universal suffrage or as a traitor to his native state depended on the 
year and to whom you were talking. Mahone prospered in this turbulent political and economic 
scene in Virginia thanks to his pragmatic personality. His small and frail figure belies his 
immense ambition which he committed to reforming Virginia’s economy through his beloved 
railroads, and later through politics. Prior to the Civil War, after becoming a railroad president at 
the age of just twenty-seven, Mahone felt destined for greater things than his upbringing as a 
tavern-keeper’s son might have suggested. Upon the conclusion of the conflict, which he ended 
in Robert E. Lee’s council, he used his experience during the war combined with his immense 
wealth as a railroad magnate to influence state politics and both Democrat and Republican 
politicians saw him as a potential powerful ally. Mahone recognized the benefit of having allies 
in multiple camps and viewed his pragmatic approach to politics as being in Virginia’s best 
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interests. However, this approach earned him many enemies over time, especially among white 
Democrats, who were much less open to Mahone’s willingness to work with Republicans and 
black people. The Democrats heaped every abuse imaginable upon Mahone over his twenty-five-
year political career until Mahone and the Republicans were defeated in the state. So successful 
was this Democrat propaganda that the positive reception his policies received among black 
people and many whites as well went largely forgotten, as another footnote in the failures of 
Reconstruction. William Mahone worked within Virginia’s postwar political system that was 
based on white supremacy, a racial order that he was a part of, but he believed the future 
prosperity of Virginia required cooperation or at least toleration between white and black people. 
Mahone’s acceptance of universal male suffrage, support of public education, and work with the 
Republican Party makes plain that the actions and motivations of former Confederates and white 
southerners were highly complex between the end of the Civil War and the segregation of the 
twentieth century.2 
Several scholars have informed my interpretation of William Mahone’s life before his 
political career, but they focus on the rivalries Mahone was involved in during the Civil War and 
my work carries these debates over into the Readjuster period. Peter Carmichael provides a 
framework for thinking about the motivations of Mahone’s generation of white Virginians. He 
argues that this generation felt less of an attachment to the antebellum South and wished to 
reform its economy and society. However, Carmichael’s examples do not cover the political 
                                                          
2 Nelson Morehouse Blake, William Mahone of Virginia: Soldier and Political Insurgent (Richmond: 
Garret and Massie, 1935), 1-38. Blake’s biography is the only one on Mahone and the best coverage of 
his early life and railroad career. Just before he turned 18 William Mahone obtained a state scholarship to 
the Virginia military Institute and graduated in 1847. Two years after this William Mahone began his 
career as a railroad man when he worked as civil engineer for the Orange and Alexandria Railroad in 
1849 at the age of twenty-four. He had a steady and successful career in railroading during the 1850s and 
was promoted to President of the Norfolk and Petersburg Railroad Company in April of 1860. 
11 
 
infighting between these men. I argue that William Mahone represented a more radical departure 
from tradition than any member of this generation that Carmichael highlights. Kevin Levin and 
Kenneth Noe argue that Mahone’s alignment with the North and the Republicans insulted the 
antebellum conception of honor of ex-Confederates, such as Lt. Gen. Jubal Early, and 
precipitated the Readjusters’ collapse. My work demonstrates that Mahone the politician was an 
expert at adapting to changing circumstances and attacks against his martial record or allegiance 
to Virginia were not the decisive reason for his political downfall. Mahone prospered under ex-
Confederate governor James Kemper and wielded large political influence in the state much to 
the chagrin of Jubal Early and others. Mahone’s Confederate service contributed to his legacy as 
a “traitor” to the white South only after he had aligned himself with the Republicans and black 
suffrage in the 1880s.3 
William Mahone’s leadership of the Readjusters was the most successful period of 
Reconstruction that took place after the Civil War, but scholarship on Reconstruction by Eric 
Foner and Mark Summers ends Reconstruction in 1877, before the Readjusters came to power, 
making a nuanced understanding of their impact difficult. My thesis fits within recent 
scholarship by Hillary N. Green, Gregory Downs and others who argue that Reconstruction was 
a longer struggle for black rights that encompasses the Readjuster Party. My work combines the 
timelines of these scholars and shows how William Mahone structured the Readjusters to appeal 
                                                          
3 Peter Carmichael, Last Generation: Young Virginians in Peace, War, and Reunion (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2005); Kenneth Noe, “Damned North Carolinians” and “Brave 
Virginians”: The Lane-Mahone Controversy, Honor, and Civil War Memory’, The Journal of Military 
History, vol. 72, no. 4 (October 2008): 1090; Kevin Levin, “William Mahone, the Lost Cause, and Civil 
War History,” The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 113, no. 4 (2005), 378-412. 
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to the Republican Party on economic and racial issues and how his leadership sustained the 
movement after the traditional end of Reconstruction.4  
Multiple scholars have focused on William Mahone and the Readjusters, but their scope 
tends to be limited to one aspect of Mahone’s life, whereas my work synthesizes the scholarship 
on William Mahone into a cohesive whole. Scholars typically present Mahone and the 
Readjusters as a case study within larger arguments, and this limits the analytical possibilities of 
using Mahone and the Readjusters as the frame for a study of Virginia during this period. Third-
Party movements in the South, like the Readjusters, and the opportunities they presented were 
initially analyzed by renowned southern historian C. Vann Woodward in his Origins of the New 
South. The 1970s saw scholars Jack Maddex, Carl N. Degler, and James Tice Moore reinterpret 
the Readjusters in Woodward’s framework by focusing on the accomplishments of the party in 
the realm of universal male suffrage and economic reform, but they were essentially top down 
studies of Mahone and leading Conservative Party figures only. They also neglected to consider 
voting data for the period following the Readjusters’ collapse to gauge the movement’s impact 
and its consequences for Mahone’s later political career as a Republican. Recent scholarship by 
Jane Dailey, Steven Hahn, and William Blair remains quite positive on the effects of the 
Readjusters and Mahone’s leadership, but they use the modern fields of social history and 
memory to emphasize the actions of black people within the Readjuster movement and its 
                                                          
4 Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877 (1988; New York: 
Harperperennial, 2014), 413; Mark Summers, The Ordeal of the Reunion: A New History of 
Reconstruction (Chapel Hill: The university of North Carolina Press, 2014), 170-171; Hillary N. Green, 
Educational Reconstruction: African American Schools in the Urban South, 1865-1890 (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2016); Gregory P. Downs, Declarations of Dependence: The Long 
Reconstruction of Popular Politics in the South, 1861-1908 (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2011); Historiography has taken this approach since the 1990s. See Carl H. Moneyhon 
“The Failure of Southern Republicanism 1867-1876, in The Facts of Reconstruction: Essays in Honor of 
John Hope Franklin eds., Eric Anderson and Alfred A. Moss Jr (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1991), 108. 
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ultimate limitations within the context of a white supremacist society.5 However, their 
approaches also do not present a complete picture of William Mahone’s life. My thesis combines 
elements from these scholars’ study of Mahone and presents a comprehensive overview of his 
life and career, which is essential to understanding the complexities of Virginia’s Reconstruction 
era. Specifically, my work focuses on what factors allowed William Mahone to successfully 
organize the Readjusters and what his interactions with various factions, and their views of him, 
meant for the party and his career. This thesis is organized around Mahone’s story, and it adds to 
the work of past scholarship by showing how he changed over the course of his life to become 
the most radical, and reviled, white political reformer in the state.6 
My research demonstrates how white Virginians crafted a collective memory that 
excluded Mahone’s political legacy because his Republican allegiance and defense of black 
suffrage did not fit neatly into their Lost Cause ideology that venerated Confederate heroes, and 
because the Readjusters represented a historical period of black suffrage that white Democrats 
                                                          
5 C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, 1877-1913 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1951), IX; C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, 2d rev. ed. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1966); Jack Maddex, The Virginia Conservatives 1867-1879: A Study in Reconstruction 
Politics (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1970); Carl N. Degler, The Other South: 
Southern Dissenters in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Harper and Row, 1974); James Tice Moore, 
Two Paths to the New South: The Virginia Debt Controversy, 1870-1883 (Lexington: The University 
Press of Kentucky, 1974),103; Jane Dailey, Before Jim Crow: The Politics of Race in Postemancipation 
Virginia (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Steven Hahn, A Nation Under our 
Feet: Black Political Struggle in the Rural South from Slavery to the Great Migration (Cambridge: 
Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 2003); William Blair, Cities of the Dead: Contesting the 
Memory of the Civil War in the South, 1865-1914 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2004); For another source on the concept of the New South broadly see Edward L. Ayers, The Promise of 
the New South (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
6 For Democratic disenfranchisement strategies Michael Perman, The Struggle For Mastery (Chapel Hill: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 2001); For an additional perspective on black voter suppression 
see Joel Williamson, The Crucible of Race: Black and White Race Relations in the American South Since 
Emancipation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 225-229; For a study on disenfranchisement 
in another southern state see Eric Anderson, Race and Politics in North Carolina 1872-1901: The Black 
Second (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981). 
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could not reconcile with the establishment of Jim Crow laws in Virginia. Scholars such as 
Fitzhugh Brundage, Kirk Savage, and David Goldfield frame my analysis of Mahone’s 
relationship to the Lost cause by arguing that the construction of collective memory by any 
group is dependent upon picking specific people and events to commemorate that fit a narrative 
while excluding more controversial ones. As my work shows, it was William Mahone’s political 
allegiances that made his postwar career incompatible with the Lost Cause. Historian David 
Blight argues that a concept of Reconciliation existed between white Civil War veterans which 
allowed them to accept the results of the war without broaching uncomfortable racial issues. 
However, Mahone’s work as a Republican in the Senate saw a very real battle over the role of 
black people in southern politics, a role the Readjusters were unwilling to budge on. Thus, 
Mahone was perhaps the most prominent southern figure to put the war behind him in his 
political dealings in the 1880s. Mahone was unique in this respect as most prominent ex-
Confederates were uncomfortable with any alliance with the Republican Party on racial or 
economic matters.7 
This thesis is structured as a biographical analysis of William Mahone’s life and legacy 
arranged in three chapters. As such it is based on the personal correspondence of William 
Mahone and his contemporaries. Mahone was the primary organizer of the Readjuster Party, and 
                                                          
7 Fitzhugh Brundage, Where These Memories Grow: History, Memory, and Southern Identity (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 2, 6; See also Fitzhugh Brundage, The Southern Past: A 
Clash of Race and Memory (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005); Kirk Savage 
Standing Soldiers, Kneeling Slaves: Race, War, And Monument in Nineteenth-Century America 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); David Blight, Race and Reunion: The Civil War in 
American Memory (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001); The most recent 
scholarly synthesis on Civil War memory is Caroline Janney’s, Remembering the Civil War: Reunion and 
the Limits of Reconciliation (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016); see also Gaines M. 
Foster, Ghosts of the Confederacy: Defeat, The Lost Cause, and the Emergence of the New South 
1865 to 1913 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). 
 
15 
 
his correspondence demonstrates his relationship with his white and black supporters and what 
each hoped to gain from the other. A consultation of the Official Records of the War of the 
Rebellion demonstrates how Mahone’s career as a soldier was unremarkable until his service at 
the Crater and why officers like Jubal Early were offended by his rapid rise to prominence in the 
war’s last days. Newspapers show that regardless of Mahone’s actions, the dialogue between 
Readjusters, Republicans, and Democrats was the principle reason the Readjusters aroused so 
much animosity and racial backlash in Virginia during the 1880s. Newspapers were intensely 
partisan in the nineteenth century, and both Republican and Democratic newspapers pushed a 
narrative about the Readjuster Party to appeal to their base. My thesis also consults election 
returns from 1880-1889 to analyze how white and black Readjusters voted following the party’s 
defeat and what this meant for Mahone’s leadership of the Virginia Republicans. Additional 
sources consulted include obituaries, early twentieth century scholarship on Mahone, and school 
textbooks which I use to track how William Mahone’s legacy changed over time and was 
excluded from most discussions of Reconstruction in Virginia  
In Chapter One I argue that Mahone’s rise to leader of the Readjusters was made possible 
through a combination of his Confederate war record and his experience as a railroad magnate. 
Mahone’s military legacy was important to his success as a politician, but debates with his 
former comrades about his wartime service were never more important than those over race, and 
Virginia’s financial situation, that defined the Readjuster Party. Chapter One also argues that 
Mahone’s status as a railroad magnate gave him substantial influence in Virginia’s politics 
during the 1870s which he eventually used to assume a leadership role in readjusting the state’s 
debt. In Chapter Two I argue that Mahone’s leadership of the Readjusters represented the most 
successful example of Republican Reconstruction in the South and that this was made possible 
16 
 
due to Mahone’s acceptance of a radically different vision of politics in Virginia than most of his 
white contemporaries. Additionally, I argue that despite the inherent weaknesses of the 
Readjuster coalition, and Mahone’s divisive personality, the movement did not collapse due to 
Mahone’s intra-party fights but was defeated by white supremacist violence and legislation in the 
1880s. Chapter Three argues that William Mahone and the Readjuster Party have been 
selectively remembered by white Virginians because Mahone’s legacy as a Confederate general 
did not fit with his Republican allegiance and promotion of African American suffrage in the 
1880s. Mahone’s leadership of the Readjusters challenged the Lost Cause narrative promoted by 
white southerners by the turn of the century which claimed that Reconstruction had been 
tyrannical toward the white South and that ignorant black men had imposed their will on 
Virginia’s white population. Democrats either ignored Mahone’s political career entirely or used 
it as an example of “negro rule” during Reconstruction and of the dangers of letting the masses 
vote both black and white. Thus, Mahone’s legacy remained as a Confederate military hero 
among southern whites and his political career was rarely discussed.  
A biographical study of Mahone’s life and career is more than just a simple biography of 
the man; it helps bridge the gap between the disconnected historiographies of Reconstruction and 
New South scholarship. William Mahone was a central figure in the ongoing debates over 
political, economic, and racial issues in Virginia after the Civil War. The contours of these issues 
changed depending on who was in power, and people like Mahone who found themselves in one 
party in the 1870s could have very different allegiances in the 1880s. The extended timeline of 
this thesis helps to capture the sense of hope and promise for a more equitable system of 
government in the South that black people and Republicans fought for, but it also demonstrates 
the reality that the politics of white supremacy remained the dominant force in southern politics.  
17 
 
Chapter I: The War and Reconstruction Era Politics 1861-1879 
Mahone viewed secession as the means to transform southern society with an eye toward 
the future, via the elevation of new leaders like himself. Despite the failure of the Confederacy, 
Mahone’s military success convinced him that he should have an active role in shaping 
Virginia’s economic and political landscape postwar. After Appomattox, Mahone left the issues 
of the war behind and turned to railroads and politics to build up Virginia. The influence he 
acquired through these endeavors never sat well with other ex-Confederates, such as Jubal Early, 
who viewed Mahone as having accomplished relatively little during the war. Additionally, the 
squabbling over reputation in the Army of Northern Virginia tempered Mahone for the political 
battles of his postwar career. Educated at the Virginia Military Institute, William Mahone joined 
the Confederate armed forces when Virginia seceded and was commissioned as a brigadier 
general by 1862, but he passed most of the war without distinction. However, his service in 1864 
during the Siege of Petersburg elevated him from a relatively unknown Confederate officer to 
Robert E. Lee's right-hand man, a dramatic rise that Mahone would use to make a decisive 
impact on Virginia politics for the rest of his life.8 
  William Mahone and Jubal Early represented two fundamentally different perspectives 
on what path Virginia should take following the war. Early was a representative of a small but 
vocal minority of white Virginians who resisted any attempts to work with the North in politics 
                                                          
8 Joseph T. Glatthaar, General Lees Army: From Victory to Collapse (New York: Free Press, 2008), 353. 
Mahone played this game as well as any officer in the Army of Northern Virginia. Indeed, Glatthaar 
recounts how Mahone at one point had the Virginia General Assembly petition Jefferson Davis for an 
appointment on his behalf; The only biography of Mahone is Nelson Blake’s, William Mahone of 
Virginia: Soldier and Political Insurgent (Richmond, Va: Garret and Massie, 1935), 13-15. William 
Mahone was born in Southampton County, Virginia in 1826. He was always a rather peculiar looking 
figure. As an adult, he stood about 5 foot 6 and weighed around 100 pounds due to digestive problems. 
His appearance earned him the moniker of “little bantam” among his men, who admired his fiery 
personality. 
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or business while Mahone was open to these possibilities. The two men initially clashed over 
Mahone's portrayal of himself and General Lee in Mahone’s personal memoir, and their 
differences extended into politics as each man fought to influence Virginia's political direction in 
the 1880s. For men like Jubal Early, military disputes were inseparable from politics and his 
harsh attacks against Mahone’s record have somewhat obscured the fact that William Mahone 
was a competent, if unspectacular, general who adequately defended his war record. It was only 
his eventual course as a Readjuster, and eventually a Republican Senator, that allowed Early and 
his other rivals to portray him as one of Virginia’s most odious enemies.9 
  William Mahone's focus on industry and railroads in Virginia, combined with his 
Confederate legacy, allowed him to influence the Conservative Party in Virginia and act as the 
driving force behind the signing of a new state constitution that kept Confederate figures like 
himself in positions of power. Mahone demonstrated substantial political skill during this period 
which he used to great effect as leader of the Readjusters. Constantly falling in and out of favor 
with various elected officials and business partners, Mahone was a master manipulator and knew 
how to adjust his sails to find a new course every time he ran into hardship. Mahone's career as a 
railroad man and Conservative politician showed that he had no desire initially to turn over 
Virginia to the Republican Party or northern economic interests. Despite being portrayed as a 
traitor to his state by many white Virginians due to his Republican allegiance, Mahone never 
viewed his actions as a betrayal of the late Confederacy, but rather as the means to rebuild the 
state with himself in a leading role.  
                                                          
9 For the debates between Mahone and Early following the war see Kevin Levin, “William Mahone, the 
Lost Cause, and Civil War History,” 378-412; on Early see Gary Gallagher, “Jubal A. Early, the Lost 
Cause, and Civil War History: A Persistent Legacy,” in The Myth of the Lost Cause and Civil War 
History, eds. Gary Gallagher and Alan Nolan (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), 40. 
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From Relative Unknown to the “Hero of the Crater:” William Mahone from Secession to 
Defeat 1861-1865. 
Mahone’s postwar antagonists like Jubal Early and David Weisiger repeatedly called him 
a coward and questioned his war record, but there is no contemporary evidence to support these 
claims. Prior to his success in 1864, Mahone had failed to distinguish himself as an officer, but 
he had participated in several battles and was wounded. Mahone and his brigade took an active 
part in the Seven Days Battles around Richmond, where he led his men at the battle of Malvern 
Hill in “five separate and distinct charges” against the Union forces.10 His next engagement 
occurred at the battle of Second Manassas where he was wounded in the chest, which Lt. Gen. 
James Longstreet described as a “severe wound,” in his praise of Mahone.11 None of these 
accomplishments gained him special distinction, and Mahone was likely concerned that his 
military service in the first few years of the war was of little note compared to other officers. 
After the war, Mahone regularly referenced his close relationship with Robert E. Lee to 
bolster his political clout, but this close relationship did not begin until the Petersburg Campaign 
of 1864. To demonstrate this dramatic change, it is only necessary to look at Mahone's 
assignment by Lee to the river defenses at Drewry’s Bluff where he was ordered to share 
command, something Mahone actively resented. Lee's orders had directed Mahone to 
“harmonize these several operations,” of the river’s defenses. This prompted Mahone to write the 
                                                          
10 U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union 
and Confederate Armies, 128 vols. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1880-1901), ser. I, vol. 2, pt. 2:826 
(hereafter cited as OR; all references are to volumes in series I). These Confederate attacks were repulsed 
with staggering losses by Union artillery and gunboats in the water. Following the battle, the commander 
of the entire Confederate assault, Maj. Gen. “Prince” John Macgruder wrote that “I cannot speak too 
highly of the officers and men of the three brigades attacking in front,” which included Mahone’s brigade. 
11 OR, vol.7, pt. 2:883-898; Blake, William Mahone of Virginia, 45. From this wounding came easily the 
most well-known anecdote concerning Mahone. Upon learning of his wounding which Virginia Governor 
Letcher described to Mahone’s wife as a “flesh wound” his wife exclaimed, “It can’t be a flesh wound; 
the General hasn’t any flesh!” 
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Secretary of War, explaining that, “I cannot be responsible in any copartnership authority, [and 
that] engineers should be directed to report to me and made subject to my directions.”12  Perhaps 
fed up with not being able to take the initiative Mahone attacked at the Seven Days Battles 
“without awaiting a definite order,” and then, “withdrew his brigade without any orders,” 
according to Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill. Hill’s forces held against the federal assault, but he was not 
pleased with Mahone’s apparently less than adequate support. That evening Mahone decided to 
stop pursuing federal soldiers to perform further reconnaissance which drew the ire of Maj. Gen. 
Benjamin Huger, his superior. Huger criticized Mahone’s actions saying, “I was much 
disappointed that General Mahone had not caused the retreat during the night.” Mahone had 
clearly seen battle, but his brashness and eccentric character had irritated some of his superiors, 
and he remained a relative unknown to Robert E. Lee.13 
Despite this record, Mahone, and later his biographer, asserted that after Lt. Gen. 
Stonewall Jackson’s wounding at Chancellorsville, Mahone occupied Jackson’s former place as 
Lee’s favorite general, citing a poem from 1892 as evidence.14 Mahone’s biographer likely used  
this comparison to Jackson to help explain Mahone’s prominent place by Lee’s side during the 
final months of the war, but there is no wartime evidence that Mahone ever occupied Jackson’s 
                                                          
12 OR, vol. 2, pt. 3:518, 545.  
13 OR, vol. 2, pt. 2:788-798; Douglas S. Freeman, Lee’s Lieutenants: A Study in Command, abrid., 
Stephen W. Sears (1942; repr., New York: Simon and Schuster Inc, 1998), 137. (Hereafter cited as Lee’s 
Lieutenants); The emaciated figure of William Mahone only added to the eccentric appearance and 
lifestyle he led in the army. His health concerns caused him to require a traveling livestock pen from 
which to prepare special meals for himself. A good description on Mahone’s appearance and attire is 
Moxley, Sorrel, Recollections of a Confederate Staff Officer (1905; repr., Dayton Ohio: Morningside 
Bookshop, 1978), 277-278. Sorrel remarked that “His appearance arrested attention. Very small both in 
height and frame, he seemed a mere atom with little flesh…Sallow of feature, sharp of eye, was the 
General; in dress quite unconventional, he affected jackets rather than coats…topped off by a large 
Panama straw hat of the finest and most beautiful texture.” Sorrel also described Mahone’s luxurious 
eating requirements: “A cow was always by his quarters and laying hens cackled loud, besides many 
luxuries. Delicate in physique, he had to nourish himself carefully.”  
14 Blake, William Mahone of Virginia, 46. 
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exalted status, and if Mahone was the new Stonewall Jackson then it is surprising that he was not 
a central part of any of Lee’s plans during the Army of Northern Virginia’s next major 
engagement at Gettysburg. Mahone was initially responsible for exaggerating his relationship 
with Lee and Jackson following the war, an intolerable exaggeration for Confederates like Early, 
whose postwar smears of Mahone ended up in early twentieth-century scholarship. Douglas 
Freeman wrote in his personal papers that Mahone's actions at Gettysburg led to a “suspicion [in 
the army] that he [Mahone] sometimes kept them [his men] out of the fighting.”  While some of 
Mahone’s chief antagonists, like Early and David Weisiger, made this assertion, there is limited 
wartime evidence to support this view. Due to the bitter antagonisms Mahone’s postwar business 
and political career fostered, it is most likely that the poem was written by Mahone’s defenders 
and Freeman’s comments colored by anti-Mahone propaganda.15 
The Spotsylvania campaign in May 1864 saw Mahone go on the offensive to take credit 
for himself and his men. Douglas Freeman called Mahone’s ascendancy during this period “as 
strange a rise to fame as the army witnesses in 1864,” and this increase in responsibility provided 
Mahone with opportunities to assert his central role in Lee’s army. At Spotsylvania Mahone’s 
old twelfth Virginia regiment under Brig. Gen. David Weisiger advanced towards a breach in the 
Confederate’s defensive line known as the “Mule Shoe.” Arriving on the scene they reinforced 
Brig. Gen. James Lane of North Carolina. At this point, William Mahone arrived at the front 
lines to check on Weisiger’s men and he believed Lane’s North Carolinians were abandoning 
                                                          
15 OR, vol. 27, pt. 2:621; Blake, William Mahone of Virginia, 44. Douglas Freeman was arguably the 
preeminent scholar on the Confederacy in the early to mid-twentieth century. While he had a strong bias 
toward the Lost Cause mythology he was raised in, his portrayals of Confederate figures are thorough, 
and they give a comprehensive analysis of their military careers. It should be noted that Freeman never 
criticized Mahone’s military actions in his principal works on the Confederate army, likely because 
Mahone was of little importance to the Army of Northern Virginia prior to 1864. The harshest criticism of 
Mahone's military record came from David Weisiger and Jubal Early, with Early’s criticism likely 
entirely based around postwar exchanges with Mahone. 
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them, and he shouted that “the damned North Carolinians were deserting his brave Virginians.” 
Additionally, Mahone claimed that it had been his men who captured the Union flags and not 
Lane’s, arousing immense hatred from Lane and the men from North Carolina. He angrily 
complained about Lane’s alleged incompetence at the Mule Shoe and went after Lane’s 
immediate superior, Maj. Gen. Cadmus Wilcox. This debate with Mahone engendered a lasting 
hatred on the part of James Lane, but he would only be able to fully voice it after Mahone’s 
political support among white Virginians collapsed in the 1880s. Mahone’s fame during the 
upcoming Petersburg campaign shielded him from all earlier critiques of his record.16 
After Spotsylvania, Mahone established himself as the preeminent Confederate 
commander left at Lee’s disposal. This was in large part because Lee had almost no reliable 
commanders left to turn to by this point, and Mahone actively criticized his fellow commanders 
for any perceived shortcomings.17 Once again General Wilcox was his target. On June 22 a 
combined assault from Mahone and Wilcox’s men was a success, but Mahone was quick to 
criticize Wilcox for not attacking at the proper moment and perhaps this influenced Lee’s official 
report which offered praise only for Mahone. In the years following the war, Mahone changed 
his story of the assault several times to heap more blame on Wilcox. Three years before his 
death, in 1892, a politically defeated and likely bitter Mahone remarked to a Union veteran that 
                                                          
16 Freeman, Lee’s Lieutenants, 48. Douglas Freeman also referred to Mahone’s men as the “most 
renowned shock troops in the army [of Northern Virginia].” This image was essentially based around his 
men’s participation in the Battle of the Crater; Kenneth Noe, “Damned North Carolinians” and “Brave 
Virginians”: The Lane-Mahone Controversy, Honor, and Civil War Memory’, The Journal of Military 
History, vol. 72, no. 4 (October 2008): 1090-1094; Also see Gordon C. Rhea, The Battles for 
Spotsylvania Court House and the Road to Yellow Tavern: May 7-12, 1864. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 2005.), 78-81, 113. 
17 For an analysis of the attrition among Lee’s commanders at the start of this campaign see Gary 
Gallagher, “I Have to Make the Best of What I Have: Robert E. Lee at Spotsylvania,” in The Spotsylvania 
Campaign, ed. Gary Gallagher (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 5-29; For 
additional comments on Mahone’s rise to prominence see Lee’s Lieutenants: A Study in Command, 735-
737. 
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when Wilcox asked him where on the field, he should deploy his men Mahone told him to “to go 
to hell.” For his part, Wilcox maintained that it had been impossible for his men to be where 
Mahone said they should have been, and he insisted Mahone did not initiate the attack at all. 
Regardless, of the truth of Mahone’s claims, he had won a great victory and taken all the credit 
for himself.18 
The culmination of Mahone’s growing military record came on the early morning hours 
of July 30 in what became known as The Battle of the Crater. The Union Army blew up a section 
of the Confederate line with dynamite to break the ongoing siege warfare around the city of 
Petersburg. The mine destroyed one Confederate strongpoint at Rives Salient, killing over three-
hundred Confederate soldiers and creating a Crater 126 feet long, 87 feet wide, (at the surface) 
and 25 feet deep. Thousands of Union soldiers flooded into the gaping breach in the Confederate 
line, however, the initial Union brigades that assaulted the breach milled about in confusion 
inside of the Crater itself and did not seize key high ground behind the Confederate lines. 
Mahone’s division was further down the line and orders were dispatched for them to hasten to 
the breach.19 
Mahone’s counterattack, just miles outside of Petersburg, established him as a 
Confederate hero late in the war, finally giving him the laurels, he craved. However, the 
execution of United States Colored Troops who surrendered to Mahone’s men stands out in 
horrific contrast to Mahone's later political career as the leader of the biracial Readjuster 
                                                          
18 OR, vol. 40, pt. 1:750; For an analysis of Mahone and Wilcox’s dispute at Petersburg see A. Wilson 
Greene, A Campaign of Giants: The Battle for Petersburg (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2018), 238-249. 
19 For Mahone’s actions around Petersburg see OR, vol. 40, pt. 1:752; Wilson Green, A Campaign of 
Giants: The Battle for Petersburg. Vol. I. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2018), 298; 
Greene, A Campaign of Giants, 436. 
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coalition. The heightened violence of the Petersburg campaign was racially motivated and a 
somewhat regular occurrence and there is no evidence Mahone nor any other Confederate officer 
took any measures to prevent this butchery. Previously, Confederate soldiers had murdered 
fleeing black refugees as they chased Union forces following the first battle of Rheams’ Station, 
of which Mahone’s command took part, and the Crater would be the brutal culmination of this 
violence. This was the first major assault carried out by Lee’s men against the USCT and one of 
Mahone’s men opined that if the black soldiers were not repulsed “life would not be worth 
living.”20 
 Mahone’s instructions to his men before the assault captured the fear and anger that 
gripped Confederates when they encountered black soldiers. According to several veterans, he 
stated the case to his men thusly, “Men, you have got something to do to-day that you have never 
done before…you have got to fight negroes. Die before you give an inch.” The Petersburg 
campaign had already seen racially motivated executions, and both sides expected no quarter in 
the fierce struggle in and around the Crater. As the USCT advanced, audible cries of “No 
quarter!” and “Remember Fort Pillow!” were heard from their ranks. When initial assaults were 
unsuccessful, Mahone again reminded his men that “the black troops had cried no quarter,” and 
he personally led the final assault that won the day for the Confederates. Upon breaking Union 
resistance in the Crater, the Confederates executed black soldiers they saw until they were “worn 
out with exhaustion.” After an indeterminate amount of time, numerous accounts testified that, 
                                                          
20 Blake, William Mahone of Virginia, 58; Greene, A Campaign of Giants, 475, 301. Greene recounts how 
black refugees were executed following the First Battle of Rheams’ Station about a month earlier with 
one of Mahone’s men commenting that upon the site of black people “our men became enraged, and it 
was difficult to restrain them.”; For an analysis of how race contributed to the growing violence of the 
Civil War in general see Aaron Sheehan-Dean, The Calculus of Violence: How Americans Fought the 
Civil War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018), 272-273, 462; For an analysis of the executions 
of black POWS see Kevin Levin, Remembering the Battle of the Crater: War as Murder (Lexington: 
University Press of Kentucky, 2012.) 
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for reasons that are not entirely clear, Mahone himself ordered the killing to stop. One soldier 
reported that “General Mahone got sick of the slaughter going on and begged his men to stop 
killing them.” This account is borne out in numerous primary accounts, with Union officer 
Colonel Sharpe reporting that “many of the blacks had been killed after surrender; that their 
slaughter was stopped by General Mahone.” The primary accounts do not specify how many 
USCT men were killed after surrender or exactly when Mahone came on the scene. It is likely he 
was simply concerned over having temporarily lost control of his command, but in primary 
sources, he is portrayed as “mercifully” bringing an end to the killing for the day, as the 
Confederates recaptured the Crater and sent the surviving Union prisoners to the rear.21  
Whatever Mahone's personal feelings about the black soldiers he fought he could not risk 
any perception that he did not have control over his men following the battle. He had recently 
stopped his men from lynching a black camp slave and likely viewed his halting of the post-
battle executions in a similar vein. The victory at the Crater would be known Mahone’s grandest 
achievement in the eyes of his men and white southerners, and Mahone realized he had to 
present himself as the man of the hour in total control. However, he was not immune to criticism. 
The local press harshly criticized Mahone's sparing of even a single black soldier writing, “We 
regret to learn that some negroes were captured instead of shot…go forward until every negro is 
                                                          
21 Accounts of the battle from Mahone’s veterans can be found in William H. Stewart, Description of the 
Battle of the Crater. Recollections of the Recapture of the Lines (Norfolk: Landmark Book and Job 
Office, 1876), 41-42, 65-66. As Stewart’s book shows, Mahone and his brigade commanders made sure 
to tell their men that the black soldiers would give no quarter and to recapture the Crater by any means 
necessary and the bloodlust of the men took care of the rest. As one soldier described: “The orders of 
Major General Mahone were obeyed to the very letter, the brink of the ditch was gained before a musket 
was discharged, the cry ‘No quarter!’ greeted us, the one volley responded, and the bayonet plied with 
such irresistible vigor as insured success in the shortest space of time. Men fell dead in heaps, and human 
gore ran in streams that made the very earth mire beneath the tread of the victorious soldiers.”; For a 
detailed account of the entire battle see Greene, A Campaign of Giants, 461, 477, 480, 498, 502; OR, vol. 
42, pt. 2:32. Fort Pillow was a battle on April 12, 1864 in Tennessee. Following the Confederate victory, 
numerous black soldiers were executed under the orders of Confederate General Nathan Bedford Forest.  
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slaughtered.” That his prevention of every black soldier from being executed could be criticized 
by the local press foreshadowed the future problems Mahone’s biracial political movement 
would face.22 
Mahone’s reputation as “the Hero of the Crater” following the battle demonstrated not 
only his genuine military success, but also how he had maneuvered himself from a relatively 
unknown officer to a leading figure in the army through both action and words. However, this 
rise was not without controversy. Brig. Gen. David Weisiger challenged Mahone’s account of 
the Crater fight in which Mahone took sole credit for ordering the charge. Weisiger had been 
wounded in the assault and bitterly asserted that he had ordered the Confederate counterattack 
and not Mahone. Veterans from the attack nearly all stated that Mahone was front and center in 
planning the attack, with one writing that “I heard General Mahone’s voice, ‘Charge, Boys.’ He 
was not over thirty feet from me.” While Mahone ventured into the fray himself, it is apparent 
that Weisiger’s bitter critiques alerted Mahone to the need to protect his reputation in his 
preeminent action of the war. Additionally, as the Confederates retreated from Petersburg several 
months later Mahone again criticized James Lane’s actions in defense of one of the last 
Confederate forts around Petersburg. While the details of the incident could be interpreted in 
favor of either general, much like at Spotsylvania, Mahone’s criticism of his fellow officers 
discredited their importance and emphasized his own leadership. As a result, Mahone emerged 
                                                          
22 Ervin Jordan, Black Confederates and Afro Yankees in Civil War Virginia (Charlottesville: The 
University Press of Virginia, 1999), 277. The black camp slave was named Ben. Ben had struck and 
killed a Confederate soldier who was attempting to steal the extra rations that Ben was guarding. 
Apparently “only the intervention of William Mahone prevented Ben from being lynched by the dead 
soldier’s comrades.” 
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from the Petersburg campaign as a well-known Confederate hero, while the officers he criticized 
did not.23 
After Mahone’s successful counterattack at the Crater, Robert E. Lee promoted him to 
Major General and relied on him for the remainder of the war, a fact that was likely not forgotten 
by Mahone’s fellow officers both during and after the war ended. Lee’s reports frequently 
mentioned Mahone’s activities in this period in short, effusive praise. “[Mahone] penetrated the 
enemy’s picket-line last night near Petersburg and drove it for half a mile,” reported Lee on 
October 31. During the Battle of Sailor’s Creek, where a large part of the remaining Confederate 
forces was captured before Appomattox, Mahone came to Lee's aid. Responding to Lee's query 
“has the army been dissolved?” William Mahone replied, “No general, here are troops ready to 
do their duty.” Mahone was part of a final council of war with Generals Lee and Longstreet 
about whether to surrender to Union forces. His growing role by General Lee’s side from the 
Petersburg campaign to Appomattox likely caused lingering jealousies among many of 
Mahone’s former Confederate comrades in the postwar era. Perhaps the most notable in relation 
to Lee was Jubal Early. As Lee’s chief defender, Early bitterly opposed Mahone’s recollections 
about the war, and later, his politics. It could not have escaped Early’s notice that while Mahone 
was promoted after Petersburg, and ever in Lee’s council, Early himself had returned almost 
                                                          
23 William, Stewart, Description of the Battle of the Crater, 55-56; OR, vol. 40, pt. 1:795; For additional 
detail regarding the controversy over who ordered the Confederate charge at the Crater see Greene, A 
Campaign of Giants, 481. It is probable that both Weisiger and Mahone reacted to the sight of Union 
soldiers in the Crater with orders to advance, though most of Mahone’s veterans in 1876 give General 
Mahone credit. Weisiger always insisted that he had launched the first charge, and some subsequent 
historians have taken this view. For an interpretation in favor of Weisiger’s account see Douglas S. 
Freeman, Lee, abrid., Richard B. Harwell (1934; repr., New York: Simon and Schuster Inc, 1997), 432. 
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alone to Petersburg after being defeated in the Shenandoah Valley and was relieved of command 
by Lee.24 
William Mahone’s Conception of the Lost Cause 
Considering his close relationship with Lee during the closing stages of the Civil War, 
and Lee’s growing mythology in the postwar years among white southerners, Mahone’s decision 
to approve a biographical sketch of himself in 1870 that criticized Lee and promoted his own 
greatness was a serious miscalculation for the “Hero of the Crater.”25 Prior to his memoir 
Mahone had organized several reunions of his old brigade in the 1870s and gave his likeness and 
signature to people seeking to commemorate the Confederate war effort. Mahone likely viewed 
an exaggerated memoir as another way to build his claim to glory in the late war. However, 
Mahone's memoir, published in 1870 by New Yorker John Watts De Peyster and Mahone's 
secretary, S. Bassett French, went too far. It stated that Mahone had been a superior general to 
both Stonewall Jackson and Robert E. Lee and criticized living Confederate generals including 
Jubal Early, Cadmus Wilcox, and James Lane. This extravagant praise of Mahone’s martial 
prowess is typical for the entire memoir: “no man between the oceans, the gulf, and the lakes is a 
finer illustration of the innate military capacity and adaptability of the American people than the 
subject of this sketch—William Mahone.” While Mahone was little concerned with the legacies 
of Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson, he would soon learn that Jubal Early was. Early 
                                                          
24 OR, vol. 42, pt. 2:32; Freeman, Lee, 475. 
25 Kevin Levin, “William Mahone, the Lost Cause, and Civil War History,” The Virginia Magazine of 
History and Biography 113, no. 4 (2005), 391-391. Kevin Levin’s work is the primary analysis of the 
controversy between Mahone and Jubal Early. Levin noted how Mahone approved of the memoir to raise 
money for railroads and promote Reconciliation with the North, but that he miscalculated by provoking 
Early and comparing himself to Lee and Jackson which “violated the tenets of Lost Cause ideology.” 
Levin argues that despite Mahone’s personal success in politics and the railroads, the Lost Cause ideology 
that was being defined by Jubal Early held powerful sway over white southerners and it was incumbent 
upon Mahone to respect its emerging tenets, especially with respect for Robert E. Lee.  
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challenged Mahone, initiating a rivalry based around two different conceptions of the Lost Cause 
in Virginia in the postwar era.26   
Mahone’s disagreements with Early and other former Confederate generals, were based 
on the antebellum South's common concept of honor. In short, southern honor reinforced the 
loyalty to the antebellum South’s strict social and racial hierarchy. In this hierarchy, a man’s 
social standing was dependent on his loyalty to the community and his neighbors’ perceptions of 
him. Therefore, Mahone’s public criticisms of Jubal Early and other officers following the war 
were a deep affront to the manhood and social status of these men and had to be answered 
vociferously. That the concept of honor was vitally important in Virginia, despite men like 
Mahone who cared little for it, was apparent in his later political career. A decade after his initial 
exchange with Early over his personal memoir, Mahone’s willingness to consider a drastic 
reduction or even a complete repudiation of the state's wartime debt and his advocacy for fair 
elections again challenged the honor of Virginia in the eyes of traditional Conservatives. Thus, 
the dispute with Jubal Early over Mahone’s memoir was the first incident in what would be a 
long career of Mahone upsetting the social controls of honor and white supremacy inherent in 
southern society.27  
Jubal Early was more concerned with the honor of the old South and of the Confederacy 
than perhaps any other Confederate veteran, and he positioned himself as the arbiter of what 
could and could not be said by Confederate veterans about the war through his own voluminous 
                                                          
26 J. Watts De Peyster, “A Military Memoir of William Mahone, Major-General in the Confederate 
Army,” Historical Magazine (June 1870). 
27 My discussion of southern honor in this thesis is based on the work of Bertram Wyatt-Brown’s Honor 
and Violence in the Old South (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986); For the specific contours of the 
debate between Mahone and Confederate veterans besides Early see Noe, “Damned North Carolinians” 
and “Brave Virginians,” 1089-1115. 
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writings in the Southern Historical Society Papers, which contained endless debate over wartime 
issues.28 William Mahone’s self-aggrandizing memoir, with its snub of Early, Lee, and Stonewall 
Jackson, was a direct challenge to Early’s own military record and the Lost Cause ideology that 
he had created. This ideology was based around a few basic principles designed to vindicate the 
wartime actions of Confederate heroes. Early argued the two most well-known positions: Robert 
E. Lee was a legendary general beyond reproach, and the Confederacy’s war effort was doomed 
to failure in the face of overwhelming odds. In the spring of 1871, Early read Mahone’s memoir 
and bristled at its deification of Mahone. He then wrote to Mahone about the memoir’s assertion 
that Mahone did not like to fight under Early because he had “a disputatious order of 
mind…delay was the consequence at times, when the battle might be fought and won.” When 
Mahone received Jubal Early’s caustic letters, he realized he had neither the ability nor the time 
to win a war of words with the ornery general and admitted to De Peyster that he was “greatly to 
blame in the first place for not giving the matter attention [or this] could have been avoided.” 
Mahone replied to Early that he had not read the memoir closely and meant no offense, but Early 
was far from satisfied and replied, calling Mahone a fraud and a coward who outright lied about 
his prominence in numerous engagements. “No man can now doubt your propensity for blowing 
your own horn, with the accompaniment of some very small whistles,” wrote Early.29  
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29 William Mahone to John Watts De Peyster, Aug 13, 1871, vol 18, WMP; De Peyster, “A Military 
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Figure 2: Maj. Gen. Jubal Anderson Early 1860 (Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs 
Division, reproduction number LC-DIG-ds-01484) 
 
 Mahone’s memoir represented that despite Early’s prominence in the formation of its 
major tenets, the Lost Cause was not any one set of ideas in the postwar years. For William 
Mahone, the value of the war’s legacy was that it could bolster his credibility as a businessman 
among white Virginians. Mahone was focused on expanding Virginia’s economy through his 
railroads and likely authorized the memoir as a means of simple self-promotion. However, what 
men wrote about the war was everything to hardliners like Jubal Early, who also disagreed with 
economic cooperation with the United States. Mahone’s industrial plans were supported by many 
white Virginians, but Mahone realized he would have to be more careful in how he promoted his 
military career. Generals like Lee and Jackson were sanctified in the Confederate pantheon by 
Jubal Early, and Mahone’s spat with Early alerted him to this. Thus, while Early’s writing 
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shaped white Virginians’ views about their Confederate heroes, Mahone’s success in business 
spoke to the popularity of industrialization among white Virginians, reforms that Jubal Early 
shunned.30 Mahone edited his memoir to comply with Early’s criticisms and turned his full 
attention toward his railroad and political pursuits in the 1870s. He assured Early that “you may 
see that it was never my intention to do you and other Confederate officers the injustice which 
appears in the article.” When Mahone next wrote about the war, he would focus on his 
relationship with Robert E. Lee to argue that he pursued a postwar career that would have met 
with Lee’s approval.31 
Republication of the revised memoir defended Mahone from Early’s wrath by removing 
the offending passages, but there was one aspect of his military career he refused to compromise 
on after the war, his role at the Battle of the Crater. When General Cadmus Wilcox and others 
asserted that Mahone had been too slow in response to the detonation of the Union mine at 
Petersburg, Mahone responded in several newspapers where he claimed, “no order had been 
given to hold my division in readiness to move at a moment’s notice.” He argued that he had 
responded as quickly as possible under the circumstances and published numerous letters from 
veterans that supported his position. One such veteran, W. Gordon McCabe, reaffirmed that 
Mahone deserved full credit for the counterattack at the Crater and that this “was never a 
question in the army.” Mahone also stated he was Lee’s most reliable subordinate at the Crater, a 
strategy that would defend him from attacks from Jubal Early and one he employed more 
frequently as he became involved in politics. The letter from McCabe also served this purpose 
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because he was with Lee during Mahone’s counterattack and reported that, upon learning of 
Mahone’s men leading the charge, Lee expressed satisfaction and said, “I thought so.” Examples 
of Lee's trust and praise of Mahone's service at the Crater, combined with the revised memoir, 
ensured that Mahone's reputation as a Confederate general would be safe from further criticism 
for the remainder of the decade.32 
The exchange with Early was embarrassing for Mahone, but it did not sink his reputation 
among white Virginians and Confederate veterans. Mahone’s correspondence after the 
republication of his memoir demonstrated that he had successfully defended his reputation as the 
Hero of the Crater. In the years following his debate with Early, Mahone received numerous 
letters referencing his service, with the Virginia legislature offering to have a special vote to 
honor the service of “your gallant brigade.”33 In the 1870s, Mahone used his military legacy to 
his advantage, with several reunions with the Crater veterans that complemented his railroad and 
political scheming, but he only returned to discussing his role in the war when he was forced to 
reinvent himself as leader of the Readjusters in 1879. This reinvention under the banner of a new 
political party awakened the vitriol of many ex-Confederates he had sparred with in the past, all 
                                                          
32 William Mahone, “Reply to a Communication Published by General. C.M. Wilcox,” New Orleans 
Times, Jan 1, 1872, folder 3, box 1, Mahone Family Papers, Library of Virginia, Richmond Virginia. 
(Hereafter cited as LV); J. Watts De Peyster, “A Military Memoir of William Mahone, A Major General 
in the Confederate Army,” New York Historical Magazine, July 1871, p.  26. Mahone’s revised memoir 
stated that from the Petersburg campaign to the war’s end Lee accepted Mahone’s advice about troop 
deployments and that he “never failed to express his appreciation of Mahone.” 
33 (?) to William Mahone, April 13, 17, 1875, Box 11, Papers of the Mahone-McGill Families, Albert and 
Shirley Small Special Collections Library at The University of Virginia, Charlottesville Va. (Hereafter 
cited as UVA); S. Basset French to William Mahone, May 17, 1875, Box 11, UVA. Mahone's dear friend 
and author of the troublesome memoir, S. Bassett French said that “I almost felt like crying,” upon 
hearing Mahone speak at one such event; James Lawson Kemper to William Mahone, June 7, 1875, Box 
12, UVA. Like many other friends and associates of Mahone, French himself had fallen on hard times and 
Governor Kemper wrote Mahone asking if something might be done to prevent French and his family 
“from being turned out of doors to either starve or enter the poor house?” Mahone apparently assisted 
French by appointing his son to a railroad job and he also appointed numerous officials in Petersburg 
during this time at Governor Kemper's request.  
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of whom were loyal members of the Conservative Party and would organize against Mahone 
during the Readjuster years.34 
William Mahone: Railroad Tycoon and Political Organizer 
While the defense of his Confederate legacy was important to William Mahone, his true 
interest was in developing Virginia's railroads and making the state economically competitive 
again following the devastating war, acts that would of course personally benefit Mahone 
himself. Throughout these years Mahone supported the Conservative Party and showed no 
inclination to realign himself with the Republican Party (even though Republicans championed 
most of his economic goals). Mahone used his prewar railroad acumen to build a postwar 
railroad monopoly in Virginia, which garnered him extensive influence in Virginia’s politics. 
Mahone knew reunion was the surest way to acquire the northern investment his railroads 
needed, and he used his influence to help organize the compromise that allowed Virginia to be 
readmitted to the United States with Confederate veterans’ voting rights restored. These years 
following the war give us several important insights into what motivated Mahone and what the 
Readjusters’ success depended on, his own immense ambition. Before analyzing Mahone's role 
in the Conservative Party, and the importance of the expanding railroad lines during this period, 
it is necessary to briefly situate Virginia in the process of Reconstruction.35   
                                                          
34 “One of his Old Brigade Speaks,” Scrapbook, 29:56, Box 215, WMP. Mahone never fully lost the 
support of his former men. After Mahone caucused with Republicans in the Senate, one of his former 
soldiers wrote an editorial that criticized the Conservative Party in Virginia and said, “General Mahone 
has shown us a way out of the woods…we shall follow him and fear no danger.”; Samuel Keiningham to 
William Mahone, Oct 3, 1875, Box 2, UVA. While many veterans attributed the Confederate victory at 
the Crater to Mahone, many others stayed in contact with him in hopes of financial aid. Sam E. 
Keiningham, of Mahone's old Virginia brigade, pleaded with Mahone to assist him, writing, “oh general if 
you can, assist one who is afflicted during the war and the lord will surely repay you.” To former 
veterans, Mahone was always known to be generous with his finances, which is perhaps why he received 
so many requests for money. 
35 Maddex, The Virginia Conservatives, xii. Maddex’s account is the most detailed study on Virginia’s 
politics during Reconstruction; On the meaning and label of “conservative” in the late nineteenth century 
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The United States was victorious in the spring of 1865 but questions of when and how to 
readmit the former Confederate states back into the Union remained unanswered. Andrew 
Johnson assumed the presidency following Abraham Lincoln’s assassination on April 14 (died 
on the 15) and his administration adopted a lenient stance toward the former Confederate states, 
offering pardons to thousands of rebels, and moving to return control of their states to them as 
soon as possible. These policies were viewed by Radical Republicans as a threat to the newly 
won freedom of black people that the Thirteenth Amendment guaranteed. If southern states were 
quickly allowed to govern themselves, they might curtail the freedoms of the former slaves and 
prevent them from voting. Additionally, the Radical Republicans saw a largely unrepentant 
South that might have accepted defeat, but not that their cause had been wrong and believed 
Reconstruction must be a slower process in order to restructure southern governments without 
input from former Confederate statesmen. Radical Republicans and President Johnson fought 
over the path Reconstruction should take with the president vetoing every measure passed by 
                                                          
see James Tice Moore, Two Paths to the New South: The Virginia Debt Controversy, 1870-1883 
(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1974); Adam Smith, The Stormy Present: Conservatism and 
the Problem of Slavery in Northern Politics 1846-1865 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2017). Political terminology in Virginia can be confusing. Between the end of the Civil War and 1883, the 
Conservative Party comprised most white Virginians. The term conservative, as used in our politics 
today, is not translatable to how it was used in Mahone’s era. Politicians in the North and South, 
Republican and Democrat, could refer to themselves as conservatives. Historian Adam Smith describes 
how calling yourself a conservative was a way to “legitimize” any number of political views or actions. 
And how the people who used this term “shifted under the pressure of events,” but that generally, calling 
yourself conservative denoted “a disposition, a way of signaling a measured, mature approach to the 
problems of the world.” However, by 1883 the Readjusters had linked the Conservative Party unfavorably 
to traditional and elitist elements in Virginia often called the "Bourbons" or “Funders.” The Readjusters 
strongly critiqued these men as being stuck in the antebellum past and refusing to compromise on issues 
like the state debt and black suffrage, thereby irrevocably harming the future of the state. These attacks 
led the Conservatives to begin calling themselves Democrats in 1883, around the same time the 
Readjuster coalition was falling apart. In this thesis, the use of “Conservative” will be used in reference to 
Virginia's Conservative Party of which Mahone was a leading figure until the mid to late 1870s. Many 
Conservatives remained ardently against economic reform or readjustment of Virginia's state debt, they 
also tended to be hardliners on the proper way to honor the defunct Confederacy and the Old South. 
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Congress. In response, the Radical Republicans passed the first of the Reconstruction Acts on 
March 2, 1867. These acts divided the former Confederate states into military districts and 
prevented them from returning to the Union until they ratified new constitutions that adopted the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, which protected African American citizenship and voting 
rights respectively. 
The process of Virginia ratifying a new constitution was drawn out and controversial. 
From December 3, 1867, through April 17, 1868, Virginia held a convention to ratify a new 
constitution that would draft what would come to be known as the Underwood Constitution. This 
convention was made up of twenty-four African American delegates and many Radical 
Republicans who determined, among other things, that men who had supported the Confederacy 
should be disenfranchised. It was clear that Congress would not budge on the requirement that 
states must adopt the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, but there were different opinions on 
the clause that disenfranchised many former Confederates. Even the United States general in 
charge of Virginia’s Reconstruction, John M. Schofield, disapproved of this measure (to say 
nothing of most white Virginians) and the ratification of the Underwood Constitution was 
delayed at his orders. 
Having started his career as a railroad man, railroad expansion was the cornerstone of 
Mahone’s vision for a revitalized Virginia following the war and Virginia’s turbulent political 
landscape provided Mahone an excellent chance to lobby for political influence via his railroads. 
Railroads underwent a dramatic expansion on the east coast following the war as numerous 
smaller lines vied to be the eastern terminus for railroads that stretched into the western United 
States, and in Virginia, political parties became increasingly beholden to railroad interests. 
William Mahone knew he could use this connection to his advantage and quickly regained 
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control of the railroads he operated prior to the war. As Jack Maddex writes, “the influence of 
railroad companies pervaded the Virginia Conservatives’ politics,” and that, “Mahone’s railroad 
gave legislators passes [to ride] as long as they voted in its interests.” Mahone combined several 
prominent Virginia railroads into the Atlantic, Mississippi and Ohio company, which essentially 
created a monopoly over all railroads in Virginia and allowed him to exercise considerable 
political influence. Through the railroads, Mahone vaulted himself into prominence both 
financially and politically but Virginia's impoverished condition meant he needed investment 
from the North. Many northern Republicans shared his views on rebuilding the South's economy 
through industrialization, and their common goal made them eager to work with Mahone to 
readmit Virginia back into the Union.36 
Mahone realized his railroads could not attract the northern capital they sorely required 
unless he could convince his fellow Virginia Conservatives to compromise with the Republican 
Party on the issue of drafting a new state constitution. Despite the Radical Republicans on one 
side, and some Virginia Conservatives who were fiercely opposed to economic deals with the 
North, Mahone and many white Virginians agreed with the Republicans on economic policies to 
rebuild the state. Despite their similar goals, Mahone never advocated for northerners to take 
control over his business interests and believed his railroads recognized a responsibility to the 
Old Dominion that no northern concern did. However, his railroads were in dire need of financial 
                                                          
36 Maddex, Virginia Conservatives, 143, 145. Maddex argues that the political impact of railroads was felt 
before the war, but that it became of increasing importance in its aftermath as men like Mahone plotted to 
consolidate any smaller railroads they could, turning them into “interstate trunk lines.”; On Mahone’s 
railroad career see also Nelson, Blake William Mahone of Virginia, 76, 89. Mahone resumed his role as 
president of the Norfolk and Petersburg Railroad without opposition after the war and began plans for the 
Virginia-Lynchburg railroad. Mahone's consolidation schemes saw him elected president of two 
additional railroads and paid a salary of $25,000 yearly which was the same as the president of the United 
States at the time; See also Mark Summers, Railroads, Reconstruction, and the Gospel of Prosperity 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 9-10. 
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assistance and he began to pressure politicians of both parties to seek out a compromise that 
would allow Virginia to write a new state constitution and be readmitted to the United States.37  
Mahone’s effective organization of the Readjuster Party in the 1880s was built upon his 
aggressive use of insiders in the state legislature in the preceding decade. These operatives 
pushed his railroad consolidation plans and waited day and night for orders from William 
Mahone. Railroads were an important issue for governments in nearly every state, as politicians 
and business executives competed for the most profitable routes. These trade routes were 
connected via the railroads, making who owned and operated them of crucial importance. 
Shortly after the war, Mahone’s supporters wrote to him about the issue of consolidation, 
describing Mahone’s “noble efforts to build up Virginia through her railways.” Mahone’s three 
primary lobbyists were R. F. Walker, a newspaper man with Mahone’s Whig who had contacts in 
Virginia’s government and acted as Mahone’s chief spy; John Slaughter, a railroad ally of 
Mahone’s from Lynchburg and future bank executive; and W. Statham, a tobacco dealer and 
banker also from Lynchburg. Walker in particular bombarded Mahone with correspondence. In 
letters to Mahone, he recounted that “The governor thinks you are the best railroad man in the 
U.S.,” and he asked Mahone to “command me day and night” to work on lobbying for 
Consolidation.38  
                                                          
37 Summers, Railroads, Reconstruction, 11; Maddex, Virginia Conservatives, 149. 
38 Summers, Railroads, Reconstruction, 63, 150; William Cabell Rives to William Mahone, Oct 24, 1867, 
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  Railroads appealed not only to politicians but to individual towns and communities as 
well, and this made investing in railroads and their owners attractive for all politicians. Every 
class of society had something to gain from the railroads in this era of the New South via 
commerce and jobs, but railroads represented more than this. They embodied a spirit of 
possibility and revival in a war-ravaged Virginia and politicians were in constant conflict to 
make sure their locality benefited from them. The success of one railroad over another could 
destroy the economic prospects of a town or county while driving untold wealth and commerce 
through another, and this engendered intensive sectional rivalries that local politicians had to 
cater to. The high stakes involved in these operations opened the door for considerable 
corruption and Mark Summers wrote that “such haggling and political corruption was typical of 
all efforts to foster internal improvement.” Therefore, William Mahone relied on men like 
Walker to accomplish his goals and Mahone remained committed to running an organization 
filled with insider loyalists throughout his career in politics.39  
  
                                                          
39 Summers, Railroads, Reconstruction, 9, 35; For a view that contradicts Summers’s opinion on the 
importance of railroads to the politics of ordinary Virginians see Richard Lowe, Republicans and 
Reconstruction in Virginia 1856-70 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1991), 186. Lowe 
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were an integral part of both the Conservative and Republican parties during this period and fighting 
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important ways even if race and the status of former Confederates were slightly more divisive issues, as 
Lowe argued. 
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Virginia Readmitted: Mahone’s Organization of the Committee of Nine 
  Mahone’s economic philosophy placed him in a growing group of “New Movement” 
Conservatives who wished to facilitate Virginia’s reentry into the United States as quickly as 
possible to support business opportunities for the state. To accomplish this Mahone likely 
politicked for two of his friends to be placed on the “Committee of Nine.” In January 1869, this 
group negotiated with President Grant for the separation of the provision in the Underwood 
Constitution that disenfranchised Confederate veterans from a vote on the constitution itself. The 
committee had swayed President Grant and now Mahone and several conservative Republicans 
met in Petersburg and proposed a moderate Republican, Gilbert C. Walker, for governor of 
Virginia. Gilbert Walker was a native New Yorker who currently lived in Norfolk and directed 
Mahone’s railroads there. A moderate Republican who favored Mahone’s business and industrial 
policies, and essentially worked for him, Walker was Mahone’s ideal candidate to calmly lead 
Virginia back into the United States, and most New Movement Conservatives and compromise 
minded Republicans supported him.40 
Mahone was central to the success of these events however, not all Conservatives 
believed Virginia should negotiate with the Republicans on a new constitution and they wanted 
to wait out Grant’s ultimate decision, even if it risked Radical Republican rule. Before Jubal 
Early attacked Mahone’s characterization of him in his memoir he led this vocal minority of 
Conservatives who opposed the New Movement’s plan. These men argued that any negotiation 
was a slight on Virginia’s honor, but they did not provide an alternative course and most 
Conservatives got behind the Walker ticket, though many never agreed on the provision for 
black suffrage and office holding. That the Walker compromise came to fruition in Virginia 
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demonstrated the fluidity of political ideology among white Virginians after the war. 
Conservatives like Early, who acted out of honor for the state, were a minority compared to 
industrial minded opportunists like Mahone. For many, loyalty to the state and older traditions 
was not worth the financial cost.41 
   When Grant accepted the Committee of Nine’s proposal to hold a separate vote on 
disenfranchising Confederates from the gubernatorial ticket, Conservatives realized they had to 
back the compromise ticket of Gilbert C. Walker or risk losing Virginia to the Radical 
Republican candidate Wells and his African American supporters. Following Conservatives’ 
acceptance of this ticket, Mahone supported Gilbert C. Walker's bid for governor through any 
means necessary, and this alerted him, possibly for the first time, to the significance of 
controlling the black vote in Virginia. On May 12, 1869 an A. H. Ashburn wrote to Mahone 
about African Americans working for Walker's opponent and requested Mahone find a black 
speaker to stump for candidate Walker. Another of Mahone’s railroad allies, Robert Owen, wrote 
in plain terms to the general about the prospects of controlling the negro vote in favor of 
Governor Walker writing, “they can to a great extent be controlled by the same motives and 
influences that control the whites…but this will be a work of time.” We can surmise from these 
                                                          
41 Maddex, Virginia Conservatives, 28, 70, 77; Blake, William Mahone of Virginia, 102; Summers, 
Railroads, Reconstruction, 67,74; Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863-
1877 (1988; New York: Harperperennial, 2014), 413. These works argued in favor of Mahone having a 
major impact on the formation and effectiveness of the Committee of Nine and the overall Walker 
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letters that Mahone saw black people in Virginia as means to an end as early as 1869. If 
Conservatives could convince black Virginians that they were their friends, and not the 
Republicans, they could tap into this large voting bloc of black men in Virginia that had been 
resolutely Republican since the end of the war.42 
The Conservative Party’s efforts to split or control the black vote to aid their election of 
Walker were unsuccessful, with the African Americans resoundingly voting for the Radical 
candidate Wells. However, the Conservative unity orchestrated by William Mahone ensured the 
white majority would elect Gilbert Walker and he won in a landslide of 119,535 votes to 
101,204. Most importantly for white Virginians, the laws restricting Confederate voting were 
soundly defeated and the state would shortly pass a new constitution that ratified the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments. Walker assumed the office of governor in 1869 on what he called a 
“liberal Republican platform” and this was a significant victory for William Mahone as his major 
goal was Walker’s support of his railroad consolidation scheme. However, the unity of the 
African Americans voting for the Republicans was likely not lost on Mahone, or any other 
Conservatives in Virginia. This was yet more evidence that the Conservatives had little appeal to 
black voters in Virginia compared to the Republicans.43 
The Conservatives’ positive reactions to Gilbert Walker’s election dramatically increased 
Mahone’s popularity. With Walker’s election, white Virginians avoided the feared Radical 
Republican control of their state, which was unique among the other former Confederate states in 
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43 Vote total is from Maddex, Virginia Conservatives, 80-83; Richard Lowe, Republicans and 
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this respect.44 Mahone was viewed as a hero by white Virginians for his role in voting down the 
disenfranchising clauses directed at ex-Confederates, giving him substantial power and influence 
over state politics. A friend and supporter wrote exultantly to Mahone proclaiming, “All hail to 
the chief!...Virginia’s salvation is consolidation, and you are consolidation,” and former 
governor Francis H. Pierpont expressed his gratification toward Mahone when he stated that, 
“Virginia’s future depended on Walker’s election.” All of the praise directed at Mahone was 
motivated by ex-Confederates’ goal of restoring white, Conservative government in Virginia, 
and this could only be achieved if Confederate veterans were allowed to vote and hold office. 
The most personal praise for Mahone’s involvement in the process came from another supporter 
on July 22 who wrote, “He [Governor Walker] as well as the whole country owe you a debt of 
gratitude. For to you more than any other; are we indebted for the removal of our political chains 
with which we have been bound for many years.”45 
  Buoyed by his success, Mahone immediately pressed Governor Walker for consolidation. 
In the process, however, he began to clash with rival northern railroad interests that would sow 
the seeds for his downfall in a few short years. The immediate result of Gilbert Walker’s election 
was the furtherance of Mahone's consolidation scheme; as one of his lieutenants reported, “our 
friend Walker is driving your railroad business like a crack…your schemes are sensible, seeking 
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for the welfare of this downtrodden state, the cause is a good one and will in the end prevail.” 
When Mahone came up against John S. Barbour of a rival railroad, who was also a future 
Democratic antagonist, even Mahone’s staunchest supporters urged him to compromise. While 
the author of one letter to Mahone in early 1870 stated, , “I am your friend for two reasons, first 
because of your war record…and whatever you do I will still be your friend,” the author 
proceeded to wonder whether  Mahone and Barbour should not “harmonize instead of 
antagonize?” Mahone's closest council routinely urged him that both his interests and the 
Barbour's interests were formidable and for this reason, Mahone should seek a compromise on 
the issue of consolidation. His decision not to increased hostility toward him from rival railroads 
and worried some Virginia Conservatives about his motivations and loyalty.46 
  Mahone’s political star was perhaps never brighter than in the summer of 1871, and he 
affirmed his staunch commitment to the Conservatives in a letter to his favorite insider R. F. 
Walker. “ft interest, and should always expect to have, in the success of the Conservative Party,” 
Mahone stated, “and do not mean to shrink from any responsibility which it [?] right for me to 
undertake. And to perform in the furtherance of its principles.” He further elaborated in a 
different letter that his support for Governor Gilbert Walker had been part of a long strategy to 
weaken the Republicans and that the Conservatives “need to acquire sufficient strength from that 
party [the Republicans] combined (with) the Democratic Party, will destroy radical supremacy.” 
With this statement Mahone seemed committed to the Conservative Party in Virginia, and he 
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argued that the Conservatives needed to make alliances with black men and moderate 
Republicans in Virginia to undermine Radical Republican control of the state.47 
Despite all this political maneuvering, Mahone’s focus remained defending his railroads 
them from the unregulated winner-take-all system that typified all railroads during this period. 
While Gilbert Walker had initially been in Mahone’s favor, he started to voice support for rival 
northern railroads and Mahone believed he needed to be replaced. Some of Mahone’s 
Conservative friends thought Mahone himself was the man for the job with one telling Mahone 
that he was “practically at sea” after Mahone declined to run. However, Mahone still preferred to 
remain an influencer behind the scenes as politics only mattered to him as far as it benefited his 
railroads. Mahone’s reticence to run for Governor was also a practical choice. For all his 
supporters there is no evidence that Mahone had enough support to run for governor in 1873. 
Another reason Mahone chose not to run for governor in 1873 was that his railroad business was 
slowly falling apart due to the national financial panic of that year and he was desperately trying 
to salvage what he could of his consolidated Atlantic, Mississippi, and Ohio railroad. He spent 
most of his time traveling to meet with bondholders, including to England, and still believed he 
could salvage his business.48 
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Mahone supported former Confederate James Lawson Kemper for Governor in 1873 to 
try and save his railroads. Mahone backed Kemper once he revealed himself to be a friend of 
Mahone’s consolidated Atlantic, Mississippi, and Ohio railroad and Mahone’s support again 
proved decisive as Kemper won the election. Kemper was a self-styled New Movement 
Conservative himself who favored cooperation with northern states in both business and politics. 
Traditionalist Conservatives like Jubal Early warned Kemper about relying on Mahone’s 
support, but Kemper and Mahone united over railroad policy much to Early’s chagrin.49 Mahone 
wielded substantial power behind the scenes and his friend who had expressed disappointment 
that he personally did not run for governor told him to “unite your friends [Kemper] and the 
work is done.” Upon assuming office Kemper worked in “close co-operation with General 
Mahone in policies and patronage,” further underscoring Mahone's influence by this point. 
Kemper's cooperation with Mahone demonstrated how the economic policy Mahone had 
advocated for during this period had real pull among a wide variety of white Virginians that had 
little to do with loyalty to an antebellum past.50 However, Mahone’s successful support of 
Gilbert Walker and James Kemper agitated many Conservatives who believed he was controlling 
Kemper from behind the scenes and Kemper refused to support Mahone’s own bid for governor 
in 1877 and broke all contact with him. Mahone believed he could win back his railroads if he 
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was governor and the Conservatives failure to support his bid must have convinced him that he 
had few friends left in that party despite his service to their interests throughout the 1870s. 
Mahone, the formidable political organizer, yielded to Frederick Holliday in the 
gubernatorial nomination in 1877, but Governor Holliday would soon run the Conservative party 
aground over the lingering financial issue of Virginia’s wartime debt that neither Governor 
Walker nor Kemper had resolved successfully. After years of lobbying politicians as a railroad 
magnate, Mahone’s railroads were collapsing into bankruptcy after the financial crisis of 1873 
and he looked toward new opportunities in the fragmented Conservative ranks to stabilize 
himself. His status as a railroad magnate, Confederate war hero, and political influencer drew 
many people to him who were loyal beyond question and many others who desperately sought to 
benefit from Mahone’s substantial business and political connections. However, Mahone was 
never truly a Conservative at all and had no qualms about breaking up that party on the issue of 
Virginia’s war debt in 1879 and leading a third-party coalition, the Readjusters to power in 
Virginia. The Readjusters relied on black voters in Virginia for their success and Mahone’s 
political experience during the 1870s and cultivation of the crucial black vote allowed him to 
lead the most successful third-party movement in southern politics during Reconstruction.51 
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development of this line of railroad has been my life’s most earnest work, I grew up with it and it with 
me. It was the pride and sole object of the best days of my life.” “President Mahone’s Statement to the 
Stockholders,” Norfolk Virginian reprinted in the Bristol News, March 1, 1881, Scrapbook 41, Box 221, 
WMP. (All Scrapbooks are from the WMP.) 
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Chapter II: Virginia Radical, William Mahone the Readjuster and Republican 
 
Figure 3: Mahone shortly before his appointment to the United States Senate as a Readjuster 
1879-1880 (Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, reproduction number LC-
DIG-cwpbh-04844). 
 
Following his unsuccessful attempt to secure the Conservative Party’s nomination for 
governor in 1877, William Mahone emerged as the leader of a political coalition of white and 
black Virginians who favored a reduction or complete repudiation of Virginia's wartime debt; 
Mahone organized this coalition into the Readjuster Party. I argue that Mahone was an 
instrumental reformer of Virginia’s economy and political system and, even if his acceptance of 
black suffrage had clearly defined limits, Mahone and the Readjuster Party made a legitimate 
attempt to form a new political center in Virginia based on the Republicans’ Reconstruction 
policy of universal male suffrage and free and fair elections. Mahone’s pragmatic leadership of 
this Party was essential to its success and this has been obscured by his political enemies’ 
attribution of all of the Readjusters’ failings to Mahone’s overbearing leadership. The 
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Readjusters’ reforms were successful, if only briefly, and they were defeated by the Democratic 
Party’s appeals to white supremacy with Mahone’s leadership a contributing but not decisive 
factor. My interpretation of William Mahone’s career as a Readjuster is a fusion of past 
scholarship that has portrayed Mahone as either a highly principled reformer, or a pragmatist 
who gave little thought to anything outside of his own self-interest. These personality traits were 
not mutually exclusive and both were fundamental to Mahone’s successes as a politician.52 This 
chapter is divided into several thematic sections: the “liberalism” of the Readjusters, Mahone’s 
status as the quintessential reconstructed rebel, the results and reactions to the extensive federal 
patronage Mahone controlled as a Senator, and the white supremacist violence that ultimately 
defeated the movement. These sections analyze Mahone’s motivations and those of the party in 
the context of what they accomplished, and what these accomplishments meant for both white 
and black Virginians. William Mahone accepted a postwar society in Virginia that fundamentally 
challenged the state’s white elites, and this made the Readjuster Party’s brief success even more 
remarkable.   
                                                          
52 Maddex 249-255. Maddex portrayed Mahone as an opportunistic and effective political actor. For 
scholarship that supports this interpretation but focuses more on Mahone’s principles and the successes of 
his policies in the realm of black suffrage and public education see Moore, Two Paths to the New South; 
Hahn, A Nation Under Our Feet; Dailey, Before Jim Crow, 39. These interpretations, especially Dailey's 
stress Mahone's “principles over his opportunism” and emphasizes his belief that the South's future 
depended on entrepreneurship, technology, and an investment in mining, manufacturing and the labor 
force in Virginia's cities as a way forward for the Old Dominion. For an excellent analysis of the broader 
issues of Reconstruction and how the Readjuster attitudes on race aligned with the Republicans see Foner, 
Reconstruction, 231. Even the great Radical leader Thaddeus Stephens remained reticent on what black 
suffrage would mean for social equality. In a speech in the House Stephens stated that “Negro 
equality…does not mean that a negro shall sit on the same seat or eat at the same table with a white man, 
that is a matter of taste which every man must decide for himself.” See also Blair, Cities of the Dead: 
Contesting the Memory of the Civil War in the South, 1865-1914; Brent Tarter, The Grandees of 
Government: The Origins and Persistence of Undemocratic Politics in Virginia (Charlottesville: 
University of Virginia Press, 2013). 
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Political allegiances shifted rapidly in Virginia following the Civil War as white and 
black people formed alliances based on class, locality, race, and ideology. In this turbulent 
atmosphere, party affiliation was less a determiner of who someone would vote for than we view 
it as today. This factionalism gave Mahone and white Conservatives leeway to form the 
Readjuster Party out of the Conseratives and Republicans. Adding to the confusion, opposing 
factions often used the terms liberal and conservative to describe their policies. For William 
Mahone, the Readjusters’ policies were liberal because they encouraged northern investment and 
promoted universal male suffrage in contrast to the Conservative elites of the state. This 
terminology is limited by our modern standards, but it is important to analyze the Readjusters 
with the terms they used to aid in conceptualizing the movement’s accomplishments as well as 
its limitations. Theirs was liberalism very much in line with Republican ideology during 
Reconstruction; revitalizing the South through industry and allowing African Americans to 
participate in Democracy as guaranteed by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments. On the other hand, the Virginia Conservative Party, which was also known as the 
Bourbons and Funders, realized Mahone had effectively turned the label of conservative against 
them by associating it with economic stagnation and aversion to progress. To remedy this the 
Conservatives renamed themselves as the Democratic Party in 1883 in solidarity with the rest of 
the white South and described their own economic policies as liberal in an effort to undercut 
Mahone.53 
                                                          
53 For scholarship that focuses on the factionalism or sectionalism of Reconstruction era political parties 
see Nicolas Barreye, Gold and Freedom: The Political Economy of Reconstruction (Charlottesville: The 
University of Virginia Press, 2015); Michael F. Holt, By One Vote: The Disputed Presidential Election of 
1876 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008); The label “Bourbons” referred to the ruling house in 
France who had been restored to power but had allegedly learned nothing after said restoration. Degler, 
The Other South: Southern Dissenters in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), 
271. 
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Mahone’s rhetoric on liberalism was important because it built a firm foundation for the 
Readjusters by convincing black people and Republicans that the party would protect their 
interests, and by persuading agrarian whites that the Conservatives represented a Virginia run by 
and for the white elite at the expense of everyone else. For Mahone and his supporters, being 
socially liberal did not clash with their view that their African American supporters should 
occupy a lower status in the Readjuster movement and Readjusters’ policies did not create a 
drastic restructuring of race relations in Virginia, as Mahone’s enemies routinely claimed they 
did. Nevertheless, his letters are full of idealistic references to universal manhood suffrage and 
an industrialized, modern society that the Readjuster Party was working toward. This liberal 
rhetoric of the Readjusters legitimized African American suffrage in a way not seen in the rest of 
the former Confederacy.54 
Rhetoric about liberalism complimented Mahone’s ability to mix idealism with practical 
benefits to his supporters in the form of state and federal patronage. As a United States Senator 
Mahone distributed over 2,000 federal appointments and he “cooperated with black party leaders 
to find African American laborers to fill positions in the Norfolk Navy Yard and Washington 
D.C.” Using this strategy, the Readjuster coalition promoted debt reduction, suffrage for all men, 
free schools, and fair taxes, and they abolished literacy tests and other restrictions on the suffrage 
of African Americans and poor whites in Virginia. The party’s potential was realized quickly. In 
1879, the Readjusters won control of the state government until 1884 and elected seven men to 
                                                          
54 Moore, Two Paths to the New South, 86; Dailey, Before Jim Crow, 2. Moore summarized the 
Readjusters’ vision from 1881 on as “a glowing dream of the future…a Virginia with the opportunity for 
the able, democracy for the masses, and public education for all. New-comers-immigrants and investors 
alike-would be welcomed without regard to their religious or political beliefs. Farmers and townsmen 
would share in the profits of industrial growth. The races would also coexist in harmony, socially 
segregated but united by common political rights and economic needs.”  
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the United States House of representatives, two to the Senate (including Mahone where he 
served until 1887) and Readjuster William Evelyn Cameron served as Virginia’s governor from 
1882-1886.55 
Mahone’s balancing act as party leader proved insufficient to quiet his opponents’ 
accusations that he favored a Virginia controlled by black people and Republicans. The 
Readjuster Party ultimately collapsed once the debt issue was resolved and white Virginians 
reacted with violence and hostility to black Readjusters’ increasing demands for better jobs and 
leadership positions within the party. William Mahone resisted appointing black men to the 
highest levels of the party, but it is important to note that white Republicans in Virginia had 
resisted this as well and the collapse of the Readjuster Party is best understood in the framework 
of a national Republican retreat from defending black rights in the South. The murder of 
unarmed black men in Danville in 1883 was another occurrence of the violence against black 
people throughout the South during Reconstruction and it severely weakened the Readjusters, 
who were defeated by the Democrats in the election that November. Black people voted the 
Readjuster ticket in 1883, even after the murders, but the violence irreparably shattered 
Mahone’s white coalition who feared violent reprisals for supporting Mahone and who had no 
concern for black rights.56 
Virginia's inability to settle its exorbitant wartime debt magnified the class divisions 
within the Conservative Party and opened the door for Mahone to organize the Readjusters along 
                                                          
55 Moore, Two Paths to the New South, 45-47, 66, 79. 
56 Moore, Two Paths to the New South, 100, 151. Moore’s conclusions on why the movement broke apart 
are sound, and my thesis builds on many of them. His reasons include the antagonistic factions that made 
up the party that, for all their cooperation, could not transcend racial divisions in the South. Democrats 
organized to defend white supremacy in the face of the benefits the Readjusters provided for black 
Virginians. 
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economic fault lines. Poor whites clamored for debt readjustment and this demonstrated that 
these white Virginians would adopt new party loyalties if their livelihoods were threatened. Prior 
to the Civil War, Virginia had accrued a large amount of debt to fund numerous internal 
improvements, primarily railroads. The immense destruction wrought by the war on these vital 
arteries left Virginia in a perilous financial position. A series of Conservative governors 
remained committed to repaying Virginia’s debt in full and their supporters were colloquially 
called Funders because of their view on Virginia’s debt. The Funders were unwilling to make 
drastic concessions to tackle the debt issue and, with the economic recession of 1873 and other 
financial difficulties, a movement within the Conservative ranks to pay less of the state debt or 
absolve it entirely, gained traction. Proponents of this movement were called readjusters for their 
plan to downwardly readjust the debt and use the surplus capital to fund Virginia's infrastructure 
and social institutions, such as the public-school system. Their plans appealed to working-class 
whites and black Virginians, who felt robbed by the exorbitant state debt and did not feel 
obligated to pay it all off.57  
Mahone entered the debate over Virginia’s debt because his business and political future 
depended on it. When his railroads collapsed in the mid-1870s, and his bid for governor in 1877 
was blocked by his Conservative rivals, Mahone realized he had no future in the Conservative 
ranks and aggressively took on the cause of the readjustment of Virginia’s debt which had long 
threatened to break up the Conservative Party due to the mismanagement of governor Kemper. 
Previously, Mahone had supported the full funding of the debt and many of his own railroad 
employees had little love for his economic policy. Mahone had made intractable enemies in the 
                                                          
57 Moore, Two Paths, 3, 15. Moore described how Virginia’s debt spiraled out of control in the postwar 
years, reaching a height of $45 million dollars in 1870. This left each Virginian with a “per capita debt 
burden more than twice the national average,” and Virginia teetered on bankruptcy.  
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Conservative ranks due to his railroad and political scheming. This scheming, combined with his 
political machinations behind the scenes, caused many Conservatives not to trust him. In this 
atmosphere, Mahone realized the issue of readjusting the state's debt had divided his 
Conservative rivals and might give him a new political future.58   
Mahone Revisits His Wartime Service to Acquire Legitimacy 
As Mahone stepped into the foreground of Virginia’s politics he decided to write about 
his military service again, for the first time since the controversy over his memoir with Jubal 
Early in 1871, in order to build some legitimacy for himself among white Virginians. Poor 
agrarian whites especially would likely have little inclination to support a former railroad tycoon 
after the economic disasters of the 1870s. To combat any negative perceptions of his business 
career among these white men, Mahone reframed his military service around his interactions 
with Robert E. Lee to play to the popular Lost Cause narrative of the day. Mahone focused his 
writings in the period on his closeness with Lee at the war’s end in several letters to his friends, 
including General Longstreet. Through Longstreet and others Mahone sought confirmation of his 
role as Lee’s close confidant and he likely believed this was necessary to cut off his detractors 
such as Early, Weisiger, and James Lane. These men viewed Mahone’s sudden advocacy for 
debt repudiation, and eventual allegiance to the Republicans, as the same type of betrayal as 
                                                          
58 Maddex, Virginia Conservatives, 245, 250-253. Both the administrations of Gilbert Walker and James 
Kemper had tried and failed to address the debt issue. Traditional Conservatives believed in paying all the 
debt to uphold Virginia’s honor, and this was the policy Kemper pursued. However, after the financial 
panic of 1873 Kemper’s determination to pay off the entire debt threatened financial collapse across the 
state, especially among the farmers. With the policy of funding the debt backfiring on traditional 
Conservatives, Mahone seized his chance to align himself with those Conservatives who favored 
readjustment of the debt, as Maddex writes, “the general had experienced the same financial stringency 
that had brought the farmers to question the debt, and he, too had suffered at the hands of foreign 
bondholders,” and that, “Mahone…was losing his railroad power and had now become a pariah to most of 
the Conservative leadership.” In this situation, Mahone viewed tying his career to the growing opposition 
to paying off Virginia's debt as the only sensible course left to him.  
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general Longstreet’s allegiance to President Grant and the Republicans in 1868, and they 
redoubled their attacks against him.   
Mahone highlighted conversations he had had with Lee during the Appomattox campaign 
to show how frequently Lee relied on him in the final days of the war. On the eve of Lee’s April 
ninth surrender at Appomattox Courthouse, General Lee called Mahone and Longstreet to him to 
seek their advice. Following the war, likely in 1879, when Mahone wrote several letters about 
this moment, he wrote to Longstreet to corroborate his version of the event. Mahone stated that 
upon his arrival in camp Lee said to him “you know general that I always send for you when I 
am in trouble.” Mahone said he advised surrender to General Lee, after he advised him that it 
was his personal preference to fight to the bitter end, and that Lee reluctantly agreed with him. 
To Longstreet Mahone wrote “you and I as the only living witnesses to that interview might 
agree upon a statement of it if you please.” Longstreet was a close friend of Mahone and offered 
no contradictory version of these final days. With Longstreet’s support Mahone likely felt 
confident in discussing the war again, since nearly a decade had passed since his feud with Early, 
and he needed to inspire support among Confederate veterans if he was to have political success. 
Despite Longstreet being reviled by Lost Causers like Early, if Longstreet could corroborate 
Mahone’s discussions with General Lee, Mahone was willing to seek his support. Additionally, 
Longstreet himself was regularly arguing against his portrayal by Early and others and his role as 
historical scapegoat for Confederate defeat was not as clear cut then as it has been made since.59 
While he organized the Readjusters in 1879, William Mahone argued that Robert E. Lee 
had believed working together with the northern states was beneficial and not a betrayal of the 
                                                          
59 William Mahone to James Longstreet “The Interview,” Folder 3, Box 1, LV; The best book on James 
Longstreet’s reputation is William Garret Piston’s, Lee’s Tarnished Lieutenant: James Longstreet and his 
Place in Southern History (Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 1987). 
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South. Mahone described his mindset in a letter that referred back to his meeting with Lee prior 
to the surrender at Appomattox, which stated that “the war ended as I took it to be, then and 
there…and as I am sure Genl Lee considered, my desire was and my every effort from that time 
has been to repair the waste at home and to heal the wounds of war.” Lee died in 1870 and did 
not publish memoirs, but he did express his desire to rebuild Virginia and accept the war’s 
outcome (at least publicly). Lee told one of his friends that “Virginia and every other state in the 
South needs us. We must try, and with as little delay as possible, go to work to build up their 
prosperity,” and to a Confederate widow, he wrote: “Madam, don't bring up your sons to detest 
the United States Government. Recollect that we form but one country, now. Abandon all these 
local animosities and make your sons Americans.”60 Therefore, when men like Jubal Early railed 
over Mahone’s alleged apostasy from the Conservative ranks, Mahone claimed he was simply 
working to rebuild Virginia as Lee had wanted and that the Conservatives no longer suited these 
ideals. From Mahone’s perspective, his close association with Lee at Appomattox restored the 
legitimacy that he had squandered in the memoir dispute with Early. As a Readjuster, Mahone 
stated that he moved forward with no sectional bitterness in an honest effort to rebuild Virginia 
and this won him substantial support among Republicans.  
Mahone Breaks from the Conservative Party 
With a strong legacy of Confederate service and political success, Mahone emerged as 
the clear leader for readjusting Virginia’s debt as soon as he decided to speak on the issue. He 
organized the Conservative supporters of debt readjustment into the Readjuster Party at a 
meeting with white and black people in 1879 at Mozart Hall in Richmond Virginia. There were 
                                                          
60 William Mahone to Edwin R. Robbins, May 9, 1879, vol 31, 15, WMP; See also “Mahone, Virginia,” 
Richmond Whig, Scrapbook 19:77, Box 212; Freeman, Lee, 515; Edward Childe, The Life and Campaigns 
of General Lee, trans. George Litting (London: Chatto and Windus, Piccadilly, 1875), 331. 
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only fourteen black Republican delegates out of the 200 assembled, but they pleaded for racial 
unity and were apparently well received by Mahone’s white supporters. This was the new 
coalition that enjoyed a quick victory in 1879 when they won both the Virginia House and 
Senate. Despite the inclusion of African Americans in the movement in 1879, the Readjusters’ 
leadership came from the ranks of the Conservative Party, especially “original” Conservative 
Readjusters, such as prominent orator “Parson” John Massey. Conservatives such as Massey 
supported readjustment solely to aid the poor white farmer and were not concerned with 
appealing to African Americans in Virginia, or lowering taxes and funding public schools, which 
would become central planks in the Readjuster platform. This version of the Readjusters had 
achieved success, but Mahone knew he needed to attract more Republican voters and financial 
supporters to continue to fight the Conservative Party. To this end, Mahone’s adopted an 
increasingly liberal stance on black suffrage and laid out reform plans for taxes and public 
schools. This change in platform united dissident Conservatives, and black Republicans as 
Readjusters on a broader base of issues and won the support of the northern Republican Party.61 
By 1881, The Readjusters’ rhetoric on black suffrage resembled the Radical Republicans. 
The Party won further electoral victories in that year and Mahone took his seat in the United 
States Senate on March fourth. Senator Mahone recognized how crucial the black vote had been 
for Republican success in Virginia at the local level in the years before the compromise election 
of Gilbert C. Walker, and under his leadership the Readjusters’ policy evolved from one of 
                                                          
61 Carl N. Degler, The Other South, 276-277. In the election of 1879, the Readjusters won fifty-six seats 
out of a hundred in the lower house and twenty-four out of forty in the upper. Eleven black men were 
elected to the former and two to the latter; The most comprehensive breakdown of black and white voters 
by county in Virginia from 1879-1883 is Moore, Two Paths to the New South, 82, 125-130. Parson John 
Massey had been the leading Conservative in favor of readjusting Virginia’s debt in the 1870s. He argued 
that the war had so impoverished Virginia that the state had no means of paying the exorbitant debt and 
that both local and northern bondholders must swallow the loss. 
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indifference toward black voters into the liberal language of the Radicals by 1881. Mahone 
reframed the party’s goals as a fight for opportunity and equality in politics for both races. Black 
males in Virginia made up over forty percent of the electorate and constituted a large segment of 
Readjuster supporters, and Mahone brought agrarian whites in to complete his coalition. These 
men had been drawn into the movement by Massey's rhetoric on readjusting the debt, but it 
remained to be seen if they would truly support a third party once the debt issue was settled. This 
alliance between prominent white men, black people, and poor whites made the Readjusters the 
most successful challengers to Democratic hegemony in the South. 
Mahone seized control of the Readjusters through political opportunism, but if he was not 
an “original Readjuster” he was certainly the man responsible for breaking the movement away 
from the Conservatives and realigning its policies to benefit black people in Virginia. However, 
in taking control of the movement from men like Massey he exacerbated the already growing 
resentment many Conservatives had for him and threatened the delicate relationship the 
Readjusters had with white Virginians in general. Massey's biographer described John Massey as 
a “Conservative on all matters except fiscal,” and stated he believed that “white supremacy must 
be maintained.” Thus, many Conservatives, like Massey, would only remain loyal to Mahone 
insofar as they could advance their own careers by supporting the Readjusters. This led to the 
instability of the movement as Mahone showed no intention to return to the Conservative Party 
after 1879 and demonstrated a willingness to advocate for black interests and fair elections at the 
expense of Conservative supporters. Once Mahone backed a former captain in his old Virginia 
brigade, William Evelyn Cameron, for governor instead of Massey in 1882, the Parson became 
an ardent critic of Mahone and expressed severe bitterness long after the fact when he stated that 
Mahone, “finding he could not use me for his personal ends had no further use for me.” Massey 
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returned to the Conservative Party and made an unsuccessful bid for Congress against Readjuster 
John Sergeant Wise in 1882, but he effectively took three majority white Readjuster counties out 
of the Party when he broke from Mahone in 1882.62           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
62 Richard, Doss, “‘Parson’ John E. Massey, Relentless Readjuster,” Albemarle County Historical Society 
Papers, vol. 11 (1950-1951), 17; John E. Massey, Autobiography of John E. Massey, ed. Elizabeth 
Hancock (New York: Neale Publishing Co, 1909), 193-199; Brief biographical information on William 
Cameron can be found in Moore, Two Paths to the New South, 141; See also John Massey to William 
Mahone, April 1881, box 13, UVA; William Mahone to John Massey, Oct 1882, vol 33, p. 12-15, 41-43, 
WMP. Prior to the nomination, Massey wrote Mahone a letter seeking assurance he would be nominated 
instead of Cameron: “I know, moreover, you would never consent that one who has proven himself as 
faithful a friend as I have should suffer at your hands.” In a letter shortly before this Mahone kept Massey 
in the dark and said that gubernatorial nominations “must be left to the party.” Parson Massey died in 
1901, but not before participating in the constitutional convention of that year which would ultimately 
pass a new state constitution that disenfranchised black people through numerous methods; For the 
election results between John Sergeant Wise and Parson John Massey see Warrock-Richardson Almanack 
(Richmond Va., 1882), 59. 
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Readjuster Reconstruction in Virginia: A Political Realignment 
 
Figure 4: “2 Years of Readjuster Rule. 14 Years of Funder Rule.” Mahone and the Readjusters’ 
styled themselves as liberals because they argued that their goal of lowering Virginia’s debt 
would free up money and capital to be used on modernizing Virginia and returning the state to a 
leadership role in the country. As opposed to the Conservative Party (or Funders) who were 
committed to paying back Virginia’s debt, and risked bankrupting the state to do it. Here 
Mahone’s paper the Richmond Whig published a broadside that depicts Mahone as opening the 
door to a new era of prosperity for the commonwealth. (The Richmond Whig, 1881, Scrapbooks, 
Box 213, WMP.) 
 
Advocating a platform of universal manhood suffrage, and full economic reform of the 
South through railroads and industry, William Mahone and the Readjusters gave hope to a 
Republican Party in full retreat from Reconstruction across the South by the 1880s. Mahone's 
advocacy for railroads and industry to rebuild the South mirrored the Republican Party’s “Gospel 
of Prosperity” ideology from the 1870s, and he seemed to have survived the backlash against 
advocates for railroads and big business that had followed the financial panic of 1873. In 
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Virginia, Radical Republicans occupied just fourteen seats in the General Assembly in 1878, 
falling from fifty-six in 1870. This Republican collapse in Virginia was typical in other former 
Confederate states and it left them ill-suited to continue their advocacy for black suffrage. As the 
power of southern Republicans waned, they looked to Mahone as the quintessential example of 
an influential southerner that they could convert to their cause, a hope buoyed by Mahone’s 
apparent adoption of the Republican policies of debt reduction, lower taxes, and school funding. 
All these policies were popular among African Americans, and many of these black people were 
hopeful that the Republican rhetoric of Mahone’s Readjusters would equate to tangible benefits 
for them in Virginia in the wake of a Republican withdrawal.63 
The Readjusters’ advocacy for black suffrage was politically expedient in light of the 
Republican retreat from Reconstruction. Alignment with the Republican Party was not William 
Mahone’s original plan, but both he and his fellow white Readjusters could not overlook the 
large number of African American voters in Virginia who supported debt readjustment and were 
frustrated by the Virginia Republicans’ relative impotence. Two of Mahone’s lieutenants 
discussed the opportunity the black vote provided them in 1879. One of them argued that, “it is 
incumbent upon us as Readjusters, to make use of them [black men] as voters on all important 
                                                          
63 Summers, Railroads, 29, 158. As Summers describes: “in the greatest reversal of partisan alignments in 
the nineteenth century, they erased the massive Congressional majority Republicans had enjoyed since the 
South’s secession, transforming the party’s 110-vote margin in the House into a Democratic majority of 
sixty seats,” in the election of 1874. On the importance of railroads to Republicans during this period, that 
in some ways, lined up with Mahone’s vision of their potential Summers wrote: “Railroads had been a 
means to an end. They stood for the sort of South that Republicans hoped to create. Party members did 
not only want to bring commerce to the cotton states, but a new economic order and different attitudes 
toward work and wealth…Railroads would produce a society in which prosperity might alleviate race 
hatreds and free the black laborer from dependence on his former master.”; See also Foner, 
Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 523-525. Foner’s section: “The Politics of Depression” 
is the most useful summary of the depression that followed the 1873 financial crisis and its impact on the 
goals of the Republican party during the 1870s. 
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questions. For without them, we can do nothing within ourselves, for we are weak as yet, and 
need all the assistance we can possibly get, And, since there is a great revolution in politics in 
this state…now is the time, while excitement is up, for us, as Readj [sic]…to use every effort to 
coax the colored people into our party.”  This letter affirmed what Mahone surely realized: only 
the black vote could sustain the Readjusters as a third-party. Importantly, nothing about this 
suggested a restructuring of the racial hierarchy in the state, as this same lieutenant described 
how the Readjusters should give black people “our political sympathy and fellowship (but I 
mean by this, that we shall put ourselves on social equality with them what-ever, no, never) to 
induce them to come into the ranks of the Readjuster Party.” Mahone and his inner circle 
understood the potential for electoral success if black men voted for them in the strength that 
they had typically given the Republicans and that, in their opinion, no drastic changes on social 
equality were necessary to accomplish this.64 
When the Readjusters failed to fully dislodge the Conservative Party from control of the 
state in 1879 and 1880, Mahone worked to unseat the Conservative elite for good through a 
coalition with the Republican Party, with the defense of black suffrage as one of the Readjusters’ 
central issues. Mahone’s planned Readjuster-Republican fusion faced stringent opposition from 
current Republican President Andrew Garfield and the “Straight-Out” Republican faction. But 
when Garfield was assassinated in September of 1881, his successor, Chester A. Arthur, was 
more favorable to Mahone’s plan and northern Republicans backed the Readjusters politically 
                                                          
64 W.P. Epperson to Samuel Yates Gilliam, Dec 23, 1879, Box 4, Gilliam Family Papers, UVA; See also 
H.S. Orkey to William C. Elam, Sept 5, 1881, Box 34, WMP. The paternalism and prejudices that 
underscored white Readjusters’ treatment of black voters is further demonstrated by a letter between two 
Mahone lieutenants on the topic of campaign literature. Orkey described that he wanted his “simple 
documents, that can be easily read and understood by the colored people” to be distributed to black men. 
He said this would assure their support for the Readjusters in said county.  
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and financially. Black Virginians supported the Republican Party in national elections, but 
realized the party had little power in Virginia. The Readjusters represented a chance to change 
this and black Virginians flocked to the movement. Mahone understood that the debt issue 
created space in the Conservative ranks for a splinter movement and he was prepared to accept 
almost any platform that would give him success.65 
Never one to openly discuss his ideological views in the past, Mahone took an idealistic 
public stance toward black suffrage and political representation as soon as he organized the 
Readjusters in 1879, though he remained somewhat vague as to the role political parties should 
play. Mahone stated that “in respect to the question and in the exercise of the right of a freeman. 
In my judgement the question stands above party and rises high above man.” With Readjuster 
and Republican unity accomplished in 1881, Mahone was appointed to the United States Senate 
where he caucused with the Republicans, who promoted him to chairman of two Senate 
committees. Encouraged by these developments, Mahone doubled down on liberal rhetoric about 
the protection of black suffrage, for which Republicans routinely praised him. He stated that the 
Readjusters’ primary mission concerned “equal rights for all,” and that, “I believe universal 
suffrage the only safety for the people. I want every man to vote white or black, and I want him 
to vote as he pleases…and to be neither threatened beforehand nor ostracized afterward for 
expressing his free opinion.” The Readjusters’ actions, both in their policies and on election day, 
support that Mahone was committed to African American suffrage because it was a winning 
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issue among his new friends, and it granted him a new political lease on life in Virginia. 
However, just like many Republicans, he had no real plan to protect universal suffrage for black 
people as it came under attack in the 1880s.66 
Mahone’s time as an essentially Republican Senator convinced him that black men had a 
place in Virginia politics, even if he understood that place as being irrevocably beneath white 
men. This pragmatic view on race is demonstrated in his letters. In July of 1881, a Readjuster 
wrote to Senator Mahone about some troubling comments he had expressed toward black voters. 
Mahone had given an interview where he had allegedly expressed “a most decided indifference 
respecting the Republicans of Virginia and total apathy toward colored Republicans.”  In another 
letter Mahone discussed “humoring their political action” and through this, Mahone stated, “they 
can, and they may exercise important influence in thinking.” However, Mahone ended this letter 
by stating that African Americans “are a race acting distinctively as such…[they have] the free 
enjoyment of life liberty and the pursuit of happiness,” a statement that no white Democrat in 
Virginia would have been likely to make. As Steven Hahn outlines, Mahone believed positions 
in the state legislature and above should be reserved for white men, with lower level offices 
given to black people to placate both races. Therefore, Mahone viewed the black vote as a 
necessity to his coalition and entertained no ideas about truly radical changes to Virginia’s white 
supremacist social order, but his success on the issue of black suffrage perhaps convinced him 
that black voters would allow Virginia to exert real influence on the national political stage. 
Mahone’s paternalism remained apparent in all his discussions on black voters in the 
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Readjusters’ most successful years, but his expanded overtures toward black political actors set 
him apart from other white Virginians who believed any African American voting was a threat to 
white supremacy when faced with the Readjusters’ success.67 
For William Mahone, and a select few other white Readjusters, black suffrage was an 
expedient means for resolving the racial antagonisms in Virginia that they viewed as interfering 
with the prosperity of the state. Thus, an acceptance of black suffrage was a way to remove a 
barrier to Virginia’s financial and economic progress by ending fierce debates on race that 
divided the white electorate. With Virginia seemingly on this path in 1881, Mahone expressed 
relief that the issues of slavery and black suffrage would no longer hinder Virginia’s progress. In 
one of his first Senate speeches Mahone stated that “The Readjusters of Virginia have no feeling 
of hostility, no words of unkindness for the colored man. His freedom has come, and whether by 
purpose or by accident thank God that among other issues which so long distracted country and 
restrained its growth was concluded, and I trust forever by the results of the sanguinary struggle 
between the sections.”68 In Mahone’s view, if black men were accepted as voters in Virginia then 
the Readjusters would most likely continue to be the primary beneficiaries and this, in turn, 
would allow Mahone to remain the principal figure in building the Commonwealth. The 
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successful election of Readjusters to the General Assembly, United States Congress, and 
countless local offices make it probable this was Mahone’s genuine outlook at the time. Away 
for senatorial duty in Washington D.C. Mahone had perhaps blinded himself to the building 
discomfort among white Virginians over the Readjusters’ policies.  
William Mahone offered black Virginians a practical means to defend their suffrage 
through a vote for his party, even if many black people thought the Readjusters’ benefits stopped 
short of what they deserved. An African American Readjuster, M. L. Price, wrote to Mahone 
about his unhappiness with the Readjusters’ policies toward black Virginians, to which Mahone 
replied, “I need not remind you that the colored people are now restored to the practical 
enjoyment of every right…guaranteed to a citizen, by the constitution and laws of the country. 
The colored people are now at the most critical juncture of their history since the freedom of all.” 
Mahone told Price that black Virginians must remain loyal to the Readjuster Party for having 
secured their “actual freedom” and stated that “I need not say it is essential if the colored man 
would preserve his equal rights at the polls, before the law, and in the jury box, and if he would 
keep open the schools to the education of his children.” These actions had been passed by the 
Readjuster-controlled General Assembly, and Mahone and black Virginians were aware that a 
return to Democratic control might undo all these benefits. Mahone’s response was essentially a 
threat to “vote for me or else,” but in the political context of the time, Mahone and black 
Virginians understood that the Readjusters’ continued success depended upon their unity at the 
ballot box. Mahone emphasized the threat of a Democratic victory before the pivotal election of 
1883, stating that such a victory would “imperil everything which has been gained for him [the 
black man]…he cannot afford to separate on any pretext from the real friends who have 
conducted him to this haven of safety and full citizenship.” Mahone was quite accurately 
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presenting the Readjuster Party as the only coalition of its type in Virginia that would protect 
black suffrage and other rights, and most black men felt this was reason enough to support him, 
even if his use of the term “full citizenship” was inaccurate.69 
The northern press viewed Mahone as an influential figure they could use to promote 
Republican policy, and they generally praised him without reservation from 1880-1884. A 
Michigan paper lamented the voting practices in the South but commented that “in Virginia at 
least there shall be a free suffrage, a full vote and an honest count.” Northern papers routinely 
emphasized the Readjusters policies on black suffrage. The Independent in New York published 
an article in 1881 that said Mahone “had done more than any other man in Virginia whether he 
be Democrat or Republican to secure the colored people in that state their political rights and 
give them protection.” Mahone certainly had done more than Virginia’s Conservatives in his 
inclusion of black men in the Readjuster Party but these Republican papers essentially praised 
the Readjusters based off platitudes in Mahone’s Richmond Whig paper and provided little 
analysis of the origin of the Readjuster movement. A Republican paper in Florida commented 
that “the success of Mahone marks the beginning of a new era in southern politics. The triumph 
of the Readjuster and Republican coalition in Virginia shows that with time the prejudice of the 
southern whites against negro suffrage is fast giving way and disappearing in practical politics.” 
These papers based their declarations on Mahone’s own language and the fact that he caucused 
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with Republicans in the Senate and they showed very little engagement in the state of politics in 
Virginia which had only become more divided due to Mahone’s actions.70 
The highpoint of the Readjusters’ success, and Mahone’s idealistic rhetoric, occurred 
with the election of William Cameron over Conservative Funder John Warwick Daniel to the 
governor’s mansion in the fall of 1881 as a Readjuster. Republicans and Readjusters alike 
described this election as a clear triumph of biracial government that had so far been attempted 
unsuccessfully across the South.71 Mahone called this victory a blessing on all Virginians that 
will continue “until the government of every county shall be of the people, by the people, and for 
the people…manhood suffrage is the security to the man of his liberties [and] education.”  
Cameron’s election was in large measure due to the Republican Party elites who had financed 
Mahone’s payment of poll taxes for thousands of black voters in Virginia who gave roughly 
ninety percent of their vote to Cameron in most counties.72 
Cameron’s election was only possible through Mahone’s shrewd conciliatory actions 
with the Republicans and orchestration of their fusion with the Readjusters. The Readjusters now 
controlled both Houses of the Virginia General Assembly and gave black Readjusters increased 
prominence within the movement through the election of fifteen African American 
                                                          
70 “Mahone, A Free Ballot and an Honest Count,” Allegan Journal, April 9, 1881, Scrapbook 19:129, Box 
212; The Independent, March 24, 1881, Scrapbook 19:133, Box 212; “Portentous Signs,” The Florida 
Weekly Telegraph, Scrapbook 28:16-17, Box 215. 
71 Hahn, A Nation Under Our Feet, 382. 
72 William Mahone to W. Smith, November 21, 1882, Vol 35:295, WMP; “An Address to the 
Republicans of Virginia,” 1881, Scrapbook 22:22, Box 213. The Readjuster convention that nominated 
Cameron framed his campaign as the dawn of a new era that meant the “annihilation of intolerance-
liberalization of public sentiment, and more important than all else to the cause of loyalty, its success 
means the destruction of sectionalism in national politics.”; For a breakdown of the votes for Cameron see 
Warrock-Richardson Almanack (Richmond, Va., 1882), 28-29. Cameron received 113,473 votes to 
Daniel’s 100,758. 
69 
 
representatives between the two bodies.73 Once all their representatives took their seats in 1882, 
the Readjusters accomplished their major goal of debt reduction with the passage of the 
Riddleberger Act which cut a third of the state’s debt and cut taxes by twenty percent. 
Cameron’s administration went still further and abolished the onerous poll tax for voting and a 
degrading symbol of slavery, the whipping post. Black Virginians reacted positively to these acts 
and a pamphlet written by a group of them stated that  “we think we can see the dawn of a 
brighter day,” and it asked black men in Virginia to give their full support to the Readjusters who 
will “permanently settle the antagonism of the races.” Mahone had initially resisted an alliance 
with the Republican Party in order to keep the Readjusters as an independent movement and 
attract the support of white Virginians, but Cameron’s election demonstrated a fundamental shift 
in allying the movement with Republican interests, a move that Virginia’s Conservative elites 
would not leave unchallenged. 
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“The War is Ended, the Wounds Must Heal”: Mahone Advocates Reconciliation 
 
 
Figure 5: Mahone (pictured in the middle of the first row) regularly toured the Crater battlefield 
with veterans from the North and South to remember his most well-known wartime action. Here 
he is pictured with members of the 57th Massachusetts Infantry in 1887. (Library of Congress, 
Prints and Photographs Division, reproduction number LC C-DIG-ppmsca-56346) 
 
William Mahone’s policies gave hope to northern Republicans, but overall, his rhetoric of 
reconciliation was never accepted by most white Virginians, many of whom were former 
Confederates and served in Congress. No comprehensive study on Confederate participation in 
government after the war exists, but if Mahone’s career is any measure, these former 
Confederates wielded powerful influence. One tally concluded that “of the 585 former 
Confederate civilian and military leaders, 418 after the war held elective or appointive office in 
the state, local, or federal governments.” Mahone’s newspaper and his supporters frequently 
discussed the praiseworthy reception that their “progressive policies” were met with across the 
nation, but much less noted was the reaction of these Confederate veterans in government or the 
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many white Virginians who disagreed sharply with his rhetoric. The final straw for many of 
these ex-Confederates was Mahone’s decision to caucus with the Republicans in the United 
States Senate when he took his seat in 1881, giving the Republicans a majority. Mahone’s 
allegiance to the Republicans might have been sustainable if the Republican Party had a strong 
base of support in Virginia, but Mahone’s Readjuster movement had been the closest they had 
come to being viable in the state and many former Confederates lead the opposition to Senator 
Mahone and the Readjusters.74  
Throughout the postwar years it is clear William Mahone believed he could lead Virginia 
in reunification with the North, and he never openly brooded on the Confederacy’s defeat. In one 
of his first speeches Mahone stated that as soon as the war ended he concluded that the South 
“must necessarily not only abandon all aspirations for political independence, save in the Union, 
but that its only hope for prosperity and happiness depended upon a hearty alignment with the 
best thought of the ruling section of the country.” Mahone knew northern capital was beneficial 
for himself and for Virginia’s economy and this always transcended any lingering animosity 
toward his former enemy. In February of 1883, he wrote a letter to president Arthur to thank him 
for his support of the Readjusters and Virginia itself from which “has come an honest endeavor 
to overthrow sectional and race contentions and to enforce the constitution and the laws.” This 
was Mahone’s vision of a Virginia fully in compliance with the laws of the United States and 
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living up to the Reconstruction era amendments. Arthur’s support, with the subsequent flow of 
Republican money into the Readjuster Party, was the major benefit of Mahone’s stance.75  
 
Limits of Reconciliation 
Mahone’s alliance with the Republicans catapulted the Readjusters to their greatest 
success in Virginia, but this alliance was interpreted as a serious threat by Virginia’s 
Conservative Party. The Readjusters’ domination of the black vote was a growing concern for 
these men, and they would not abide the specter of a strong Republican Party in Virginia, the 
white South’s enemy from the war and Reconstruction. Senator Ben Hill of Georgia, a Democrat 
and Confederate Senator during the war, demonstrated that reconciliation only existed between 
Readjusters and Republicans when he challenged Mahone on the Senate floor. Hill said that 
Mahone owed his allegiance to the Conservative Party of Virginia who elected him and to the 
southern Democratic Party at large. Mahone replied that he had proudly fought for the South and 
had not apologized for his role in the war and would not apologize for it now in the Senate. 
However, in his opinion, the South was now “a mere geographical expression and no longer has 
political idealization.” He went on to tell other senators that “I was not elected as a Democrat. I 
am a Readjuster and owe my election to the Readjusters.” Ensconced in a Republican-controlled 
Senate and fresh on the heels of William Cameron’s victory in Virginia, Mahone likely felt safe 
in distancing himself from Virginia's Conservative Party and the other southern Democrats. 
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Republicans were quick to come to Mahone’s defense, without any apparent irony, by touting his 
war record.76 
Northern and Republican newspapers argued that Mahone’s record as a Confederate 
soldier demonstrated that he was more qualified than any other former Confederate to be 
Virginia’s Senator. The New York Herald stated that “Mr Mahone has a better war record as a 
Southern Confederate general than any other man in Congress.” Pieces like this one intended to 
expose how foolish southerners’ charges of betrayal were, and an Ohio paper stated that “a 
comparison of war records between Hill and Mahone is very disadvantageous to Hill.” Not all 
northern papers were positive on Mahone’s military career. One Iowa paper reminded its readers 
that Mahone had “fought to destroy the Union” and only those who “slew without tears or 
sorrow” should now embrace him.77 However, most of these accounts offered nothing but praise 
for Mahone’s role as a Confederate general. With the Democratic party in control across every 
former Confederate state, the Republicans were clearly ready to embrace any challenger against 
them that emerged, regardless of said challenger’s past record.78 
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Contrary to Republican papers, southern accounts stressed that Mahone’s Republican 
allegiance in the Senate invalidated his confederate service. A paper from New Orleans wrote: 
“when he [Mahone] made that declaration to the world, he became a monster in the eyes of all 
those who still adhere to the Lost Cause and hope for the resurrection of the Southern 
Confederacy.” Additionally, prominent Conservative papers, like The Richmond Dispatch, 
portrayed Mahone as a failed businessman who seized control of the issue of Readjustment from 
Conservative politicians for his own designs. In 1882, The Dispatch said that Mahone was a 
“bigoted despot and the most vindictive tyrant that ever thrived in a Republican government.” 
These southern white responses equated any deals with the Republicans as supporting the enemy 
of the white South. For these papers, policy was irrelevant in comparison to the threat of a 
Republican takeover of Virginia with Mahone’s help.79 
Senator Hill’s attack emboldened Mahone’s Conservative rivals who worried Mahone 
would wrest control of the state away from them by giving the vote to poor white Virginians and 
black men. As previously mentioned, many of these traditional Conservatives were attached to 
notions of southern honor and, as Bertram Wyatt-Brown argued, the very system of Democracy, 
and the equality it promoted through suffrage, undermined southern honor by invalidating the 
system of reputation and class that it rested upon. As Mahone embarked on his reform 
movements in state government he commented that “this twaddle about the honor of the state is 
sheer nonsense.” Nonsense perhaps to the industrious William Mahone, but not to traditional 
Conservatives such as William Royall. Royall was a Confederate cavalryman during the war and 
served as a lawyer for Virginia’s Conservatives, who favored complete debt repayment, and he 
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eventually left Virginia for North Carolina in a rage when the Readjusters triumphed in 1881 and 
1882. In his 1909 memoir, Royall stated that when it came to Mahone “I hated him, and he is the 
only man I ever hated.” Royall demonstrated in his autobiography that even more odious than 
Mahone’s stance as a debt-payer was his recruitment of black voters in Virginia. According to 
Royall the “negroes” always voted against the whites and it was a betrayal for Mahone to utilize 
them to his advantage, and that “all the negroes and the worthless whites supported him.” Royall 
also noted how Mahone avoided several duels in this period, even one with his former ally 
Governor Kemper. In Royall’s mind Mahone had already shirked his honor as a man by avoiding 
these duels, and now his political activity threatened the honor of Virginia itself and its white 
elites.80 
Mahone’s rhetoric never implied that Virginia would be controlled by the northern 
Republicans or black people. He always advocated for Virginia to have a leading role in the 
United States and saw a prosperous relationship with the North as the means to achieve this. Just 
as in his railroad days, Mahone believed that his leadership in Virginia would facilitate its revival 
as the most prosperous southern state. On Virginia's role he commented that “it is eminently 
proper that Virginia should lead…in the restoration of harmony and fraternal relations between 
all the cities of our common and undivided country.” While many white Democrats would have 
agreed with this, they took issue with Mahone because they could not control him, and this was 
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even more threatening because of the influence his movement had on Virginia’s black voters. A 
statement of black voters in 1881 said they were supporting the Readjusters for their protection 
of the political rights of black men but that “the Readjuster Party does more than this: it 
cultivates respect and attachment for the Union—that Union which we love so much and to 
which we are so attached.”81  
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Republicans Embrace Mahone’s Rhetoric 
 
Figure 6: “More Than Their Match” Northern Republicans viewed Mahone as the best method 
they had left to break up the Democratic Party in the South. This cartoon from Harpers Weekly 
joyfully mocked the Virginia Democrats dismay over Mahone’s decision to caucus with the 
Republicans in the Senate. (Scrapbook 19, 1881, Box 212, WMP.) 
It was Mahone's ability to antagonize the southern Democrats that endeared him to the 
Republicans, and they saw his sparring with Ben Hill in the Senate as proof of this. From the 
moment he aligned himself with their cause, the Republicans portrayed Mahone as a 
revolutionary political leader who would be capable of unshackling the South from the 
traditional power of the Democrats and create a viable basis for the Republican Party to expand 
in the South. The Warren Tribune of Ohio commented that “the new senator from Virginia has 
already become famous…his refusal to be bull-dozed by the Democratic caucus, have won for 
him the esteem of all honest men.” Republican papers as far away as Los Angeles, California 
saw the rise of senator Mahone as proof that “The Readjusters of Virginia are the advance guard 
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of a considerable element which will shortly make itself felt in the disruption of the solid South.” 
Republicans had been willing to compromise with Mahone and the Virginia Conservative Party 
in the election of Gilbert Walker, but their foothold in Virginia had only gotten smaller since. 
Mahone’s leading role in that compromise as a prominent Conservative figure was proof for 
many Republicans that Mahone could lead another such compromise movement in Virginia, and 
maybe inspire similar movements across the South.82 
The Republicans had tried and failed to build a viable base of white support in the South 
during Reconstruction and many viewed prominent white men like Mahone as the only chance 
left. Mahone and the Readjusters were portrayed in highly optimistic terms by many of these 
Republican leaders and papers as the dawn of a new age of third-party movements that were 
essential in allowing Republicans to win elections in former Confederate states, and ultimately, 
destroy the Democratic party from within. Republicans viewed supporting Mahone, and 
reconciliation with white southerners like him, as a bulwark against the resurgent ex-Confederate 
influence in politics which they considered a “fearful menace to the peace and prosperity of the 
Union.” As the New York Times described, “Bourbon rule in the South can only be destroyed by 
a division in the ranks in the Democrats of that section. The Republican organization as it exists 
now, cannot compass that destruction.” Republicans viewed the Democrats in the South as “the 
odious vestige of the Confederacy,” and their newspapers often professed an irrational level of 
optimism. One proclaimed that “Mahone is the first step forward and there are more to 
follow…Republicans will stand by him until the Solid-South is broken.”83  
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Republicans predicted the downfall of the Democratic party in the South, even as the 
Readjusters collapsed and Mahone was increasingly vilified by white Virginians. The State 
Republican paper published numerous editorials about Mahone’s last bid to be governor in 1889, 
nearly all of them attributing Republican “success” in Virginia to Mahone. One man from 
Powhatan wrote that “the advance of the Republican Party in Virginia is due to the resolute, 
untiring, manly and judicious leadership of William Mahone.” Another Republican stated that 
“Mahone has done more for the Republican Party in Virginia and the South than any living 
man.” While there is some truth behind this lavish praise, Mahone and the Republicans had seen 
major reverses since he had sided with them as a senator in 1881. The Readjuster Party had 
collapsed, Democrat Fitzhugh Lee had supplanted Readjuster William Cameron for governor, 
and Virginia had voted for Democrat Grover Cleveland in the presidential election of 1884. In 
1889 especially, Mahone was routinely criticized for appointing former Democrats and other 
personal friends into Virginia's Republican leadership. Mahone was comfortable working with 
the Republicans, as he had few friends left in Virginia’s Conservative Party, but there is no 
evidence he ever viewed his actions in the framework of a national strategy. The success of the 
Readjusters was not replicated by the numerous other third-party movements across the South 
that The National Republican hoped for when it described William Mahone as “a leader foremost 
among a thousand who will follow in his footsteps.”84 
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The Readjusters’ Foundation: Mahone’s distribution of Federal Patronage 
 
Figure 7: “Patronage Mill” William Mahone (pictured wearing the Confederate jacket in the 
middle) used his position as Senator to distribute extensive patronage to his Readjuster 
supporters in Virginia. This was typical of political practices of the day, but Mahone’s enemies 
could not tolerate his control over jobs and offices in Virginia. (Scrapbook 41, 1888-1889, Box 
221, WMP.) 
 
Mahone’s greatest contribution to the success of the Readjusters was his calculated 
distribution of federal patronage to his supporters as a Senator that ensured their loyalty to the 
coalition. After Mahone secured the support of President Chester A. Arthur in 1881, Arthur 
rewarded Mahone with 1,970 government jobs to fill as he pleased. These patronage postings 
were handed out to loyal Readjusters and provided black Virginians with opportunities that 
surpassed anything the Republicans had been able to accomplish in these areas. This was a 
fundamentally quid-pro-quo relationship, but it did generate considerable optimism among black 
Virginians who supported Mahone throughout his political career. This practice of patronage was 
termed “Mahoneism” by his opponents, to emphasize its cronyism, but it was far from unusual 
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considering the centrality of patronage to Gilded Age politics. The power of U.S. senators to 
hand out patronage in their states was used to dictate loyalty to party regardless of any policy 
concerns, something Mahone recognized could sustain his shift away from the Virginia 
Conservative Party. Mahone primarily distributed patronage to people and counties that he 
needed to win the next election, but these patronage benefits came closest to the establishment of 
genuine racial reconciliation during the Readjuster years.85 
For Mahone, black men working and voting for him was the primary motivation for 
distribution of patronage. However, patronage also accomplished Mahone’s goal of revitalizing 
Virginia’s economy through the participation of all citizens in the work force. Mahone said that 
patronage “elevates them [black people] as citizens,” and, “promotes their productive capacity” 
but he always made it explicitly clear that patronage depended on the procurement of votes for 
the Readjusters. To one likely black supporter, he said that he must “carry the colored vote of the 
county in this fall election by a certain majority,” if he was to get a job in Washington. It was 
evident that these exhortations by Mahone had an effect, as the man replied that “I will use every 
effort from now until the polls close on the 8th day of Nov to gain a great victory.” When African 
Americans worked for Mahone’s campaign he often rewarded them. Ross Hamilton was a 
prominent black politician who served in the Virginia General Assembly from 1869–1882, and 
1889–1891, as a representative of Mecklenburg County. He requested travel funds from Mahone 
and Mahone even lobbied for him to receive a vacation, but this was followed up by asking him 
                                                          
85 Degler, The Other South, 291. Degler breaks down the postings as “200 offices in the Treasury 
Department, 1,700 in the Post Office, 70 in the courts, and an unspecified number at the Norfolk Naval 
Yard”; Frances E. Lee, “Patronage, Logrolls, and ‘Polarization’: Congressional parties of the Gilded Age, 
1876–1896.” Studies in American Political Development 30, no. 1 (2016): 1–12, 117, 121. Lee argues that 
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to go and stump for Readjuster candidates in Mecklenburg County.86 The importance of 
Mahone’s patronage to black voters is demonstrated by the countless black people who 
supported the Readjuster movement and wrote to Mahone about post office jobs and other 
employment concerns. Overall, applicants to Mahone received a mixed result, because Mahone 
regularly filled vacancies based on who could help the Readjusters win various counties, even if 
Mahone outwardly portrayed his decision making as impartial to people writing him for 
positions.87  
Even though Black Virginians held a minority of the offices in the Virginia House and 
Senate, the patronage they received was a crucial part of Mahone’s strategy and not just a token 
effort of appeasement. Mahone’s call for “competent young colored men” typically meant a job 
in the post office, naval yard, or school system. It is important to note that while Mahone likely 
agreed with a naval yard foreman in Norfolk who wrote him that “this is one of the places a 
colored man is competent for,” the patronage jobs he filled with black people were essential to 
the Readjusters’ success. Mahone needed loyal Readjusters in key postings, especially the post 
offices around Virginia. The post office was a vital way to disseminate Readjuster literature 
across the state and its workers often doubled as political organizers. There were hundreds of 
these jobs to be filled and Mahone relied on the organization in black communities to send him 
                                                          
86 Michael J. Jackson to William Mahone, Sept 14, 1881, Box 34, WMP; William Mahone to Anna 
Weber, March 12, 1883, Vol 38:313; ibid., William Mahone to Ross Hamilton, March 7,12:313,366; For 
a contemporary example of another white Virginian who favored education for black people as a means to 
increase Virginia’s prosperity see Lewis Harvie Blair, A Southern Prophecy: The Prosperity of the South 
Dependent Upon the elevation of the Negro (1889; Boston: Little and Brown, 1964). Blair would 
eventually retract his advocacy for black suffrage and was openly in favor of Jim Crow by the time of his 
death in 1916.  
87 For examples of this, William Mahone to Mr. Edmondson, Feb 15, 1883, Vol 38:30, WMP. Mahone 
stated that “it will not do for me to be controlled by personal friendships in such matters.” 
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candidates. This system allowed black men to participate in, and benefit from, the political 
activities of the Readjusters.88   
  Patronage appointments were the crucial link that held the Readjusters together, and 
African Americans stressed to Mahone that their support for him hinged on receiving them. In 
July of 1881, a black Readjuster from Petersburg offered himself up to be the city’s Post Master 
and stated that if Mahone appointed him it would “do an act of justice to the negro race of 
Virginia, and at the same time perform a strategic move on the political chessboard [which] will 
make it almost impossible to find a colored man of any intelligence, opposed to the coalition of 
Republicans with ‘your' party…your political experience will enable you readily to see that the 
colored people will rally to the cause you espouse; if such an appointment is made.” This letter 
demonstrated that black people viewed post office jobs as a genuine commitment to their welfare 
by the Readjuster Party. This system of patronage, so common in Gilded Age politics, was thus 
mutually reinforcing for white Readjusters like Mahone and black Virginians and it directly 
complimented another key issue on which they found common ground on, education.89 
 Public education had always brought out bitter factionalism in Virginia, and next to the 
state debt, it was the strongest issue for Mahone and the Readjusters. The traditional 
Conservative attitude resisted funds for public schooling at all costs with governor Frederick 
Holliday commenting on the eve of the Readjuster movement that “our fathers did not need free 
schools to make them what they were.” Holliday’s refusal to fund public education and his 
continued refusal to readjust the state’s debt thus gave a major impetus for the Readjusters who 
                                                          
88 MP, Box 48, 1882. James W. Edloe to William Mahone, June 5, 1882, Box 48, WMP; U. D. Groner to 
William Mahone, June 10, 1882, Box 48, WMP; See also Hahn, A Nation Under Our Feet, 379, 383. 
89 M.M. Demortle to William Mahone, July 1, 1881, Box 32, WMP; Hahn, A Nation Under our Feet, 381. 
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argued that public education for all white Virginians regardless of race was essential for 
Virginia’s prosperity. As Mahone stated, “the best interests of the state demand that the large 
class of persons recently admitted to the privileges of citizenship [black people] should receive 
careful and ample instruction.”90 The Readjuster Party made good on their claims and provided 
opportunities for black Virginians with adequate funding for public education and opportunities 
to be teachers in their own schools for the first time since the Civil War ended. Under these 
circumstances, it is unsurprising that Readjuster policies on education galvanized black 
Virginians the most.  
The Readjusters also reformed universities to fit their goal of “modernizing” all areas of 
the state. Mahone believed universities, in general, were teaching policies out of line with the 
direction of the state. To remedy this, the Readjusters revitalized and changed the curriculum of 
the University of Virginia to broaden its courses for the present day and enroll students from less 
wealthy backgrounds. Additionally, Mahone routinely expressed support for public schooling in 
Virginia and stated that “I am a friend of all of them” in a letter appealing for funding for his 
alma mater: The Virginia Military Institute. For black Virginians, the Readjusters provided 
$100,000 to construct a Normal and Collegiate Institute for black people in Petersburg in 1882, 
which is today Virginia State University.91 On the national stage, Mahone supported the Blair 
Education Bill which was brought before Congress several times in the 1880s, but never made it 
out of the Senate, and would have provided federal funding for public schools and thereby 
guarantee black people access to them regardless of state politics. These policies represented a 
sincere commitment by Mahone and the Readjusters to education for both races in Virginia. 
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Between 1879 and 1883 black schools increased from 675 to 1,715 and enrollment from 35,768 
to 90,948. The Readjusters’ funding for public schools, and appointment of black teachers, 
elicited the greatest enthusiasm among black people who had been actively campaigning for 
black teachers, school board members, and school presidents throughout Reconstruction.92 
Letters from black Virginians to the Readjuster leadership show that many were 
genuinely inspired by these education reforms, and many supported the Readjusters over the 
Republicans because of them. This inspiration is apparent in a letter written to Governor 
Cameron by a black schoolteacher in Alexandria named, S. L. Tundas. He wrote that “I am a 
col[ored] Republican and have been always as a col[ored] man can be nothing else consistently 
yet at the present time in the present issue I think it is the indispensable duty of Repubs [sic] to 
support the candidates of the June [Readjuster] convention. I intend to fight it to the bitter end 
under the Readjuster banner.” Tundas’s letter demonstrated how he viewed supporting Mahone’s 
policies as the foundation for additional cooperation with the Readjusters. As Tundas described, 
“I have been trying to impress the col[ored] people…that our salvation depends on the success of 
the Readj party this fall. I am tired of working to make enemies I wish to make friends and I 
think the best way to do that is for all good citizens irrespective of race color or previous 
condition if they want to see the state prosper will vote the Readj ticket.”  This is a clear 
representation of the mixture of practical and idealistic motivations that convinced black people 
to unify behind the Readjuster movement. Some of them at least partially viewed a path to 
                                                          
92 Hillary Green, Educational Reconstruction, 80-83, 157-158, 162, 169, 187. Green argued that the 
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political “salvation” through the support of the Readjusters, which mirrored Mahone and the 
party's white leaders’ lofty language about their party. However, the party’s appointment of 
African American teachers to the public-school system over white teachers challenged traditional 
social relationships between white and black people in the state and contributed to growing 
resentment among white people in Virginia.93 
 
 
Figure 8: “District School” The Readjusters, and 
new Movement Conservatives before them, argued 
that traditional Conservatives would sooner destroy 
any schools in Virginia than fund them. Here 
Conservative John Warwick Daniel is pictured 
putting the torch to a schoolhouse. He would 
eventually replace Mahone in the Senate as a 
Democrat in 1887. Woodstock Virginian August 26, 
1881, Scrapbook 22, Box 213, WMP. 
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accounts from black men who wrote to Mahone about their enthusiasm with Readjuster policies. Turner 
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Racial Violence and the Collapse of the Readjusters 
After Governor Cameron’s election in 1882, Virginia’s white Conservatives realized they 
could not beat the Readjusters on economic issues and a growing number of poor whites had 
proved to be strong Readjusters. Without any policies of their own to campaign on the 
Conservatives renamed themselves as the Virginia Democratic Party and, led by some of 
Mahone’s longtime antagonists such as Jubal Early, desperately attacked the Readjuster 
movement with the inflammatory charges of “negro rule” and “miscegenation” to unite white 
Virginians in defense of white supremacy and destroy Mahone’s movement. Modern scholarship 
has portrayed the resulting massacre of unarmed black men in Danville Virginia prior to the 
election of 1883 as proof that the Readjuster coalition was doomed from then on by implacable 
white supremacy in Virginia and that Mahone and the party’s leadership abandoned African 
American voters and gave up their designs on a Republican government in Virginia. There is 
nothing inherently wrong with this interpretation, but the violence perpetrated against Readjuster 
voters in the 1883 election was just the beginning of a pattern of violence and fraud against 
Mahone’s supporters, and splinter movements across the South generally, who were not 
discouraged after the election of 1883 and continued to fight on primarily under the Republican 
banner.94 
For Americans in the nineteenth century, violence or the threat of violence was an 
established part of the political process. During Reconstruction, white people carried out various 
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Virginians had when confronted with the prospect of racial integration, and white Democrats used this 
paranoia to go on the offensive in Virginia. 
 
88 
 
forms of mob and individualized violence against African Americans to defend white 
supremacy. As scholar Carole Emberton argues, such acts of violence “enabled Americans to 
define who they were as well as who they were not” as citizens and political actors. For 
traditional white Conservatives (now Democrats) they would not allow Mahone’s Readjusters to 
elevate black men and poor whites into a bloc that might overturn their hierarchical system of 
white supremacy. Democratic leaders reminded white men of supposed duty to their race and 
mixing violence with voting was a powerful tool because it spoke to martial tradition inherent in 
American society, with gun ownership in the South being in most instances the exclusive right of 
white men before the Civil War. Thus, in the lead up to the murders in Danville the Democrats 
equated any black voting to a race war and set out to redeem their manly honor that Mahone’s 
movement threatened.95  
The Democrats realized a focus on the Readjusters’ perceived threat to white supremacy 
was their best tactic against Mahone in 1883. After the successful election of Governor Cameron, 
the Readjuster Party seemed invulnerable and Mahone gushed that “the outlook for the South is 
better and with a resolute and determined effort, on the part of those who would expel the 
nightmare of Bourbonism there is in reserve for her and every interest a bright and prosperous 
future.”  He believed the party had substantial support across the state and that only the issue of 
racial integration could threaten their dominance. This view was expressed by Mahone’s 
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Emberton, Beyond Redemption (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 8-10, 140-145; Michael 
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mouthpiece the Richmond Whig that stated that the “only real issues in Virginia this year are the 
debt, the suffrage, and the schools and they [the Democrats] know there can be no other unless 
they can succeed in re-defining the color line.” The paper said that racial harmony “has already 
shown to be possible under the Readjuster banner” and this was all that was needed to keep the 
Democrats out of power. The Whig’s optimism belied the very real concern many Readjusters 
had over the growing white backlash against Readjuster policies, especially regarding black 
teachers replacing white ones in Virginia’s schools. As the election of 1883 approached, the 
Readjusters assured white Virginians that an increase in black teachers was not a step toward 
general school integration, “nothing could be further from the truth,” wrote one Readjuster 
organ. Tensions grew across the state as voters clearly identified a racial divide between each 
party’s policies heading into the pivotal election. One man wrote that “the Bourbons [Democrats] 
publicly say that they do not want the nigger vote” and “the colored vote will go with those who 
can and will aid them in local and personal affairs.” The Democrats’ strategy of making any 
future election a racial contest appeared to be gaining steam. William Mahone was concerned 
about these tactics, but he incorrectly assumed his political success and military legacy were 
enough to retain white support as Democrats stoked the fears of mixed schools and 
miscegenation.96 
The Danville Massacre was Virginia’s first major incident of the kind of white 
supremacist violence against black men that had been seen far earlier in other southern states.  
The killings were called a riot by white Democrats to frame the incident as the potential spark of 
a race war and not the cold-blooded murder that it was. Three days before the November election 
                                                          
96 William Mahone to (?), Dec 25, 1883, Vol 48:67, WMP; “The Funder Call,” The Richmond Whig, Feb 
19, 1881, Box 209, WMP; “Mixed Schools” Spirit of the Valley, Nov 2, 1883, Box 216, WMP; Ibid., 
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of 1883, a dispute between a white and black man resulted in a crowd of white men shooting 
four unarmed black men. This instigated countless armed posses of white men to roam around 
Virginia and intimidate voters prior to election day. Danville was a Readjuster stronghold, with a 
majority black population, and African Americans held posts in the town council, police force, 
and other offices. However, its white citizens in the surrounding county were strong Democrats 
and the Democratic Party worked feverishly to stir up familiar Reconstruction paranoia with dire 
warnings against the prospect of “negro rule” in Danville. Within days the Democrats’ 
propaganda spread far and wide and directly implicated the Readjuster Party in instigating the 
violence in Danville.97  
The rhetoric of the reconstituted Virginia Democratic Party instigated the massacre at 
Danville as a retaliation against the Readjusters’ beneficial policies toward black Virginians. The 
white residents in Danville were whipped into a frenzy after Jubal Early helped publish the 
incendiary Danville Circular bulletin in October of 1883. This propaganda piece warned 
Danville’s white residents about the perceived “negro rule” the Readjusters represented in their 
town, and the subsequent murders these white Democrats committed in response severely 
                                                          
97 It should be no surprise that the Democrats’ charges of “negro rule” were devoid of any pretense in 
reality. Black men held four seats on the city council as opposed to the seven claimed by Jubal Early’s 
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Hahn, A Nation Under our Feet, 402-403; Walter Calhoun, “The Danville Riot and its Repercussions on 
the Virginia Election of 1883” in Studies in the History of the South: 1875-1922, (Greenville: Dept of 
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Americans in both the North and South during Reconstruction see Mark Wahlgren Summers, A 
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Carolina Press, 2009.) 
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damaged the confidence among black Readjusters, and William Mahone himself, that free and 
fair elections were possible. However, this violence did not sway Mahone and the party 
leadership from focusing on future elections, nor did it fundamentally sever the support of 
African Americans for Mahone and the Republicans, with twenty-three out of thirty-two black 
majority counties in Virginia voting the Republican ticket for Congress in 1884 and all but one 
of these counties voting Republican in 1886. Instead, the Democrats turned some whites away 
from Mahone with the race issue, but their ultimate success in regaining control of state 
government occurred over several years of continued violence, election fraud, and the 
assassination of Mahone's reputation. Mahone's long list of personal rivalries contributed to the 
downfall of the Republicans in Virginia. Nevertheless, Mahone remained the only figure capable 
of organizing any opposition to the Democrats in Virginia, and the Republicans’ failure to unify 
behind him in his bid for governor in 1889 assured his defeat. After this failure, Mahone 
continued to advocate for a fair election process in Virginia while the Democratic Party stamped 
out all remnants of third-party and Republican challenges to their control of Virginia.98 
The killings in Danville in 1883 suppressed the black electorate significantly, and neither 
Mahone nor the Republicans controlled the needed force to ensure fair elections. After previous 
massacres during Reconstruction the presence of federal soldiers had sometimes resulted in 
federal investigations that protected black rights in government. This was not so in 1883. On a 
national scale, Republican interest in Reconstruction was essentially dead with the last 
congressional measure designed to protect black rights, the Civil Rights Act of 1875, struck 
down by the supreme court in 1884. Modern scholarship on this act argues that it was more a 
moral act than one that could be enforced, and this was even more true in 1883. In this context, it 
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is little wonder the Democrats were emboldened to resort to violence to defeat the Readjusters, 
and the murder of unarmed black men in Danville fundamentally damaged the Readjusters’ 
ability to hold on to the white votes they needed to combat Democratic control. White violence 
against black people had previously shaken the Republican Party’s commitment to 
Reconstruction in the 1870s and created extensive internal divisions within the party, as many 
Republicans believed federal interference to protect the rights of Freedmen had gone too far and 
was not the government’s responsibility anymore. The Democrats capitalized on this apathy in 
1883 to carry out the brutal murders in Danville and undermine the legitimacy of Virginia’s 
elections, with no fear of a state or national backlash or intervention.99 
The Danville Massacre demonstrated that, for all his organizational talent, Mahone could 
not stand up to traditional Conservatives when they tapped into white Virginians’ fears over 
“negro domination” and miscegenation. These tactics used the trappings of southern honor and 
white supremacy to equate any black man getting a local job or voting at the polls to a broad and 
intolerable assault on Virginia’s collective white “family.” Longtime Conservative and Funder 
John Warwick Daniel bluntly stated the reconstituted Virginia Democratic Party’s position at a 
rally prior to the election of 1883: “I am Democrat…because I am a white man and a Virginian.” 
As historian Gregory Downs argues, these tactics connected any black success to white 
impoverishment in a racial zero-sum game where “an inequity to any white man was an insult to 
                                                          
99 Federal protection was seen in response to the “riots” in Memphis and New Orleans in 1866 where 
numerous black people were murdered by mobs of whites. See Foner, Reconstruction, 262-263, 274, 556. 
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every white man.” Virginia Democrats’ use of this rhetoric eroded the support of whites in the 
mountain counties of southwest Virginia who had little day-to-day interaction with black people. 
Democratic propaganda directly targeted this group of whites, with one party pamphlet 
proclaiming, “White men of the mountains! Many of you are not yet aware of the danger in 
which you and your families stand of being ruled over by negroes.” Following the massacre, 
Jubal Early offered his sympathies to the white citizens of Danville when he stated that, “We 
heartily sympathize with our fellow citizens of Danville in their struggle against the domination 
of the negro race, under the lead of renegade white men.” The Democrats’ actions demonstrated 
the intractable nature of white supremacy in Virginia prior to the 1883 election, and, for all its 
success, Mahone’s Readjuster coalition could not overcome this inherent racism. In the 1884 
Congressional election, only six counties out of the fifteen that had voted for Governor Cameron 
in 1881 and given the Readjusters at least five hundred white votes, went for the Republican 
Party. With the debt settled, many white people were comfortable returning to the Conservative 
ranks.100 
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The Coalition Begins to Fracture: Republican Reactions to the Massacre 
Readjusters and Republican papers fumed against the Democrats’ violence after Danville, 
but the Democrats realized neither Mahone nor the Republicans had an answer for their tactics. 
In the days between the killings and the election one northern traveler observed that “the county 
was most excited over rumors that the negroes were making a general uprising” and “the state 
was bordering on a condition of war.” Another from Philadelphia summarized how white men he 
talked to had decided to “shoot over the niggers and kill the white people who are leading them,” 
continuing, “If there is anything we are determined upon, it is that the educated whites shall rule 
Virginia, even if we have to shoot the life out of this Mahone movement.” While this story is 
essentially hearsay, the result of the subsequent election left little doubt many white people in 
Virginia believed the Democratic fear-mongering, especially whites in the southwest that 
supported the Readjusters on economic reforms but actively resented the imagined intrusion of 
black people into their towns and public spaces.101 
Northern reactions to the massacre were mixed, but they demonstrated waning support 
for Mahone, that represented Mahone’s chief value to them had always been his credibility 
among white Virginians as a Confederate veteran. The violence in Danville thus proved to many 
Republicans that even Mahone might not be enough to resist the southern Democrats. One 
Virginia Republican had previously commented that “if we cannot divide the Democrats with 
Mahone that it is useless to try anymore,” and several articles that followed the Readjusters’ 
defeat in 1883 affirmed this sentiment. In one article titled Disgraced Virginia, the paper 
concluded that Virginia “is no home for a self-respecting white man of the North.” The National 
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Republican despaired over the situation in Virginia as a result of the violence in Danville and 
said that the Democratic policy in Virginia was a war “of brute force against freedom of opinion, 
freedom of speech, and freedom of the press…the negro hater demands absolute obedience of 
others to his caprices. He tolerates no difference of opinion. Not to hate what he hates is to hate 
him.” While these papers all decried the racist attacks by the Democrats, they also seemed 
resigned to failure in Virginia with one article asking, “What is left of Mahone?” This sense of 
hopelessness among the Republicans contributed to growing criticism of Mahone himself and 
helped build the persona of “Mahone tyrannical boss” that has remained a central part of his 
legacy.102  
Some Republicans blamed Mahone’s leadership for the Democrats’ victory after the 
Danville massacre. The Washington Times commented that the result in Virginia should show 
Republicans that “Too much Mahone drove from him thousands of the best Republicans of the 
state, who did not believe that the political destiny of any state in the Union should be committed 
to the keeping of one man.” However, other Republican papers in the North represented a unified 
front following the violence and argued that it was primarily the Democrats’ tactics and not 
Mahone's leadership style that was responsible for the crushing defeat of the Readjusters in 1883. 
The Boston Times said that the only thing the Democrats could do was to “shoot a few negroes 
and intimidate the rest” and that “Mahone is a hero…he deserves Northern confidence, 
sympathy, and aid.” A Philadelphia paper predicted Democratic tactics would backfire on them 
and said that Mahone was a champion for fighting against the “resistance to the negro’s 
constitutional rights of political equality.” Mahone and the Readjusters could not afford this 
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of Terror,” The National Republican. 
96 
 
disunity of opinion among Republicans as they faced a united Democratic Party at the polls on 
election day who were determined to prevent further Readjuster victories at any cost. No matter 
what policies Mahone espoused he was unable to stop white Democrats from exercising tight 
control over most of Virginia's polling places from 1883 on.103 
 
Beginnings of Disenfranchisement: The Democrats Take Control Through Violence and 
Fraud 
Racist rhetoric about miscegenation and “negro rule” and the violence at Danville was 
not enough to assure the Democrats that Mahone would be defeated. During the election of 1883, 
various forms of election fraud were instituted by the Democrats to ensure the defeat of the 
Readjusters at the polls. The Democrats sent out armed men to the polls to prevent Readjusters 
both black and white from having their votes counted in large numbers. Many Readjusters, 
especially black men, refused to abandon Mahone, and the large quantity of aggrieved reports of 
fraud and violence at the polls that Mahone received demonstrates that there were white 
Readjusters too who were disgusted by the Democrats’ tactics. Nevertheless, there is no doubt 
the election of November 6, 1883, was a crushing defeat for the Readjuster Party in Virginia with 
the Democrats regaining complete control of both houses of the General Assembly. In the city of 
Danville, contemporary reports indicated that only 51 black people voted out of an electorate of 
1,301, and voter turnout was affected in most other counties in the state. The impact might have 
been even more serious for the fragile alliance brokered with white voters in the state. “The 
incendiary talk of the negroes in the Danville district spread like wildfire…hundreds of white 
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men deserted Mahone and in some instances moderate negroes voted with Democrats,” reported 
one paper in the aftermath of the election.104 
Democrats mixed intimidation and bribery at the polling places in a deadly combination 
that Mahone had no ability to stop. Democratic candidate and Confederate veteran Williams 
Carter Wickham had workers for his campaign at numerous polling places who bribed every 
voter who approached. A notary named J. L. Valentine described the use of alcohol to bribe 
voters writing, “I saw men taken into and behind a stable about thirty yards from the polls… by 
Wickham managers and when they returned, they showed that they were under the influence of 
liquor. A man told me he got a vote for Wickham for a drink of Brandy.” The Democrats 
employed bribery across all counties in Virginia and it had a decisive impact on the election's 
outcome. As one Readjuster from Alexandria wrote, “we were beaten here by the free use of 
money, and traitorous cause of the Republican office holders at Falls-Church and Alexandra 
[sic]…In my district they only beat us by seven votes, this was a gain of about 33 votes for them 
which were bought.”105 
The Readjusters had always obtained most of their strength from majority African 
American urban centers and a few majority white mountain counties, and the murder of black 
men at Danville devastated a major urban center of Readjuster support. Subsequently, the 
Democrats needed little help in the other Virginia counties to control the polling places. The 
Democrats relied on intimidation at nearly every polling place and they regularly outnumbered 
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the Readjuster officials there. In Hanover County, L. R. Burnett reported that “the Democrats 
were in force early in the morning; formed a cordon of self-constituted police around the porch, 
and if a man colored or white presented himself and desired to vote their way [he] was permitted 
to do so.” This report went on to describe how Democratic judges at the polling places 
outnumbered all Readjuster and Republican representatives and did the counting themselves, 
“there were during the day at all times during the day from ten to twenty Democrats in the room 
where the polls were.” These accounts made no mention of Readjuster officials at their polling 
places but many of them, especially black Readjusters expressed determination to vote anyway 
which caused the Democrats to increase their threats, as one Mahone man reported, “Men white 
and black were openly and persistently bulldozed and threatened with loss of patronage, loss of 
homes, and loss of employment.” In light of this, it is unsurprising that Democratic intimidation 
kept some Readjusters from coming out to vote at all. A post-election report from Readjuster W. 
E. Harvie stated that the Danville circular “had the effect of making many of our men who were 
either weak or timid vote with the Funders or remain away from the polls.”106  
Even before the Danville massacre many white people were too intimidated to vote for 
the Readjusters. “The white people of this section cannot be depended upon as Readjusters. 
Them that are in favor of it are afraid to vote,” wrote one Mahone man in 1882. In 1883, the 
Democrats doubled down on white reluctance and racial paranoia by declaring “war upon the 
negro” and “abandoning all discussion of state policy, the Democrats made the campaign 
exclusively [on] the race issue…half of their gains were won from the ranks of the white 
Readjusters by cajoling and threats,” reported one Readjuster. While the Readjusters recognized 
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the Democratic tactic of labeling themselves “white man's party,” they were unable to counteract 
the race war narrative the Democrats emphasized in the aftermath of Danville and, without 
another economic issue to attract poor white men to their standard, Mahone and his lieutenants 
were left shell-shocked as the election returns came in, ousting them from both Houses of the 
Virginia General Assembly.107 
The violence of the Democratic Party was the decisive factor in 1883, and they won by 
18,000 votes out of 276,000. William Mahone was surprised and disgusted as the Democrats 
won two-thirds of the seats in Virginia’s legislature, but far from resigned to defeat. Mahone 
lamented how the Democrats won on the race issue because it “precludes the necessity of 
argument…prejudice is not amenable to reason or argument,” and he believed the Democrat’s 
blatant appeals to racial fear and paranoia had been fully exposed and would ultimately backfire 
on them. In two letters written in December, Mahone expressed optimism for future elections in 
Virginia: “Many of those who were deceived, deluded, bulldozed and [harassed] into support of 
the Bourbon ticket are becoming disgusted and returning to the camp” and “you will be glad to 
know that we are stronger here and before the country than ever.” Indeed, Mahone was 
determined to reorganize the party specifically to counteract the heavy-handed Democratic 
tactics. In February, Mahone wrote to Ross Hamilton, a leading African American politician, 
about this issue, saying, “Let me urge you to perfect the organization in your county by the 
election of at least one good man at each precinct who will accurately canvass and list every vote 
therein.” Additionally, Mahone’s influence concerning federal patronage was still routinely 
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sought, and he encouraged his supporters to deliver Virginia from “the hands of the Philistines” 
at the next election so that he could reward them with wealthier positions in the state.108  
Mahone had not lost hope, but the impact of the Democratic appeals to white racial 
prejudice and the violence at Danville on the future of the Readjuster-Republican coalition in 
Virginia cannot be understated. The race issue severely eroded the Readjusters’ white support, 
which left black Readjusters, who still attempted to vote for the party in large numbers in many 
places, with little hope of their votes being counted by the white Democratic election officials. In 
Halifax County the report of R.D. Mason described the intimidation at the polling place, noting 
that, “Several white Democrats had shotguns”, but he described how “the colored people all 
voted the Readjuster ticket, and the whites voted the Democratic ticket,” and that, “two of the 
judges were Democrats and I was the only Readjuster present, no persons were admitted to see 
the votes counted…[and] thirteen colored men who offered to vote the Readjuster ticket were 
rejected by the Democratic judges.” African Americans thus braved personal danger to vote the 
Readjuster ticket in 1883, demonstrating their belief in the movement. However, Mahone’s 
officials were in most cases unable to capitalize on this sentiment as Democrat forces at the 
ballot box were too strong. Peter Boyd was a Readjuster from Halifax but was unable to ensure a 
fair vote there. He confirmed Mason’s account and stated “each party received an equal number 
of votes, but the official returns give the Democrats forty-two majority—which I know is 
fraudulent. The colored people complained to me for allowing the ballot box to be taken away.” 
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These accounts demonstrated how effective Democrat tactics were in suppressing the Readjuster 
vote in the 1883 election.109 
The Readjusters were defeated in 1883, but Mahone still believed he could carry on as a 
Republican. Having cooperated with northern Republicans in the past, Mahone officially 
reconstituted the Readjuster Party as Republican in April of 1884 to rescue his faltering 
coalition. However, his plan backfired when Democrat Grover Cleveland was elected president 
that fall, robbing Mahone of the federal patronage. As a consequence, many black Readjusters 
abandoned Mahone and many whites returned to the ranks of the Democratic Party. Of the thirty 
counties that gave the Readjusters a majority in every election between 1879-1883, only eighteen 
went for the Republicans in 1884 compared to twelve for the Democrats.110 While black 
Virginians remained strong Republicans, and the Republicans won a majority of Virginia’s 
Congressional seats handily in 1886, Mahone’s own actions strained his relationship with his 
black supporters. Many black people had long desired their own candidates to be represented in 
Congressional nominations of the Readjuster Party, but in 1884, Mahone refused to support their 
nominee, Joseph P. Evans of Petersburg, instead supporting a staunch white supporter and Union 
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veteran, James Dennis Brady. This action caused black people to question their support of 
Mahone.111 Without a national Republican regime to worry about, and with Mahone’s diverse 
coalition showing internal divisions, Virginia Democrats began the process of legalizing their 
fraudulent tactics from the 1883 election to ensure Mahone and the Republicans could never gain 
traction again. In 1884, a Democratic-controlled General Assembly passed the Anderson-
McCormick Act, mandating that electoral officials, registrars, and judges be appointed by the 
General Assembly. This gave the Democrats nearly complete control over all polling places and 
the organization and conduct of all subsequent elections.112  
With a majority in national and state politics, the Democrats undercut Mahone’s 
legitimacy as a Confederate veteran when they nominated ex-Confederate Fitzhugh Lee (nephew 
of Robert E. Lee) for governor in 1885. Fitzhugh rode around Virginia with his late uncle’s 
saddle, backed by upwards of 1,000 horsemen and in full Confederate dress. Fitzhugh Lee’s 
subsequent election proved that armed white men still held sway over Virginia politics and sent a 
clear message that ex-Confederate Democrats like Fitzhugh Lee and Jubal Early were taking 
back the state from Mahone and his black Republican allies. Fitzhugh Lee defeated Readjuster 
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John S. Wise easily as a result of these tactics and because he had co-opted most of the 
Readjusters’ most popular stances on reconciliation with the North and Virginia’s debt. Thus, the 
election of 1885 demonstrated that it was not Mahone’s economic vision for Virginia that the 
Democrats despised so much as it was his Republican loyalties and the black men who supported 
him. In 1887, the Democrats replaced Mahone in the United States Senate with John Warwick 
Daniel, seemingly defeating Mahone for good.113 
The Readjusters were the most successful challenge to the Democratic elites in the South, 
but they were not the only third-party movement. There was a trend of class-based resistance to 
the Democratic elite as indicated by similar movements in other southern states. In Texas, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, and Georgia poor whites often launched similar movements that 
allied with black men to varying degrees to attack the entrenched Democratic elites. However, all 
these movements lacked a versatile leader such as William Mahone with a Confederate and 
railroad pedigree that allowed him to appeal to the interests of both the common man and the 
rich politicians and businessmen. Additionally, Mahone’s earlier role in ratification of the 
Underwood Constitution moderated Virginia’s early course through Reconstruction and 
inadvertently this allowed the state’s debt issue to grow until the state was ripe for political 
change. The Readjusters thus served as a catalyst for other movements and for the Populist Party 
in the 1890s, but all these movements would struggle to make the radical concessions on racial 
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and political issues that Mahone made in Virginia and all would be absorbed back into the 
Democratic fold by 1900.114 
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Figure 9: “Mahone’s Free Ballot and ‘Fair Count.’” This piece of 
Democratic propaganda was published in the lead up to the 
election of 1883. The Democrats charged that Mahone’s politics 
would result in a state of “negro rule” in Virginia despite 
Mahone’s assurance that the Readjusters had no desire to 
promote full racial equality. Here Mahone brandishes a musket 
and rides a mule called “coalish,” referring to the Readjuster and 
Republican fusion, while his supporters mob a polling place. The 
black men who follow him hold a razor, and the hand of a young 
white girl respectively, a clear message to white Virginians of 
violence and negro rule. (“Mahone’s ‘Free Ballot and Fair 
Count,’” The Democratic Campaign, Oct 29, 1883, Scrapbooks, 
Box 216, WMP 
Figure 10: “No More Negro Rule!” This is a 
broadside from another Democratic paper that 
celebrated the killings in Danville and the 
Readjusters’ subsequent defeat. (ibid., Box 216) 
Figure 1: “Mahone’s Free Ballot and Fair Count.” This piece of 
Democratic propaganda published in the lead up to the election 
of 1883. The Democrats charged that Mahone’s politics would 
result in a state of “negro rule” in Virginia despite Mahone’s 
assurance that the Readjusters had no desire to promote full 
racial equality. Here Mahone brandishes a musket and rides a 
mule called “coalish,” referring to the Readjuster and Republican 
fusion, while his supporters mob a polling place. The black men 
who follow him hold a razor, and the hand of a young white girl 
respectively, a clear message to white Virginians of violence and 
negro rule. The Democratic Campaign, Oct 29, 1883, 
Scrapbooks, Box 216, WMP. 
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Figure 11: “The Old Fox Nailed Up At Last. “A satirized 
version of Virginia’ governor Fitzhugh Lee and William 
Mahone in 1885. Fitzhugh Lee’s election to Governor in 1885 
was another major blow to the Readjusters and Republicans in 
Virginia. Lee campaigned on the legacy of his uncle Robert E. 
Lee and his election represented how successful the 
Democratic appeal of white supremacy had been in recent 
years. Here Lee, and the Democrats, have finally nailed up the 
wily fox William Mahone. (Puck, Nov 11, 1885 Library of 
Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, reproduction 
number LC-DIG-ppmsca-28142) 
Figure 12: Barbour- “Checkmate! The whites win.” 
Mahone- “The Devil! I thought the black bishop was 
good.” 
This Democratic propaganda published after the 
Readjusters’ defeat in 1883 shows prominent 
Democrat, Johnston Barbour, saving Virginia from 
William Mahone and the black people that support 
him. Mahone is pictured here as the devil due to his 
alliance with black people and as a master manipulator 
as he controls the black voters like the pieces on a 
political chessboard. This cartoon encapsulates the two 
main Democrat attacks against Mahone. (The 
Democratic Campaign, Scrapbooks, Box 216, WMP) 
Figure 11: “The Old Fox Nailed up at Last.” A satirized 
version of Virginia’ governor Fitzhugh Lee and William 
Mahone in 1885. Fitzhugh Lee’s election to Governor in 1885 
was another major blow to the Readjusters and Republicans in 
Virginia. Lee campaigned on the legacy of his uncle Robert E. 
Lee and his election represented how successful the 
Democratic appeal of white supremacy had been in recent 
years. Here Lee, and the Democrats, have finally nailed up the 
wily fox William Mahone. Puck, Nov 11, 1885 Library of 
Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, reproduction 
number LC-DIG-ppmsca-28142 
 
Barbour: “Checkmate! The Whites Win!” 
Mahone: “The Devil! I thought the black bishop was good!” 
Figure 12: This Democratic propaganda published after 
the Readjusters’ defeat in 1883 shows prominent 
Democrat, Johnston Barbour, aving Virgi ia from 
William Mahone and the black people that suppo t him. 
Mahone is pictured here as the devil du  to his alliance 
with black people and as a master manipulator as he 
controls the black voters like the pieces on a political 
chessboard. This cartoon encapsulates the two main 
Democrat attacks against Mahone. The Democratic 
Campaign, Scrapbooks, Box 216, WMP. 
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“Mahoneism” and the End of the Republican Party in Virginia 
 
Figure:13 “The Last Junket” After Mahone’s coalition fractured in Virginia in 1884, an 
unidentified newspaper clipping mocked President Chester A. Arthur’s defeat to Democrat 
Grover Cleveland. In the image, the president desperately tries to shed William Mahone and the 
racial strife the Readjusters have awakened (represented by the black goat) in Virginia, which 
was apparently weighing down the hot air balloon of the Republican national party. (Scrapbook 
31:31, Box 216, WMP) 
William Mahone was the only man capable of uniting a coalition against the Virginia 
Democrats, but his authoritarian leadership style made him an easy scapegoat for white and 
black Republicans following the loss of his Senate seat and his failed campaign for governor in 
1889. Many Republicans blamed their reversal of fortune in Virginia on "Mahoneism,” a term 
that portrayed Mahone as an almost comic villain regarding his leadership of the Readjuster and 
Republican Party in Virginia. Key Republicans refusal to support Mahone in 1889 essentially 
doomed his bid for governor in that year. After this campaign, and as the 1890s brought total 
Democratic control over Virginia's government, it was easy for many white Republicans to 
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accept the white supremacist view of Mahone as a tyrannical politician who unleashed 
“dangerous” forces of black suffrage upon the state as the reason for their downfall, and this 
became the accepted view of Mahone for decades to come among white Virginians. 
Additionally, Mahone’s determination to only run candidates he personally favored alienated 
many white and black supporters. Once Mahone lost his final bid for governor in 1889, the 
benefits the Readjusters had supplied for black people were largely erased by the Democrats, and 
Mahone's failures, especially his failure to support prominent black politician and former 
Readjuster president of the Normal Collegiate Institute John Mercer Langston for the House of 
Representatives in 1888, relegated William Mahone to a political figurehead for the remainder of 
his life. Mahone’s feud with Langston highlighted Mahone's own inherent prejudice that was 
reinforced by his defeat at the hands of the Democrats, and it showed that the biracial Readjuster 
coalition was always based on the shaky ground of a give and take relationship between Mahone 
and black Virginians.  
Mahone's bossism in the Readjusters’ early days was one of the most important reasons 
the party accomplished what it did. To organize his constituency Mahone utilized “quasi-military 
methods” that mobilized his men to the polls on election day, which was typical of Republican 
practices throughout the South during Reconstruction. During his career in politics, Mahone did 
not tolerate other Readjusters or Republicans trying to set party policy over him. During the 1881 
nomination of Cameron, Mahone sharply rebuked Readjuster Cabell Rives for questioning his 
methods. Mahone told Rives that he did not “recognize your right or tolerate your impertinent 
and indelicate attempt to measure my loyalty, to a party nomination, by mere conformity, to 
either your will or your judgement.” He wrote harshly to fellow Readjuster Samuel Yates 
Gilliam about the poor organization in his county: “Will you please inform me why it is we 
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cannot get an organized committee in your county. None is reported…we shall be powerless to 
help you.” These tactics and thinly veiled threats did not endear Mahone to some supporters, but 
as one paper at the time observed this bossism could be interpreted positively as Mahone being a 
“fighter” against traditionalism in Virginia and that such a disposition was required to “hold the 
masses” together.115 Mahoneism was never a prominent reason for the Readjusters collapse, 
rather it contributed to dividing the diverse interests of Mahone, Republicans, and black people 
that made up the Readjuster-Republican coalition. Each of these groups had incompatible 
priorities once the state debt was resolved. Faced with resurgent Democratic opposition, Mahone 
became an easy target for the ailing Republican Party in Virginia.   
Mahone had always played a balancing game between his black constituents and 
Virginia’s white Conservatives during the Readjuster years because he recognized that both were 
needed for the third-party to have success. Mahone’s failure to back Joseph P. Evans in 1884 had 
been the first instance of his ignoring the wishes of black leaders, and in 1888 John Mercer 
Langston provided yet another example. Most black people never harbored any illusions that 
Mahone had their best interests foremost in his mind, but they recognized Mahone’s willingness 
to provide them with job opportunities that other white politicians would not. In 1882, one letter 
to Mahone requested a black speaker for Leesburg County and articulated the fine line Mahone 
walked as party leader, stating that “the negroes say Mahone has had several Republicans turned 
out of office and invariably replaced by his Democratic followers…this makes further 
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Democratic appointments very dangerous if not fatal.” African Americans were concerned over 
their representation in the Readjuster Party, but the success of the party prior to 1883 likely eased 
their acceptance of Mahone’s control of party nominations. Mahone’s prejudice was of course a 
major reason for his failure to support Langston, but he also knew black candidates had little 
chance of being elected outside of counties with black majorities. His repeated election defeats 
due to the Democrats’ effective race baiting convinced Mahone that getting black men elected 
was an impossibility and running them at all was dangerous. In response, Langston refused to 
accept Mahone's attempt to undermine his candidacy, demonstrating that African Americans 
were prepared to challenge Mahone's leadership of the party.116 
The growing success of Langston's campaign threatened Mahone's remaining control 
over Republican politics in Virginia and, doubly problematic for Mahone, Langston was a black 
man and essentially the first black man to directly challenge Mahone's decision-making as leader 
of the Virginia Republicans. Langston had been a loyal supporter of the Readjusters and served 
as president of the Normal Collegiate Institute funded by them. In the fractious Republican ranks 
of 1888, Langston decided Mahone was an impediment to black candidates and decided to run 
for Congress with $15,000 dollars of his own money. The level of support Langston had worried 
Mahone and his supporters. One of these men wrote to Mahone and described how Langston's 
success “enthused his friends, while his opponents are thrown in confusion and disorganization. I 
desire to know something that I may give to my friends without the use of your name.”  
                                                          
116 (?) to William Mahone, September 1882, Box 34 WMP; See also Hahn, A Nation Under Our Feet, 
377;  
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Langston's campaign directly targeted Mahone and alleged that he had remarked “no nigger 
blood will stain a seat in Congress.”117  
While there was no proof of this heated charge in Mahone’s papers, Mahone’s feud with 
Langston, combined with his earlier refusal to support Joseph Evans, demonstrated that he did 
not believe black men were fit for national office on principle, causing black supporters to break 
from him. At the state Republican convention, Mahone’s men were successful in undermining 
Langston's candidacy by pretending to support him in the early stages before ultimately 
withdrawing their support, despite recognizing that this risked driving black men from the party. 
One of Mahone’s men wrote to him, stating, “our friends must not, absolutely must not give us 
away. Such action at this time would encourage the Langston negroes and so humiliate the white 
Republicans…that there would be great danger of silencing or driving away from us many white 
men.” Mahone thought he could win elections without Langston and was concerned that any 
black candidate would undermine his own chances for success and his lieutenants supported this 
view. One wrote Mahone, “our party cannot carry Langston. We cannot stand him and it's no use 
denying it,” and another reported that “after a talk with the local colored leader of the county…I 
am satisfied the county can be carried against Langston for Congress.” Mahone was still the 
leader of the Republican Party in Virginia, but years of defeat at the hands of the Democrats, 
combined with his own goals and prejudice, fractured the Virginia Republicans in 1889.118 
                                                          
117 W.H. Ash to William Mahone, May 22, 1888, Box 119 WMP; William L. Jones to William Mahone, 
Sept 5, 1888, Box 120 WMP; My understanding of John Mercer Langston’s life and career as a pragmatic 
advocate for black rights during this period is based on Luis-Alejandro, Dinnella-Borrego’s, “From the 
Ashes of the Old Dominion: Accommodation, Immediacy, and Progressive Pragmatism in John Mercer 
Langston's Virginia.” The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 117, No. 3 (2009):214-249; 
see also Hahn, A Nation Under Our Feet, 408-409.  
118 (?) to William Mahone Sept 7, 1888, Box 120 WMP; A. Jamison to William Mahone, May 25, 1888, 
Box 119 WMP; O.L. Hardy to William Mahone, Sept 3, 1888, Box 120 WMP; See also Jane Dailey, 
Before Jim Crow, 159. 
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Mahone’s Readjuster Party extended more privileges to black Virginians than any other 
political party in Virginia during the 1880s, and Mahone believed black people were a part of 
Virginia society and entitled to the vote to a degree most of his contemporaries were 
uncomfortable with. The Democrats’ racial violence perhaps moved him even further on this 
issue. Mahone stated that, “the saddest feature of this reign of terror is the sufferings [sic] it has 
inflicted upon the negroes here…when they act on their rights voluntarily accorded to them, they 
are shot down like dogs for party purposes by the beneficiaries of their toil for centuries.” 
Despite this remarkable statement, Mahone was still a white Virginian of his time with 
paternalistic racial views, his sympathy for black people likely derived from his Lost Cause 
belief that they had been loyal to the white South during the Civil War and since. Analyses that 
suggest Mahone experienced a personal evolution of his views of African Americans 
approaching social equality are overgenerous appraisals of his legacy.119  
Black people supported Mahone initially because the Republican Party had failed to 
deliver on its promises in Virginia, but Mahone’s refusal to support Langston drove away many 
of his supporters. A black Republican, John McHenry, recounted his fury upon reading an 
interview in which Mahone stated that, “the negro is a heavy load for the Republicans to carry.” 
McHenry replied, “now he [Mahone] shows that he is one of those politicians that the negro is 
                                                          
119 See Degler, The Other South, 307-308; Brent Tarter, The Grandees of Government: The Origins and 
Persistence of Undemocratic Politics in Virginia (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2013), 
245-252. Tarter provides an accurate analysis of the rhetoric of Mahone and Governor Cameron that was 
markedly ahead of most white Virginians of their time, and he is right in arguing that Mahone clearly 
advocated different policies as a Conservative in the 1870s than he did as a Readjuster and Republican in 
the 1880s, as this thesis has demonstrated. However, I disagree with his portrayal of Mahone as having 
had an awakening on the racial issue from the time he commanded the troops who executed black POWs 
at the Battle of the Crater to his political career in the 1880s. While Mahone believed black men should 
vote, and his policies genuinely benefited their communities, he never advocated for more than suffrage 
and an occasional office posting for black men, so Tarter's assertion that “Mahone's personal attitudes 
toward African Americans evolved to match his increasingly egalitarian political stance,” is 
unsubstantiated by the evidence.  
112 
 
only fit to vote to keep such as him in office. The negroes aren’t tied to any one party. They are 
thinking for themselves and don’t propose to be run over.” McHenry concluded by saying that “I 
see, now, that he was afraid of Langston, who is a long ways better man, and greater too, than 
Mahone.” McHenry expressed betrayal toward Mahone and charged him with drawing the color 
line in politics like the Democrats did. Langston’s campaign emphasized the hypocrisy of 
Mahone's decision making, stating, “enemies of Mr Langston have charged him with attempting 
to draw the colored line…they are really persistently maintaining a color line long ago 
established. Which is expressed in the decision that no colored man must be nominated.” The 
fallout from Mahone’s refusal to support Langston resulted in six out of seven black majority 
counties voting for him as an independent where he was on the ballot. In a close race marked by 
the usual fraud and bribery, it is difficult to tell the precise effect of Mahone’s refusal to back 
Langston in 1888, but it clearly divided black people who had previously been strong 
Readjusters, as evidenced by the results of the state elections of 1889.120  
Defections of Mahone’s longtime allies John S. Wise, former governor Cameron, and 
Union veteran Col. James Dennis Brady added to the challenges Mahone faced from all sides to 
                                                          
120 “McHenry is Mad: The Well-Known Negro Politician is Down on Mahone,” Scrapbook 39:6, Box 
221, WMP. An interesting note was written in the margin accompanying this piece dated January 22, 
1889. The unsigned note was to Mahone and said that McHenry's column “shows that the Republican 
party is a gang of niggers - Return to your own party general - Confed [sic] Democrat.” This demonstrates 
that Virginia conservatives appealed to Mahone on the basis of his Confederate ties to renounce the 
Republicans. However, it is unlikely that even Mahone could have switched back his allegiance by this 
point; “The Political Situation in this District,” Aug 2, 1888, Scrapbook 37:39, Box 217, WMP; 
Additionally, Langston followed Mahone’s example by issuing strict instructions to his voters to fight 
against election day intimidation: “Do not! I urge you, leave the polls for any purpose whatever unless 
you leave in your absence, a reliable, intelligent friend who can read and write.” Ibid., Scrapbook 38:34; 
For the voting returns by county for the 1888 Congressional election see Warrock Richardson-Almanack 
(Richmond, Va., 1880-1890), 35-40; Langston ultimately won his seat after he brought his case to 
Congress and proved that fraudulent practices had defeated him; For returns from Langston’s election see 
Election Returns, U.S. House Abstracts, 1888, Box 18, LOV. 
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his control of the Virginia Republicans, and his own desire for power contributed to the party’s 
dismal prospects in 1888. These men became disillusioned with Mahone’s leadership after the 
defeats of 1883 and 1885, and they believed his long stay at the head of the party would doom 
them to failure in 1889. As John Wise stated, “so long as Mahone holds a prominent place in the 
party management, we will have a small chance to win for the reason that thousands of people 
will not vote for anything that Mahone is connected with…the only way Mahone will bury the 
hatchet is in the heads of everyone who opposes him.” John Wise resented Mahone’s 
domineering method of control, but he generally agreed with him on the status of black people in 
the party. However, other Republicans labeled Mahone as a hypocrite on the racial issue. The 
Republican Congressional Campaign Committee called Mahone’s support of the colored vote 
fraudulent, stating, “Mahone poses before the country as the great protector of the 
negroes…when, in fact, he has never been able to guard the colored man at the polls in his own 
ward of Petersburg; but this claim is a mere pretense to gain sympathy at the North.” Mahone 
clearly contributed to the fracturing of the Readjuster-Republican coalition, but without the 
Democrats’ violent reprisals and election tactics it is unlikely this would have mattered. Even a 
man as resourceful as Mahone had little hope of maintaining a viable coalition out of the 
Readjusters’ and Republicans’ varying factions in the face of the Democrats’ violence.121 
                                                          
121 “Wise Vs Mahone,” Richmond Dispatch, Aug 18, 1888, Scrapbook 37:33, Box 217; “Headquarters 
Republican Congressional Campaign Committee,” Oct 8, 1888, Scrapbook 38:35; See also Jane Dailey, 
Before Jim Crow, 138. John Wise had told his audience in the black majority city of Petersburg that there 
was “not too much nigger in the Readjuster Party”; Other related letters in the Mahone papers are William 
C. Elam to William Mahone June 8, 1888, Box 119, WMP. Mahone’s longtime friend Elam told him that 
Wise and other Republicans were not so much interested in defeating the Democrats “as in defeating 
you.”; and “Virginia’s Republican Majority,” The State Republican, Dec 1, 1887, Scrapbook 36:56. Wise 
discussed Mahone with a fellow Republican and pleaded that “you must help me save our party from 
him.”; J. L. Hamilton to William Mahone, July 23, 1888, Box 119, WMP. The split between Wise and 
Mahone culminated with a second Republican ticket proposed by the Wise faction. Hamilton was a 
Mahone supporter and stated that Wise’s defection was considered “a farce, and decent men will have no 
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more of it. Mr. Wise and his associates have, by their latest action, committed a breach for which nothing 
can atone except unconditional surrender.” 
Figure 14:  Virginia’s first African 
American Congressman John Mercer 
Langston. (Photographic Print, Virginia 
Museum of History and Culture, 
Richmond Virginia.) 
Figure 15: A broadside published by Langston’s 
campaign that focused on Mahone’s refusal to 
support Langston’s bid for Congress. (Scrapbook 
38:36, Box 217, WMP.) 
 
 
 
 Figure 16: A group of black and 
white Republican voters gathered at 
one of the many “Republican 
clubs” organized by Mahone to 
bring out the vote. (Scrapbook 34, 
1885, Box 221, WMP) 
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Racial Pragmatism and Mahone’s Last Campaign 
Mahone’s biographer stated that William Mahone had essentially given up on politics in 
Virginia prior to his final bid for governor in 1889 and that it was thrust upon him by the party. 
However, Mahone’s own letters and correspondence tell a different story about the election of 
1889: Mahone ran for governor in spite of a phalanx of African American and white Republicans 
who joined the Democrats in opposition against him, and Mahone was determined to win.122 
Mahone recognized that becoming governor gave him his only chance to remain a player in 
Virginia politics now that the Republican Party was divided against him. Additionally, his 
correspondence shows that much of the antipathy he expressed toward his black supporters came 
from his belief that no black candidate could be elected in Virginia, and that popular black 
candidates like Langston threatened his control over Virginia’s Republican apparatus. Mahone 
carried out the canvass for his 1889 gubernatorial bid with the fervor of earlier elections, and this 
election underscored the complexities inherent in the Readjuster movement from the beginning. 
Unfortunately for Mahone, both his white and black support base from the Readjuster years was 
hopelessly divided in 1889. The General Assembly elections that year showed that while some 
African Americans voted Republican, and thus likely would have supported Mahone for 
governor, many more deserted him. Additionally, white voters continued to abandon the 
Republicans, with only three white majority counties out of nineteen that had voted the 
Readjuster ticket in 1880 voting Republican in 1889. Mahone’s failure to become governor in 
1889 closed what was arguably the most remarkable postwar career of any former Confederate 
                                                          
122 Both Nelson Blake and Carl N. Degler argued that Mahone was resigned to defeat by this point, even 
if he tried hard to win in 1889. I do not think this holds up with Mahone’s character, even if he was no 
doubt discouraged by his eroding support by this point. Blake, William Mahone of Virginia, 250; Degler, 
The Other South, 305. 
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general. And it also marked the last remnant of Republican control in Virginia until after the 
Civil Rights movement.123 
In the canvass for the 1889 gubernatorial contest, Mahone determined that the 
nomination of black candidates was an unacceptable risk. This was in stark contrast to the 
concessions he granted some black Readjusters during the movement's rise. As James Tice 
Moore has demonstrated, Mahone “demanded the inclusion of blacks in local party leadership” 
and said to an aide, “My judgement is, it would be politic to nominate a colored man- we 
certainly couldn't afford to defeat the nomination of a colored man. They are claiming it, and 
honestly, they ought to be allowed it. It would help us with the vote…all over the state.” By 
1889, this was no longer true. Repeated experiences with Democratic violence convinced 
Mahone that white men would not support black candidates. In his letters about the canvass for 
1889, he expressed no confidence toward African American candidates. “As you must realize of 
all times this is the last when we ought to nominate colored men,” wrote Mahone, “we want to 
deprive the Democrats of any excuse for stuffing ballot boxes, and by the nomination of 
courageous and reputable white men refute their cry of negro domination. In this county it is 
important that we nominate a white man. We can win with him, but we cannot elect a colored 
man. The nomination of a colored man would mean failure.” Mahone was now of the opinion 
that the effectiveness of white supremacist campaigning by the Democrats had totally 
                                                          
123 For the dismal returns from erstwhile white Readjuster counties in 1889 see Warrock-Richardson 
Almanack (Richmond, Va., 1880-1890), 30-31.  Of the thirty counties that had supported the Readjuster 
Party in all four elections between 1879 and 1883 only fourteen voted Republican in the 1889 election. 
Down from twenty-five for President in 1888.   
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undermined the Republicans across the state and he was determined to use black men only in 
counties where he knew they could give him the advantage.124  
While Mahone personally preferred to nominate loyal white men, he knew he still needed 
black Republican supporters, and he accomplished this by returning to the enticing promise of 
patronage he would control as governor. Mahone believed that the patronage he could provide as 
governor of Virginia was still an effective way to retain African American support regardless of 
his recent statements on Langston. He assured several black Republicans that the federal 
patronage of the Readjuster years would flow freely once he was elected. “I shall not be slow to 
recognize those who are reported to me as having performed signal service in the cause of the 
Republican Party,” Mahone said. He reminded other supporters of his past control over 
appointments to the Norfolk naval yard and said that “the officer in command of the yard is not 
friendly to us…however, it will not be very long before the way is opened for the employment of 
our people at the yard—certainly after the election.” Mahone also nominated one of Langston’s 
supporters, a black man named D.F. Batts, to canvass a county because “he was one of 
Langston’s right-hand men in this district last fall… [and he] will be invaluable in getting the 
colored forces in line and organized.” These actions proved ineffective. Of the twenty-eight 
black majority counties that had voted the Republican ticket for president in 1888, twelve 
returned Democratic majorities in the elections for the state legislature in 1889. While 
Democratic fraud in this election was rampant, these returns suggest a significant decrease in 
                                                          
124 Moore, Two Paths, 183. William Mahone to Gen. Dudley, September 16, 1889, Vol 89:307, WMP; 
Mahone utilized black canvassers only in counties with an African American majority and never in white 
dominant counties in 1889. In reference to one black man’s offer to canvass for Mahone for a fee, 
Mahone said, “In respect to the charcoal speaker, I do not see how we can utilize him. And then his 
figures are out of the question.” In another letter about black men canvassing in white majority counties, 
he commented “it does us more harm than good,” ibid., William Mahone to W.W. Dudley, Sept 13, 1889, 
160; ibid., William Mahone to F.L. Taylor, Sept 17, 1889, 295; For additional letters from Mahone on 
these issues see Mahone to Dudley, Taylor, and Treat see, Vol 89:245, 247, 293-294.  
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black people’s willingness to back the Republicans in 1889. This decrease, combined with the 
Democrats’ tactics, doomed any slim chance Mahone had in 1889.125 
  Mahone’s refusal to support Langston likely drove many black voters from him, but the 
Democrats’ fraud and intimidation was still the crucial factor for his defeat in 1889. Mahone 
instituted measures to protect polling places in the 1889 election, but he was unable to prevent 
the Democrat election officials from fixing multiple precincts in their favor. The election reports 
to Mahone give the impression that these tactics were even more effective than they had been in 
1883. A Mr. Cyrus wrote to Mahone and reported that on election day “every Democrat was 
worked up to a white heat by the Democratic press, speakers and Committe [sic] It is reported 
that they were all armed on the day of the election.” Any voter who was not dissuaded by 
character attacks against Mahone had to contend with the Democrats' favorite strategies of 
bribery, ballot box stuffing, and violence. The Republican chairman from Powhatan county 
stated that “intimidation was practiced in every [form]…Republicans were told if they voted for 
Gen Mahone they would lose their home and place of work. Old bills were demanded of some 
voters in order to keep them from voting for Mahone,” and another chairman recounted how he 
was “set upon by a mob of drunken Democrats some twenty of them made the attack upon us…I 
was knocked down several times and severely cut.”  Accounts of polling place fraud and bribery 
were even more explicit in 1889. George Bean had tried to vote the Republican ticket but 
recalled that “all of the judges and clerks are Democrats,” and that, “no Republican tickets were 
there…[someone] made away with them.” Bribery was summed up by J.L. Gleavis in his 
                                                          
125 William Mahone to A. S. Owen, Sept 17, 1889, Vol 89:286, 1889; ibid., William Mahone to Thomas 
L. Collins, Sept 17, 1889, 287: For 1888 presidential and 1889 state legislature election returns see 
Warrock-Almanack (Richmond, Va., 1880-1890), 30-37. This divided the black majority counties nearly 
evenly, with sixteen going to the Democrats and fifteen for the Republicans, not a good omen for 
Mahone.  
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statement that said: “we were defeated here by having to buy our own men, those who had 
always voted the Republican ticket were for sale to the highest bidder…it would have taken the 
national treasury to save this district.” Gleavis reported that the Democrats spent nearly $6,000 in 
his county. Even if this was an exaggerated example, it shows the willingness of the Virginia 
Democrats to buy voters off Mahone no matter the cost.126  
Despite the Democrats’ aggression, key white Republicans’ defections from Mahone, and 
Mahone’s own statements against Langston and black Republicans, African Americans 
continued to turn out for Mahone and the Republicans in 1889, even if their support was lower 
than it had once been. One Republican official reported that Democrats “told the colored people 
[that] if they voted they would not give them any work.” However, he went on to say that 
“notwithstanding a good many of the Republicans voted the Republican ticket…I think some 
Dems vote the Republican ticket that did not make it known,” and a Paul Dunnarant of 
Petersburg wrote that “every true Republican is doing his duty today the Bourbons are badly 
frightened.” Nevertheless, the Democrats were far more successful in suppressing the black and 
white vote in 1889 than they had been previously. This was evidenced by the report of R.A. 
Hamlet, an African American Readjuster from Campbell County, describing how many people 
were afraid to vote for Mahone and one man who did was “very secret about it.” A prominent 
and influential Republican told Hamlet that “he did not feel like riding eleven miles to the polls 
and then have his vote counted contrary to the way he gave it.” Without a unified Republican 
                                                          
126 J.H.A. Cyrus to William Mahone, Dec 10, 1889, Folder 1; J.B. Wren to William Mahone, Nov 1889, 
Folder 1; L. Pritchard to William Mahone, Nov 6, 1889, Folder 3; George M. Bean to William Mahone, 
Nov 7, 1889, Folder 1; G.L. Gleavis to William Mahone, Nov 8, 1889, Folder 2, All in Box 193, WMP. 
See also J. E. Beard to William Mahone, Nov 20, 1889, One Republican voter recounted how Democrats 
had stood outside the polling places and told anyone who would listen that “Mahone was an infidel and 
scoffed at the Christian religion… [and that] some of our Republican brethren drew the line at the infidel 
charge and no amount of persuasion could [entice] them to vote.” 
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Party behind Mahone, there was little chance he could secure enough African American votes to 
come close to a victory in 1889.127  
Virginia Republican leaders had become so divided prior to 1889 over their personal 
vendettas against Mahone that they squandered any remaining clout Mahone had left among 
Virginians both black and white. Mahone's desire to cling to power created animosity among 
other longtime allies; for instance, after years of supporting Mahone and being elected to 
Congress with his help, James Brady turned against him in 1889, evidently over disagreement 
with Mahone’s leadership of the party, which Mahone took as a grave personal insult. Mahone 
later wrote to his former running mate, Senator Sherman, claiming that in 1889 Brady had 
promoted “the election of Democratic candidates by putting up bogus Republican candidates in 
the districts where Republicans ought to sway,”  and he also described Brady’s support for a 
black candidate for deputy collector as “trying to incite the colored people to the nomination of a 
colored man, knowing that that means defeat.” Seeing as Brady himself had been elected to 
Congress in 1884 over the black candidate Joseph P. Evans, Mahone was likely correct that 
Brady’s opposition was a personal matter, unrelated to Mahone’s treatment of Langston. What is 
known is that many Republicans were prepared to tolerate a Democratic regime if it meant 
Mahone's defeat. A Republican paper, The Valley Virginian, stated it would prefer “temporary 
defeat” to another tenure of Mahone and called the election of 1889 a “fight to the death. 
Virginia will either come out of the struggle a free state or a political machine…held in the grasp 
of Mahone.” Mahone's style of leadership was abrasive, but both sides' refusal to bury the 
hatchet ensured they remained disillusioned and divided during the 1889 election, and this left 
                                                          
127 M.C. Althen to William Mahone, Nov 1889, Folder 1; Paul Dunnarant to William Mahone, Nov 6, 
1889, Folder 3; R.A. Hamlet to William Mahone, Nov 1889, Folder 5, Box 193, WMP. 
121 
 
them impotent against a Democratic Party united in its desire to defeat the Mahone-Republican 
machine in Virginia.128 
Mahone’s defeat in the 1889 election was the last significant barrier to white democratic 
control of the state, and his friends and supporters expressed their dismay at the prospect of a 
Virginia controlled by the Democrats. One reverend wrote to Mahone and stated that Democrats 
were celebrating the “death” of Mahone but that “I would prefer to be dead with Mahone than 
alive with such a mob, as the so-called Democracy of Virginia has shown itself to be.” Editor of 
Mahone’s Richmond Whig and Confederate veteran William Elam wrote to Mahone and tried to 
cheer him up with a “we’ll beat ‘em yet,” before he blamed the fraudulent tactics of the 
Democrats for their defeat. “Tuesday seems to have been a bad day for Republicans,” Elam said, 
“without regard to section, race, color, or previous condition…we exhausted our means in 
holding our colored forces, so insidious and tempting was Democratic ‘persuasion.’” Mahone’s 
defeat also robbed Virginia of “thousands, yes millions of dollars in capital,” according to one 
Republican, from northern markets. Republicans thus wrung their hands and blamed the 
Democrats for Mahone’s defeat in 1889. His loss was evidence that the Party had never gained 
                                                          
128 William Mahone to (?), Feb 26, 1890 Vol 91:698-706, WMP; William Mahone to W.W. Dudley, Sept 
16, 1889 Vol 89:308, WMP; “Not For Mahone,” The Valley Virginian; Scrapbook 39:4, Box 219; For 
Democratic attacks against Mahone on the same issues see “The Last Appeal,” Oct 30, 1889, Scrapbook 
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significant support among white men to maintain a viable coalition, especially in the context of 
Republican disunity.129  
After his defeat, Mahone outwardly claimed he had no desire to be governor, despite 
having waged an aggressive campaign. In a letter to Longstreet, Mahone expressed his 
frustration over how the Republican Party had allegedly abandoned “Confederate Republicans,” 
like himself and James Longstreet. Mahone stated that he had never really wanted the role of 
Governor but was forced to run. “It was not my judgement that any contest should have been 
made in Virginia except that it may have been necessary to fortify our organization for 92…I did 
not want the nomination, but the men [on] whom we had to rely for Republican work and power 
would hear to nothing else.” However, Mahone had chosen to run in 1889 against the 
protestations of many Republicans, so his letter to Longstreet here is clear revisionism in an 
attempt to absolve himself from responsibility for Republican defeat. Virginia’s Republicans had 
achieved great success with Mahone, but he would ultimately helm their downfall as well.130 
The aftershocks of William Mahone’s political action in Virginia carried into the 1890s. 
In the beginning of that decade, a growing populist movement across the South formed out of 
many of the disgruntled agrarian white and black populations who had supported earlier splinter 
movements like the Readjusters in numerous southern states. Many of the Populists were 
impoverished white farmers who sought economic reforms and to a lesser extent black people 
who sought free and fair elections. These groups formed a national Populist Party that succeeded 
in briefly toppling Democratic governments in some southern states. The Populists received their 
                                                          
129 B.Z. Caffra to William Mahone, Nov 8, 1889; William C. Elam to William Mahone, Nov 8, 1889; L. 
Pritchard to William Mahone, Nov 6, 1889, All in Folder 2, Box 193, WMP. 
130 William Mahone to James Longstreet, Dec 30, 1889, Vol 91:164, WMP. 
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impetus from Republican supporters and the legacies of third-party movements such as the 
Readjusters, and William Mahone even refrained from nominating a Republican candidate for 
governor in 1893 to support the Populists. In 1894, Mahone supported implementation of the 
Australian secret ballot to combat the Democrats’ passage of the Walton Act, which had 
complicated ballot marking procedures to confuse illiterate voters. Previously in 1890, he wrote 
that if the new laws made it difficult for African Americans to vote that “there is little to hope for 
in the way of Republican power in Virginia under existing election law, state and Federal,” and 
he likely welcomed the Populists’ successes. The Populist Party followed in the footsteps of the 
Readjusters and retained many of their supporters, but their supporters were primarily white 
men, and the movement never had the same crossover with black people in urban centers that the 
Readjusters had. They were eventually defeated by the Democrats through the same appeals to 
white supremacy that had toppled the Readjusters.131 
Mahone’s leadership of the Readjuster and Republican Parties in Virginia saw the state 
prosper with new industry and protect black suffrage and access to education in ways not seen in 
the other former Confederate states. Remarkably, Mahone used his reputation as a soldier and 
railroad man to break out of the Conservative ranks and bring these Republican policies to 
Virginia at a time when the party was essentially in retreat across the South. This was made 
possible due to Mahone’s willingness to adopt almost any position in order to advance his goals 
for himself and the state, and because of black Virginians’ willingness to embrace any potential 
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avenue for participation in the political workings of the state despite fierce resistance.  
Ultimately, the Democratic resistance to black suffrage was increased and the Democrats 
undertook a decade long crusade to destroy Mahone. This demonstrated the pervasiveness of 
white supremacy in Virginia and made it unlikely the Republican Party in Virginia could exist 
without leaders like Mahone who would use their authority to cater to both black and white 
people via patronage and a class based economic message. Mahone’s switch to the Republicans 
proved more distasteful to white Virginians because of his Confederate service and his reputation 
as a traitor and apostate defined him in the last few years of his life among white Virginians.  
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Figure 17: “The New South and Old Fossils.” During Mahone’s last campaign in 1889, he 
continued to emphasize his vision for Virginia in comparison to the Democratic Party. In this 
Readjuster political cartoon, a figure likely meant to be Mahone encourages a white farmer to 
drop his plow and points to what are possibly black farmers with the image of the New South 
behind him. The image portrays the Readjusters as a beacon of hope and progress for Virginia 
and the laboring classes via industry, while the Conservative Party “fossils” are portrayed as part 
of a beastly cuttlefish that can only spout “niggar” instead of any policy. In the text below, every 
criticism of Mahone is refuted in detail while a black man says, “golly!! Aint white folks afraid 
of my talent!” thereby mocking the Democrats’ fears of black people and demonstrating 
Mahone’s own paternalistic view of them. Vol 39, 1889, Box 219, Scrapbooks, WMP. 
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Figure 18: “Up Salt River” The election of Democrat Phillip W. McKinney in 1889 signaled the 
end of William Mahone’s challenge to the Democratic Party in Virginia. McKinney followed in 
the footsteps of Fitzhugh Lee by adopting most of Mahone’s economic proposals while working 
to disenfranchise black voters and poor whites in the state. Virginia would not have a non-
Democrat as governor until after the Civil Rights Movement. In this Democratic cartoon from 
1889, we can see Fitzhugh Lee welcoming McKinney to the governor’s mansion while Mahone 
floats up the metaphorical “Salt River,” a term used to denote political oblivion.  (Scrapbook 41, 
Box 221, WMP.) 
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Chapter III: Selective Remembering and Forgetting: William Mahone and the Readjuster 
Party in Historical Memory 
  
(Figure 19 Left: Mahone’s monument at the Cater. Figure 20 Right: His Mausoleum in 
Blandford Cemetery, Petersburg, Virginia. Author’s Photographs) 
By the time of his death, white Virginians portrayed Mahone as responsible for all the 
odious racial and social policies of Radical Reconstruction. I argue that subsequently white 
historians adopted this portrayal of Mahone and the Readjusters to fit into the Dunning School of 
Reconstruction that emphasized tyrannical northerners and black people ruling over a ruined 
South. In the era of Jim Crow, white southerners looked back at the period of African American 
voting during Reconstruction as a dangerous reminder that their current social order had not 
always been so. In this context, various southern authors and politicians crafted a narrative of the 
Reconstruction years in scholarship and textbooks that justified the current status quo of white 
supremacy and convinced many northerners that the attempt to reconstruct the South had indeed 
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been a tragic blunder. That Mahone had been a famous Confederate veteran presented somewhat 
of an obstacle to this story, and this chapter analyzes scholarly monographs, textbooks, obituaries 
from Mahone’s death through the mid twentieth century to demonstrate how white Virginians 
commemorated Mahone as a Confederate veteran and ignored the Readjusters so as not to 
provide a historical example of black suffrage during the Jim Crow era. African Americans 
rarely referenced the Readjusters or Mahone in the decades following his death as they continued 
to look for political movements that would benefit them with an eye on the present and future. It 
was at the intersection of these white and black memories that the Readjuster Party faded into the 
background.132 
Obituaries: The Construction of a Narrative 
 William Mahone died in Washington D.C. on October 8, 1895 a week after suffering a 
stroke. Mahone’s obituaries highlighted his Confederate service as something all white 
Virginians could easily celebrate. Despite his defeat in 1889, Mahone’s name still carried weight 
in Virginia politics when he died, and Virginia’s Democrats knew they needed to carefully frame 
Mahone’s legacy as they faced another third-party challenge in the growing populist movement 
in the state, that was supported by the majority of Mahone’s old coalition. After his death the 
unique dichotomy of Mahone’s martial record and his political career remained a topic ripe for 
interpretation, and Obituaries of Mahone in papers written by white Virginians labored to fit 
Mahone’s legacy into a comfortable Lost Cause narrative.133 
                                                          
132 For one recent essay about the memory of Reconstruction during Jim Crow see K. Stephen Prince, 
“Jim Crow Memory: Southern White Supremacists and the Regional Politics of remembrance,” in 
Remembering Reconstruction, eds. Carole Emberton and Bruce E. Baker (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 2017), 17-35; see also Bruce E. Baker, What Reconstruction Meant: Historical Memory 
in the American South (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2007). 
133 For Mahone’s end of life see Blake, William Mahone of Virginia, 253,254. 
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Many of Mahone’s fiercest critics found that praising the late General’s wartime service 
was an effective way to bypass any discussion of his more recent and controversial actions in 
Virginia politics. Newspaper obituaries featured casual snippets that trumpeted his war record 
and nothing else; one wrote that “Mahone is no more…he fought like a tiger at the Crater.” 
Various pieces like this one reveal that the only part about Mahone’s legacy that was important 
to the white southern vision of the South in the years ahead was his role in the Confederacy’s last 
great triumph at the Crater. Reading between the lines was not required in some accounts of why 
Mahone should be honored and venerated after his death. The Peninsula Enterprise succinctly 
laid out the argument by which white Virginians could welcome one who had done so much for 
the Confederacy back into their sacrosanct collective memory of the Lost Cause: “Virginians, for 
the most part, prefer to remember the good there was in him. His great ability, his love for 
Virginia, his distinguished services to the Confederacy no one questions, and they go very far to 
atone for the mistakes he made afterwards,” the obituary stated. This account essentially forgave 
Mahone for his political career and used this forgiveness to side-step any discussion of it.134 
  To neutralize Mahone’s controversial legacy some obituaries defended Mahone the 
Confederate and argued that this loyal Virginian had been duped by traitors like governor 
Cameron and Republican politicians. On October 9, 1895 the Richmond Times stated that 
William Mahone had a “hypnotic spell” cast over him by Governor Cameron, and it was this 
spell that convinced Mahone to defect from the Democratic Party. This left Mahone allegedly a 
“broken and disappointed man” once he realized he had been duped by his erstwhile political 
ally into presumably betraying his native state. That Cameron had been a Mahone nominee 
                                                          
134 “Mahone is no More,” Crawford Avalanche, Oct 17, 1895; “General Mahone is Dead,” Peninsula 
Enterprise Oct 12, 1895. 
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before splitting with him contradicted this author’s purpose and was excluded. Obituaries of the 
late general typically simplified his life as a loyal son of the South worthy of fond remembrance. 
The Times concluded with a spirit of reconciliation that Mahone fostered by “exchanging 
courtesies” with Union veterans on their visits to Petersburg. In this way Mahone was portrayed 
as a confused man who was persuaded by others to abandon the Conservative Party and that he 
believed in none of the polices he advocated for in the 1880s, leaving him a shell of himself after 
1889. Obituaries like this one were a subtle jab at the late general, but they were also a direct 
manifestation of the need to simplify the memory of complex individuals and events to serve the 
needs of the Lost Cause.135 
 Obituaries reframed Mahone’s actions in a less radical light when they argued his support 
of black suffrage was out of a paternalistic instinct and that his Republican loyalties were a 
justified attempt to align himself with the reunited nation. This represented a shift in Lost Cause 
arguments leading up to the turn of the twentieth century. The Lost Cause continued to venerate 
Lee and Jackson, and to find only noble impulses behind the Confederate movement for 
independence; however, it also celebrated a United States poised on the brink of the twentieth 
century as worthy of the loyalty of all Americans. The Times represented this shift in its obituary 
when it wrote about Mahone’s sense of duty in “defending the weaker race, while loving the 
Lost Cause and remaining true and loyal to the Union.”  Rather than discussing the radical 
policies of Mahone and the Readjusters this obituary articulated a form of reconciliation between 
northern and southern whites, with Mahone as the centerpiece in this instance. However, as 
several bitter obituaries show, many white southerners were unwilling to separate the veneration 
                                                          
135 Richmond Times, October 9, 1895 
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of Mahone as a Confederate hero from his machinations as a Readjuster and Republican 
senator.136 
 These were relatively mild treatments of Mahone’s career, but many Democrats used 
obituaries to continue the scathing attacks they had used to discredit him when he was still alive 
and thereby reinforce their view of Mahone as a villain. Many Democratic papers gloated in his 
passing and saw in his death a guarantee of their final victory. The Durham Recorder captured 
the tone of several bitter obituaries, writing, “General Mahone, as is generally the case, is having 
some really nice things said about him now that he is dead,” and another wrote that  Mahone was 
a “firebrand” who “through the peculiar attitude he assumed…caused one of the most bitter 
controversies ever known in the senate.” Of course, opinions had always been mixed about 
Mahone’s career. Leading up to his death The Richmond Dispatch took jabs at Mahone when it 
cited how James Longstreet, “was very much affected” by Mahone’s worsening condition and 
asserted that Longstreet was the only prominent ex-Confederate visitor to Mahone’s death bed, 
clearly drawing the connection between the two despised Republican ex-Confederates. 
Following his death, the paper commented that “Mahone was always trying to conquer or 
subjugate somebody.” This stance on Mahone, including the focus on Longstreet’s visit, 
demonstrated how Mahone’s political affiliation post-war remained the central issue for many 
white southerners and not his record in battle.137 
                                                          
136 Richmond Times, Nov 28, 1895; This is best understood in the shift in Lost Cause memory toward the 
end of the 19 Century. As summarized in Gary Gallagher, Lee and his Generals in War and Memory 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1998), 269.  
137 Durham (NC) Recorder, Oct 24, 1895; “The End Came Peacefully,” Highland Recorder, Oct 18, 
1895; “Somewhat Better” Richmond Dispatch, Oct 2, 1895. In 1903 the Richmond Dispatch and the 
Richmond Times consolidated into the Richmond Times Dispatch. 
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 In death as in life, the only accounts to focus on the accomplishments of the Readjuster 
Party were obituaries written by northerners and African Americans. These papers mourned the 
loss of someone who had fought against the Democratic regime in Virginia, and they generally 
set aside the internecine bitterness that marked Mahone’s final campaign in 1889. The African 
American run newspaper, The Evening Star, based out of Washington D.C., acknowledged 
Mahone’s legacy as being inextricably wrapped up in his biracial political activism. Mahone was 
a “firebrand cast into a mass of dry tinder who favored equal treatment for the black man,” it 
stated. Whether or not this was an entirely accurate representation of Mahone’s views, it 
reflected how many black people viewed him, and their obituaries make clear that initially, many 
refused to let this aspect of his legacy die out, especially during the Populist Movement in 
Virginia in the last years of the nineteenth century. African Americans in Virginia were faced 
with new disenfranchisement laws in the 1890s, and in this context another black paper 
published a Mahone obituary that nostalgically looked back at him as a reformer with the 
following segment: “General Mahone, who was stricken with paralysis a day or so ago, has the 
sympathy of the entire country. No man has done as much to improve the condition of the 
southern negro as this distinguished statesman. He stands without peer in the American body 
politic…he is a generous and good man, and not only Virginia will feel the loss of his services, 
but the entire South.” This obituary emphasized Mahone’s personality as a “fighter,” directly 
alluding to his fight against the Democrats as a politician. One year following his death, The 
Richmond Planet referred to Mahone as a “brilliant Confederate soldier” to emphasize how his 
aggressive martial personality had directly benefited black people during his political career. For 
these journalists, Mahone’s value was that despite fighting for the Confederacy, his aggressive 
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personality had, at least briefly, given black Virginians increased rights, and they likely wished 
for more figures like Mahone who would challenge the accepted political order in the present.138 
Justifying White Supremacy: The Readjusters’ Legacy in Scholarship 
After years of trying to establish their hegemony in Virginia, the Democratic elite 
ultimately accomplished this goal with the passage of the 1902 state constitution that legalized 
disenfranchisement. The Democrats had finally succeeded in attaching Mahone to what they 
perceived to be the worst aspects of Reconstruction. If white Virginians heard of Mahone at all, 
it was either as a Confederate veteran or as a bogeyman who had threatened white supremacy. 
During debate on the constitution, The Dispatch wrote that “Mahone captured the state of 
Virginia in an ill-omened hour for her fame. He sunk to a political damnation so deep that the 
hand of resurrection has never reached him and has never reached any of his followers.” 
Tellingly, after the constitution was passed, there was a relative silence concerning William 
Mahone in Virginia’s press, white or black, for the first decade of the twentieth century. With 
Mahone and his movement buried in what seemed a distant and unfulfilled past for African 
Americans, and with white Virginians’ place in society enshrined into law, there was no reason 
to rehabilitate the memory of General Mahone. It would take the increased commemorative 
activities at Petersburg battlefield to drive Mahone’s legacy into the spotlight once more for 
white and black Virginians.139 
Charles Pearson and Richard Morton published the first scholarly monographs of the 
Readjuster movement in 1917 and 1919 respectively, to make it an acceptable part of the 
Dunning School’s ideology. For Pearson, Mahone and the Readjusters were part of “the Dark 
                                                          
138 Evening Star (Washington, D.C.), Oct 1, 1895; Washington Bee, Oct 5, 1895; Richmond Planet, Oct 
10, 1896. 
139 Virginian Pilot, Oct 15, 1899. Richmond Dispatch, Oct 20, 1901. 
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Age of the South,” which encompassed the end of the Civil War up until Pearson’s own lifetime. 
He placed special emphasis on the “negro voters…as Mahone’s inferior allies” and presented his 
discussion of the Readjuster movement with many stereotypes of the period. Richard Morton 
similarly demonstrated the desire to defend white supremacy in his account of the movement 
when he described Mahone as nothing more than a political agitator and that the “true evil of 
Mahoneism” was the installation of black representatives in predominantly white counties in 
order to secure his power. The vilification of Mahone as a political traitor to the South was used 
by these scholars as a convenient mechanism to discredit him and portray any racial equality he 
fostered as the actions of a corrupt politician. These accounts served the dual purpose of 
reminding Virginians, both white and black, that the Democratic Party had protected white 
Virginians from corrupting influences during Reconstruction and that it continued to have their 
best interests in mind.140 
White scholarship on the 1902 constitution in the first few decades of the twentieth 
century agreed that disenfranchising the black voter had been a desirable result of the convention 
of 1901-1902, and one scholar of the convention argued that William Mahone was the reason 
they did this. In 1926, a future professor at the University of Richmond, Ralph McDanel, wrote a 
thesis about the 1902 constitution that served as the culmination of the previous two decades of 
                                                          
140 Charles Pearson, The Readjuster Movement in Virginia (Gloucester: Yale University Press, 1917), VII. 
176; Richard Morton, The Negro in Virginia Politics 1865-1902 (Charlottesville: The University of 
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Dunning School interpretations of Reconstruction. He argued that Mahone was a failed 
businessman and shameful opportunist whose only desire had been to deliver Virginia into the 
hands of Radical Republicans and black people and that white Virginians had no desire to 
disenfranchise black people before the machinations of Mahone. As McDanel wrote, “Mahone 
had resurrected the specter of negro domination, of Africanization, and thereafter the white 
people of the black belt regarded as excusable any means that would assure white supremacy…it 
seems safe to say that Virginia owes her present constitution very largely to General Mahone.” In 
McDanel’s analysis, ensuring white supremacy was a completely understandable impulse for 
white Virginians to have and men like Mahone had shattered racial harmony by their political 
action. This fit directly in the framework of white Reconstruction scholarship of the time, even 
though revisionists would begin to challenge some of this scholarship in the next decade. That a 
professor wrote this analysis as late as 1926 demonstrates how effectively Mahone’s legacy had 
been corrupted by the Democrats by the end of his life and, in a Virginia society where white 
supremacy was a fact of daily life, there was no impetus for a nuanced analysis of the Readjuster 
years. One man who attended the constitutional convention shortly before his death was one of 
Mahone’s old Readjuster comrades, turned arch rival, Parson John Massey. Massey’s attendance 
demonstrated that many white Readjusters had never been comfortable with the party’s overtures 
to the black voter during its brief stay in power. And with the collapse of Mahone and the 
Republicans in Virginia, there was no significant white opposition to the drafting of Virginia’s 
new constitution.141 
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 While no early twentieth century white scholarship argued the Readjuster Party had been 
a force for good in the state, Mahone’s legacy as a Confederate and a successful businessman 
occasionally maintained the respect of scholars who otherwise completely accepted the Dunning 
School’s view of Reconstruction. In a 1904 account, just two years after the constitution was 
passed, Hamilton Eckenrode, a Virginia historian, praised Mahone’s military and railroad career 
while faithfully criticizing the dangers of “negro rule” during Reconstruction. In order to absolve 
Mahone the Confederate, Eckenrode claimed that Reconstruction ended in 1870 and that 
Readjusters (with no mention of Mahone) and Republicans were evil for advocating racial 
equality and that “it was impossible that any such attempt should succeed.” Eckenrode published 
this as his dissertation and would go onto write about Jefferson Davis and Nathan Bedford 
Forest. His accounts stressed national reconciliation and portrayed disenfranchisement as simply 
a natural conclusion without much bitterness directed at anyone who had opposed it. This is 
perhaps why he did not criticize Mahone as, from his perspective, the issue of black suffrage had 
been sensibly settled by the 1902 constitution and his work did not make much effort to place 
this act in the context of the previous decades.142  
The 1902 state constitution ensured white supremacy in Virginia for the foreseeable 
future and this, combined with the ideology of the Lost Cause, made sure that most white 
southerners viewed the triumph of southern whites over the alleged evils of black Republican 
Reconstruction as a timeless truth by the turn of the twentieth century. Scholar David Goldfield 
                                                          
Convention of 1901. He unequivocally described their intent to discriminate against the black voter of the 
state when he said “that is precisely what we propose; that, exactly, is what the constitution was elected 
for to discriminate to the very extremity of permissible action under the limitations of the federal 
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142 Hamilton Eckenrode, The Political History of Virginia During The Reconstruction (1904; repr., New 
York: Books for Libraries Press, 1971), 127-128. 
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argues that this amounted to the creation of an entirely new history for white southerners that 
justified their place on top of the social hierarchy and honored the history and traditions of the 
Old South. In this context any mention, let alone analysis, of William Mahone and the 
Readjusters was a direct challenge to the white supremacy of the Jim Crow South from which 
white people benefitted from and thus, however famous Mahone the Confederate had been, his 
legacy had to be molded by Lost Cause adherents to fit their collective memory of 
Reconstruction. Black people in Virginia harbored their own memories of Reconstruction during 
this period that emphasized emancipation over any political movements. This clash between a 
mythologized white supremacist history for white southerners and memory in the black 
community created two distinct memories that, according to Goldfield, “floated past each other 
unknowing.” These two collective memories assured that Virginia Democrats would control any 
discussion of the legacy of William Mahone and the Readjuster Party.143 
The Readjuster movement was so controversial that many white historians initially 
ignored it altogether. While racism undergirded these decisions, the Readjusters also contrasted 
the story these scholars wanted to tell: the ultimate “triumph” of white Redeemers in the South 
over the Republican North. In James Ford Rhodes’ eight-volume History of the United States, 
the Readjuster years are skipped over entirely. Rhodes wrote in the preface to the eighth and 
final volume that, initially, “the year 1877 when occurred the final restoration of home rule in the 
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South, was a more fitting termination” [for his study]. Rhodes continued his history to 1896, but 
he made no mention of the Readjuster Party in Virginia. Throughout his work he advocated the 
white supremacist view that African Americans were too incompetent to participate effectively 
in politics and stated that “From the Republican Party no real good came to negroes. Most of 
them developed no political capacity, and the few who raised themselves above the mass did not 
reach a high order of intelligence.” Rhodes delineated a historical memory of Reconstruction that 
ended full stop with the removal of federal soldiers from the South in 1877 to focus on the racist 
narrative that white southerners faced a threat of “negro domination” during this period. Any 
discussion of the Readjuster movement in his work would have challenged his narrative of the 
restoration of Democratic political power in the hands of white men after 1877.144 
Mahone’s controversial legacy resulted in the first biography of the general not being 
published until 1935. The author, Nelson Blake, touted Mahone’s record as a proud Confederate 
and remained entirely mute on the participation of African Americans in his political career. 
Blake incorrectly asserted that Mahone enjoyed wide support among white Virginians and the 
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his “only mistake…was placing too many Mahone men throughout the state.” This biography 
prefaced the trend seen in a later textbook from 1957 by emphasizing Mahone’s character 
without touching on racial issues both in Mahone’s political and military career. In his 
description of the Battle of the Crater Blake stated that “half-drunken negroes, clamoring ‘no 
quarter’ were met by the Virginia troops, many of them Petersburg boys, who were fighting for 
all they cherished as most dear and sacred…at this juncture, however, a white handkerchief was 
raised in the pit and, at the Confederate response, a large number of willing prisoners came 
crowding over the crest of the Crater. Mahone was master of the Scene!” Blake’s aim was to 
glorify Mahone and fit him comfortably into the Lost Cause dominated society of the day. There 
was no mention of the execution of black POWS at the Crater which aligned with 
commemorations at the battlefield itself which included no presence or mention of African 
Americans. Blake’s only reference to the racial issues that undergirded the Readjuster movement 
came in a litany of Mahone’s own comments reprinted, seemingly without irony and without 
judgement. Perhaps Blake believed the supposed naivety of Mahone’s attitudes towards African 
Americans continued to speak for itself to any white reader, who would be a firm believer in the 
racist views about African Americans that were promoted by the Lost Cause in the 1930s.145 
Textbooks Exclude William Mahone 
Scholarly arguments that ignored the Readjuster Party and promoted a white supremacist 
view of Reconstruction found their way to the general public through school textbooks. Authored 
collaboratively by scholars and government officials, late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
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textbooks distilled the postwar years into a tale of a triumphant white South rising from the ashes 
of black Republican tyranny. As scholar Elaine Parsons argues, these textbooks were a product 
of their time and demonstrated their authors’ desire to create a useable history that affirmed the 
white supremacy of Jim Crow. In this way, the innumerable complexities of Reconstruction were 
simplified through repetitive stories in school textbooks, and the white on black violence and 
oppression of the period “became comfortably familiar as inevitable things we had suffered and 
overcome to become ourselves.”146 Many of these textbooks were written by Virginians, and 
while they rarely directly mentioned the Readjuster Party, the Readjuster movement was 
essentially the only period of “Radical Reconstruction” in Virginia, and thus these Virginia 
scholars’ critiques of Reconstruction were almost certainly based off their lived experiences 
during the 1880s. All these textbooks share three main themes: The alleged conspiracy between 
Radical Republicans and black people to control the southern whites via black voters, the 
necessity and nobility of the Klu Klux Klan, and the untarnished valor of Confederate war heroes 
and triumph of white Redeemers. These textbooks were unashamedly partisan in their adoration 
of the South, but the publication of some of them in the major publishing house of New York 
suggests that their portrayal of Reconstruction was widely accepted by white people both North 
and South throughout the early twentieth century. 
With Mahone defeated in 1889, prominent textbook authors updated their work to 
represent an allegedly harmonious period of Democratic control during the previous decade. 
Mary Tucker Magill’s textbook for Virginia’s elementary school students was taught in Virginia 
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for over forty years. Updated in 1890, it brazenly stated how the “the period from 1870 to 1890 
has been barren of interesting events.” Magill was a Conservative and would not let the discord 
of the Readjuster years stand in the way of her praise for the forward progress of Virginia’s 
economy and public-school system, and the fact that Virginia had the Readjuster Party to thank 
for both developments is not mentioned in her textbook. Instead she subtly critiqued the Party for 
its agitation over the state’s debt: “we can only hope that the record of the old state in the past 
will not be blotted by any unworthy action in the present crisis,” Magill wrote, likely referring to 
the populist resurgence in the 1890s. If the issues of the Readjuster years surfaced at all in these 
early textbooks they did so as the bookend to a period of progress in Virginia as another Virginia 
professor remarked in his textbook for school children, “happily in 1892 an agreement was 
reached between the legislature and the bondholders by which the debt was adjusted, and the 
matter is not likely again to disturb the politics of the state.” The bitter infighting over the Debt 
and the Readjuster movement it created was of course a challenging issue for school children to 
grasp, but the fact that both of these works essentially summarized over two decades with these 
brief comments demonstrated each author’s desire to defend the status quo of white Democrats 
in power.147 
Every southern textbook of this period asserted that the Republicans’ support of black 
suffrage was futile at best and a criminal imposition on the white South at worst. Black people 
have no agency in any of these accounts; rather, they existed as only pawns who had been 
controlled by opportunistic white men, and the Republican Party at large, to punish the South. 
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These textbooks operated as a direct critique of the Readjusters’ policies in Virginia, if an 
unstated one. According to these textbooks, black people lacked the intelligence to vote and any 
attempt to elevate them to an equal status with white people was inherently unwise. One 
textbook published in 1907 was typical of many when it stated that Republicans “resolved to 
take from the educated, intelligent white men, trained for two hundred years in the science of 
government, all political rights and power and give the South over to the control of a vast and 
irresponsible horde of negroes, all of them ignorant and inexperienced and many of them 
vicious…the negro exhibits none of the results that forty years of freedom and industrial 
opportunity…are popularly supposed to have produced.” Most of these accounts give no time 
frame or context to these claims, they simply portrayed the Reconstruction years as “dark days 
for the South” that upset the racial harmony the southern states had supposedly enjoyed before 
and shortly after the war. The nature of Republicans and black people are stated as established 
fact, unopen to challenge.148 
The majority of these early twentieth century textbooks were written by former 
Confederates and their descendants who had a direct attachment to the values of the antebellum 
South that the Readjusters had disrupted. A major fear held by many of this elite across the South 
during Reconstruction was of opportunistic southern white men who worked with Republicans 
and black people to upset southern whites’ control over society and these opportunists were 
commonly referred to as scallywags. In Virginia, William Mahone was the quintessential 
example of a “scallywag” southerner and when textbooks published for Virginia schools railed 
against said scallywags there can be little doubt that he was on said author’s minds. Susan 
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Pendleton Lee, the daughter of Robert E. Lee’s chief of artillery William Pendleton, published a 
school textbook in 1899 that blamed scallywags for the feared “negro rule” in Virginia. 
Pendleton wrote that “they gained ascendancy over the ignorant, inexperienced, credulous 
negroes by flattery and cajolement, and got themselves elected to all the best offices, while the 
Radical Congress backed them up.” That black men only obtained marginal representation in 
state government under the Readjusters was not a point authors like Susan Pendleton were 
interested in considering; their participation at all was viewed as a direct challenge to white 
supremacy, and textbooks were the ideal medium for a redefined narrative that would take hold 
among future students. As another textbook published by an actual veteran of General Lee’s 
army put it, present histories “lose their value by an attempt to be neutral.” These new accounts 
were southern histories written for white people to legitimize the teachings of Jubal Early’s Lost 
Cause for future generations.149 
The success of the Democratic backlash against Mahone, and Republicanism in Virginia 
in general, was also reflected in the textbooks published by the generation of white Virginians 
who came of age during the tumultuous politics of the 1870s and 1880s.  Henry Alexander White 
is one such example. Born in 1861 in Virginia he graduated from Washington and Lee College 
and wrote biographies of Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson. In his 1904 School History of the 
United States White declared his intention to write a “southern history” and titled the period of 
1868-1877: “negro rule in the South.” He described this period as a time when “deprivation and 
lawlessness reigned supreme.” White’s account demonstrated that the traditional Conservatives 
that Mahone had fought against as a Readjuster had complete control of the narrative of those 
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years at the turn of the century. They had educated White, among many others, in the tenants of 
the Lost Cause and these men would in turn write the history that would educate the next 
generation of young Virginians. White’s account venerated Lee and Jackson for several chapters 
in a style that would have pleased Jubal Early and he framed Reconstruction as the attempt by 
black men to control the state. That these textbooks were published for school children ensured 
that the Lost Cause was inculcated in the collective consciousness of white Virginians.150 
The influential nature of these textbooks can be further seen in the repetition of their 
arguments in textbooks by northern authors. In these textbooks, there was no trace of the 
Republican criticisms of the Democratic violence against black people seen during the 
Readjuster years. A professor from Pennsylvania stated in his 1907 textbook that the Klan had 
occasionally murdered black people, but that this had been justified to “save the civilization of 
the South.” As Elaine Parsons demonstrates, the Klu-Klux Klan were sensationalized in school 
textbooks to stand in for the entirety of white on black violence and election fraud in the 
Reconstruction years, thereby framing the violence of that period behind an allegedly mysterious 
and inexplicable organization, rather than confronting the reality that white supremacist violence 
was commonplace.151 The northern trend to repeat Lost Cause views about Reconstruction in its 
textbooks carried on into the mid twentieth century when, in 1953, a professor from Columbia 
University stated that “negroes who had now the least understanding of politics and more than 
three-fourths of whom could not read or write, formed a majority of the voters.” With northern 
textbooks repeating the tenets of the Lost Cause with respect to Reconstruction there was 
essentially no counter view in print in textbooks for school children in the United States. These 
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textbooks reinforced the narrative of Lost Cause adherents with no room for analysis of people 
like William Mahone who did not neatly fit into this mold.152 
William Mahone the politician was not mentioned in any popular Virginia textbooks until 
1957 because the Readjuster Party clashed with the accepted timeline of Reconstruction that 
ended in 1877. It took until 1957, when some revisionist historians had begun to publish new 
perspectives on Reconstruction, for Mahone’s political activity to appear in a Virginia textbook. 
This particular work discussed the Readjusters in familiar white supremacist terms but reflected 
more positively on Mahone’s personality. William Mahone was “willing to fight for what he 
considered right, even though he disturbed the peace in Virginia…Virginians disliked seeing 
untrained negroes put in office,” the book stated. In this passage, Mahone’s leadership and 
boldness can still be praised while lamenting the “regrettable” act of black suffrage that he 
encouraged. This textbook even mentioned the “Danville Riot,” which had not appeared in any 
school textbook up to this point, but it discussed it in purely white supremacist terms and blamed 
the “wild talk” of the Readjuster Party for inciting the riot, in which “several lives were lost.” 
The textbook used the riot as justification for its next statement that “ever afterward the 
governors of Virginia have been Democrats.” It is a testament to the power of textbooks to 
ingrain false narratives about the past that this school textbook in 1957 echoed the Democratic 
Party’s racist propaganda from the aftermath of the Danville Massacre in 1883. On the eve of the 
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Civil Rights movement, Reconstruction history was still shrouded in Dunning School narratives 
among white Virginians.153 
Conclusion: A Monument For Mahone 
The year of 1913 marked a shift in some white Virginians’ views on William Mahone 
that coincided with a high point for Civil War commemorations among veterans and the 
American public at large. The largest reunion took place at the Gettysburg battlefield and, 
despite continued disagreement over various aspects of the war’s legacy, the American public, 
especially southern whites, bought into a narrative of the war that emphasized the valor of 
soldiers on both sides. In the context of this national reunion, the image of William Mahone as 
the Confederate war hero was rehabilitated in Virginia. After roughly a decade of silence, there 
was a flurry of publications in the local papers over the extensive support the United Daughters 
of the Confederacy received to construct a monument to Mahone somewhere in Petersburg or on 
the Crater battlefield. Already in 1911 there had been a widely publicized event of Union 
veterans visiting Mahone’s tombstone unannounced and placing wreaths upon it. Local papers 
called this “a beautiful tribute to the patriotism and bravery of Southern soldiers.”154 By 1915, 
the fever pitch of commemorative ceremonies across the country included regular gatherings at 
the Crater and for this event the memory of General Mahone took center stage.155 
The Battle of the Crater was the crucial event that white southerners used to celebrate 
Mahone in a manner agreeable to the Lost Cause while avoiding all discussion of his cooperation 
with black people in the 1880s. In the eyes of white Virginians, the valor of the Confederacy was 
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something to be remembered and cherished. A statue to Mahone at the Crater would solidify his 
memory as a heroic Confederate general and ensure the complexities of his political career 
would remain undiscussed. Commemorations at the Crater itself already took place frequently 
with VMI cadets reenacting the battle to hundreds of onlookers. These commemorations 
occurred without any African Americans, despite their prominence in the battle to reinforce the 
Crater’s legacy as the Confederacy’s last great triumph. Mahone himself had regularly promoted 
his role at the Crater throughout his life and would make an easy figurehead for white memory of 
the battle. His actions to safeguard his war record, especially the Crater, were ultimately part of 
the construction of his memory that remained palatable to the Lost Cause yet isolated enough to 
silence his organization of the Readjusters.156 
As the 1915 summer commemorations of the Battle of the Crater approached, Mahone 
the politician needed to be reconciled with the Lost Cause. To accomplish this the legacy of 
Mahone, the proud Confederate hero, who had been relatively forgotten in the years since his 
death, was once more touted in the press. There was “no difference of opinion as to the brilliance 
of Mahone’s soldierly record,” claimed the Times, and it followed this piece up with many 
dramatic descriptions of Mahone’s brigade at the Crater when it wrote, “outnumbered five to one 
by the federals…his men made that memorable charge.” Some companies even saw an apparent 
commercial value in a rehabilitation of Mahone’s legacy. One company called Blue Ridge Water 
posted an endorsement for its spring water allegedly given by the late general himself: “For 
twenty years I have constantly used it,” Mahone supposedly said. That this company saw nothing 
unusual about printing an endorsement from a man who had been dead for twenty years 
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suggested the perceived power the symbol of Mahone still had in Virginia, and with renewed 
support for a Mahone monument, the time was apparently right for advertisement. Later that 
year, after the summer commemoration at the Crater had come and gone, the Times included 
Mahone in several of their “fifty years ago today” segments, lauding his Confederate record.157  
Even papers that had always been ardently anti Mahone demonstrated how his memory 
could be molded to fit into the Lost Cause narrative of the twentieth century. The Alexandria 
Gazette, which was perhaps the single most vitriolic paper in its prior coverage of Mahone, now 
openly supported a Mahone statue, calling his political career “a minor incident in the career of a 
great man…while the Gazette never approved of his political course it is hoped a plan to erect a 
shaft to his memory on the battlefield of the Crater will crystallize.” The Gazette had never 
retreated on its stance on Mahone’s political career, and just a few years previously, it had 
demanded a Democratic candidate for Governor “firmly deny” accusations that he had been a 
friend of the long deceased General Mahone. Even more recently, the paper had firmly reminded 
its readers that “The Readjuster coalition was responsible for hordes of renegade Virginians, and 
Negroes. This was a sad fact of her mistake... (in those years).” Yet now with the Crater 
commemorations honoring the white South, with no mention of black soldiers, the Gazette 
welcomed a monument to Mahone that recognized his service as a soldier and not as a politician. 
This would thereby accomplish the desire of many of his former opponents to remove any 
discussion of the Readjusters from public life.158 
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Faced with legalized disenfranchisement the African American press in Virginia 
remained relatively silent on the Readjusters and General Mahone since his death. But from 1910 
to 1930 there were sporadic references to the late general that argued for commemorations of 
Mahone from both a practical and emotional perspective. In a piece titled “A Different Type of 
monument for General Mahone” the author argued that the lesson of the Readjusters was what 
black people could achieve in the realm of public education if they were united. The article 
described how “Mahone wrought wonders by ulterior (political) motives in Virginia,” and that, 
any money raised for a monument to general Mahone would be better spent on libraries, 
hospitals and schools for the black community, as these projects would represent the very best of 
the results from the Readjuster movement of the distant past. If a link to Mahone was needed, 
“simple busts” of the General could be placed around in “conspicuous places” in said libraries. A 
different perspective appeared in, a poignant piece in the same paper during July that advocated 
funding a bronze statue of Mahone to safeguard the memory of black people in Virginia’s past. 
William A. Hewitt referred to Mahone as “our lamented Moses in Virginia” and he 
recommended building a large statue to him as “a sign of Negro thankfulness and love and to 
remind the world that Negroes lived in Virginia once.” These pieces demonstrated that Mahone’s 
legacy was used as a contemporary lesson for black Virginians who could not engage in the 
political activism that they believed many of their race had in the Readjuster years. While black 
Readjusters had faced their own discrimination and never occupied a prominent place in party 
leadership, the Readjusters represented a time when whites had included black men in politics 
and maybe they would do so again. As one paper put it, black people should be patient until 
white people “invite the negro in through the front door…and learn obedience through 
suffering.” Taken together these accounts viewed Mahone and the Readjusters as an idea of what 
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might have been instead of the current reality of Jim Crow. The memory of Mahone himself was 
of little importance to black people, but his politics carried powerful symbolism of a time when 
black people had voted in Virginia.159 
In the aftermath of the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s The Norfolk New Journal 
and Guide returned to the subject of Mahone and the Readjusters in 1982 and offered a more 
skeptical view from the perspective of black rights in the modern era. The column argued that 
the Readjusters were just another instance of black people being used by white leadership and 
given no material benefit. The author wrote that “Black voters were manipulated to serve one 
white faction or another, without receiving any benefit themselves…Mahone fits into a historical 
pattern of white politicians using black voters for their own political needs.” While there is 
undeniable truth to this statement, the article offered little analysis of the movement itself and 
instead used the Readjusters to emphasize that at no point during Reconstruction were African 
Americans truly seen as equals by white people. With the accomplishments of the Civil Rights 
movement, it made sense that a black newspaper would view the Readjuster Party’s history as 
inconsequential in the long struggle for Civil Rights.160 
No monument to Mahone was completed until 1927, when a stone obelisk was 
constructed at the Crater. While Mahone was never remotely as significant a Confederate figure 
as Lee or Jackson, the delay in any marker to him was likely caused by the lingering harsh 
                                                          
159 “A Different Type of monument for General Mahone,” Norfolk New Journal and Guide, July 1927; 
ibid., “A monument to General Mahone,”; ibid., “The Hero of Jerusalem,”; “Let the Negros Remain 
Excluded” Baltimore (MD) Afro American, Aug 1914. 
160 Norfolk New Journal and Guide, Feb 1982; See also Bess Beatty, A Revolution Gone Backward: The 
Black Response to National Politics, 1876-1896. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987) This work gives 
another perspective on the Readjusters that echoes concern over viewing the movement’s black 
supporters as a solid “crowd” but ultimately presents a more positive perspective on how African 
Americans viewed Mahone and the movement.  
151 
 
feelings towards his postwar career among Petersburg residents. In 1956, a Petersburg resident 
recounted that “resentment in Petersburg over Mahone’s postwar politics was strong enough in 
1927 to cause his monument to be erected at the Crater battlefield rather than nearer the city as 
originally planned.” This sentiment also thwarted a move to name the present Crater Road in his 
honor. In 1914 and 1917, markers to the path marched by Mahone’s brigade in its counter attack 
at the Crater had been funded and erected by the UDC, and the fact that General Mahone, so 
famous among white southerners after the battle, took so long to receive a monument is a 
testament to the power that the memory of William Mahone and the Readjuster Party still had to 
make white southerners in Petersburg uneasy. Despite Lost Cause commemorations at the 
battlefield, and numerous newspaper publications that focused on Mahone’s war record, he was 
still viewed as a symbol of political and racial treachery by at least some whites in Petersburg in 
1927 and this resentment was remembered even in 1956. This willful suppression of Mahone’s 
memory speaks to how disruptive the Readjuster Party was to the racial norms in Virginia during 
the 1880s and it demonstrated how the ideology of the Lost Cause had never found an acceptable 
way to incorporate William Mahone into its stories of the Confederate past.161 
 In conclusion, the memory of William Mahone remained symbolically important in both 
the white and black communities. In the African American community, Mahone and the 
Readjuster Party had offered black people in Virginia the most promising avenue for 
advancement in politics in the years following Reconstruction. The Readjusters did run some 
black candidates, and the funding they secured for the state after lowering the debt made 
meaningful impacts for the black community in the form of hospitals, jobs, and schools. 
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Additionally, party leadership never backed off their acceptance of black suffrage in Virginia. 
William Mahone himself, while against supporting African American candidates like Langston, 
showed a willingness to break from his white supporters in order to compromise with the black 
community where the issue of patronage was concerned. However, black people’s generally 
positive view of Mahone declined sharply after his political failure and even more sharply after 
his death. As African Americans faced complete disenfranchisement in the Jim Crow South the 
focus on Mahone largely disappeared from their accounts. 
 For white Virginians and ex-Confederates across the South, the memory of William 
Mahone’s service at the Crater was in constant conflict with his political activities that followed. 
Attacking his wartime reputation, Southern Democrats and Lost Cause adherents had to contend 
with the strong support Mahone retained from the men who fought under him at the Crater. But 
as Mahone passed from the scene, there could be no doubt that the Lost Cause memory was 
successful in separating Mahone’s battlefield achievements from the controversial legacy of his 
alliance with African Americans. Mahone’s military legacy was enshrined at the Crater 
battlefield itself, and not anywhere in his longtime home of Petersburg. Through this deliberate 
placement of the Mahone monument outside Petersburg, the Daughters of the Confederacy, and 
supporters of white supremacy across Virginia, molded the controversial firebrand Mahone into 
a defender of Robert E. Lee and the entire South who had prevented disaster at the Crater. This 
was the only way that Mahone was permitted to exist in white southern memory.  
 While the controversial aspects of Mahone’s career were, on the surface, forgotten and 
silenced, Lost Cause advocates’ perpetual need to interpret his actions at the Crater 
commemorations and African Americans’ efforts in the early twentieth century to assign some 
meaning to his movement demonstrated that the legacy of Mahone and the Readjusters still 
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mattered after his death. The old political battle lines of Readjuster-era racial propaganda were 
drawn again in the agrarian Populist Movement of the late 1890s, which “easily intensified the 
fears of white voters [over a return] to black Mahoneism.” While the Democrats defeated this 
movement with the same tactics they had used to undermine Mahone’s Readjusters a decade 
earlier, they did not stop Mahone’s past supporters from voting for the populists en masse in the 
1890s. With Mahone shortly to pass from the scene, and the changes in racial equality the 
Readjusters had brought to the Virginia landscape shortly to disappear under the tide of white 
supremacy, the Readjusters’ impact was not forgotten by Virginians. Rather, it continued to be 
an outlier that uncomfortably fit into the history of both races, black and white, as one grappled 
with their disenfranchisement and the other desperately tried to defend their racial supremacy in 
the New South.162 
Our modern debate regarding Confederate monuments across the South reminds us that 
the power of collective memory and monuments resonates with us today. In October 2017, a 
letter to the editor in the Roanoke Times advocated for the construction of a monument to 
General Mahone on Monument Avenue to correct the mistake of statue builders a century ago 
who “tried to erase Mahone from history” because of his political career. The editorial recounts 
Mahone’s career before advocating a statue of the general to “put our history into full context.” 
Virginia does not need any more Confederate monuments, but the fact that William Mahone’s 
memory has resurfaced, even though it was never commemorated in bronze like so many other 
Confederates, is an instructive lesson in how memory and commemoration are interrelated in our 
history. The postwar years defy any singular interpretation or analysis, and as we continue to 
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discuss how best to remember the legacy of the Civil War and Reconstruction today, it is 
important to remember that the legacy of that time period was shaped by subsequent generations 
as much if not more than by those who lived through it.163 
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